

Social Process in Hawaii: A Reader
Third Revised Edition

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Preface

This volume, now in its third revised edition, was motivated by the need to provide an integrated set of readings for use in my large lecture section in the introduction to sociology. I had used selections from *Social Process in Hawai'i*, but all had gone out of print. The opportunity to expand the project somewhat was irresistible. The opportunity to bring in new materials in this third edition was also irresistible.

Social Process in Hawai'i came into existence in 1935, a journal "devoted primarily to the social situation in Hawaii, " and was the product of the Sociology Club and its faculty advisor, Andrew Lind. Students edited, organized, and wrote many of the first articles. The first issue was mimeographed. But faculty and distinguished visitors, including Ellsworth Faris and Herbert Blumer made early contributions.

Early sociology at the University of Hawai'i had a distinctly Chicago flavor. Romanzo Adams, trained at Michigan and Chicago, came as Professor of Sociology and Economics in 1920. While he urged a broad social science program, Hawai'i, like other universities in America, departmentalized itself--with consequences that were contestably progressive. Lind joined the faculty in 1927, urged by Robert

E. Park who had visited Hawai'i at Adams' invitation. Lind's dissertation at Chicago, "An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawai'i" (1938), shows the influence of Park and the Chicago School. As Hans Joas has noted, the Chicago School "could be described as a combination of pragmatist philosophy, of a politically reformist orientation to the problems of democracy under conditions of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and of efforts to make sociology into an empirical science while attaching great importance to pre-scientific sources of experiential knowledge..."

In this volume, some of this flavor has been preserved. But there is, as well, attention to Adams's earlier interdisciplinary approach. Thus, many of the essays show a distinct concern for history and political economy. The effort, overall, is to help the reader to see connections, to identify causes and consequences, and to project possibilities and test them against assumptions and evidence.

Acknowledgements

The editor wishes to thank Professor Kiyoshi Ikeda, Executive Editor of *Social Process in Hawai'i* for his permission to use materials from past issues of this wonderful journal and for his cooperation in helping me put it together. Plainly, the contributors are deserving of my many thanks. Professor Haunani-Kay Trask was initially reluctant to reprint her essay since she felt that it was now out-of-date. Readers are urged to secure her more recent publications. Similar considerations are true of several of the other essays. Still, these documents do provide a historical record and allow us to see changes graphically, both in what was happening and how this was perceived. I hope, as well, that further work is encouraged.

Introduction

Hawai'i frequently is said to be a great "laboratory" for social study. What many people mainly have in mind is its multi-ethnic character, and, to be sure, this is not unimportant. But even its importance derives from what is more important: the stunning opportunity to develop an understanding of social change and social process in Hawai'i.

Why is Hawai'i such a wonderful laboratory for the study of social process? We should begin with the obvious: First, Hawai'i is a chain of eight major islands, situated approximately in the center of the Pacific Ocean. It is both isolated and incapable of sustaining many millions in many different sovereign states. Even today, it is five and half hours by air to California, ten hours to Tokyo, about the same to Manila and Sidney. The population is today 1,211,537. In 1890, it was but 89,990 and in 1950, 499,794. Its geography and size make it an entity which we can study without many of the complications of larger entities which have been embroiled in world history for several millions of years. Second, it became affected by external intrusions relatively late, but at the same time, these intrusions had enormous consequences. If the first remarkable fact about the place is its discovery and colonization by Polynesians some 2000 years ago, the second is its very recent incorporation into world history, when Captain James Cook quite literally bumped into the Islands. The third, of primary interest here, is the speed and quantity of change that has occurred since.

Bringing taro, sweet potato, coconut, chickens and pigs, the first peoples of these Islands established themselves, and they flourished, becoming what not unreasonably can be called one of the first "affluent societies." For reasons not clear to us, the *kanaka maoli*, as the Hawaiians called themselves, ceased their north-south ocean voyages about 1200 A.D., and remained in total isolation from the remainder of the peoples of the planet until Cook arrived. During this period the *kanaka maoli* developed a powerful and unique culture. It would be easy here to put aside the problems--and injustices--of pre-contact Hawai'i and to be nostalgic. We need, however, to get some sense of the beliefs and mode of life of these remarkable people. This is absolutely critical since these provide the point of departure for all that follows. Indeed, we shall not understand much of anything about Hawai'i in the absence of such understanding.¹

The first four chapters in this volume, by Haunani-Kay Trask, Kekuni Blaisdell, Marion Kelly and Noenoe Silva provide a beginning,

but we must emphasize, only a beginning. It is tragically true that as regards the history of Hawai'i, much needs yet to be done. Until very recently, the history of Hawai'i was written from a distinctly "*haole*" (foreign, white European) frame of reference. It was not merely that such accounts were "progressivist," but even more obviously, they failed to acknowledge that outcomes were not foregone conclusions, that resistance and struggle were key features of this change, and that in all this extraordinary social change, ordinary Hawaiians paid a very heavy price. In the course of this introduction, we will have several examples of this.

Trask provides a wonderful overview, locating Hawaiian history into the wider context of imperialism. She concludes with a sketch of the new consciousness of Hawaiians reflected both in the remarkable renaissance of Hawaiian culture and in the effort to articulate and achieve a just Hawaiian sovereignty. Indeed, there is probably no better account currently available which explains the genesis of the sovereignty movement. We return to this.

Both Trask and Blaisdell identify what was surely the most critical process set in motion by *haole* presence: a devastating depopulation. This was the consequence of infections brought by the new comers, infections to which the *kanaka maoli* utterly lacked immunity. If David Stannard's estimates of the pre-contact population of 800,000 or more are correct, as many as 400,000 died from 1778 to 1831 (Blaisdell). By the time of the overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani in 1893, the *kanaka maoli* numbered but 40,000. But we should note also that it was not until the latter part of the century that the indigenous people were outnumbered. In 1893 there were perhaps 20,000 Caucasian immigrants and another 30,000 Asian immigrants.

It is quite impossible to overstate the importance of this holocaust as regards the entire nineteenth century development. For example, it is too often supposed that the native culture simply collapsed under the weight of a "superior" Christian civilization. This prejudice has been reinforced by the fact that Queen Ka'ahumanu ordered the abandonment of the '*Aikapu* (literally "sacred eating," but more generally the prescriptions which were essential to Hawaiian religion). But a moment's thought suggests that it would be remarkable if Hawaiians, including the Queen, were not profoundly struck by this thoroughly unintelligible devastation, and if they did not, in consequence, struggle to accommodate the horrible facts into their cosmological scheme, a scheme thoroughly tested by hundreds of years of experience. It is of some importance to note also that the first missionaries arrived just five months *after* the breaking of the '*Aikapu* (in 1819) and that Ka'ahumanu did not accept Christianity until 1825.

We do not here attempt to settle the many still contestable historical problems in understanding this key event, and readers are well advised to read carefully the somewhat competing accounts of Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa (1992) and of Patrick V. Kirch and Marshall Sahlins (1992). As Kame'eleihiwa writes in summary:

In traditional Hawaiian society, the universe was *pono* [in a state of perfect harmony] when the *Mo'i* [what Westerners would call king or high chief] was *pono*. Conversely, when disaster struck, it was because the *Mo'i* was no longer *pono*; he or she had neglected the *kahuna* [priests and priestesses] or offended the *Akua* [Gods or Goddesses] and had to be replaced...

If the old *Akua* did not *ho'omalu* [protect] and preserve the *Lahui* [the Hawaiian people], even when the *Mo'i* was as faultless in his *pono* as had been Kamehameha, why should the *Lahui* continue to *malama* [care for, preserve and serve] the *Akua*?... If Kamehameha's *pono* did not save lives what would? (p. 81).

But Kirch and Sahlins (1992) offer that there were political consequences, and perhaps motivations, for Ka'ahumanu's decision to adopt Christianity. With the death of Kamehameha, a power struggle had ensued with the Ka'ahumana *ma* ["crowd"] challenged by a number of the other high chiefs including prominently, Governor Boki. Ka'ahumanu had assumed the office of *Kuhina Nui*, ("Queen Regent"), co-ruler with the youthful Liloliho. Whether intended or not, Christianity could not only replace the old *kapu*, but could become a legitimation for a changing order under the direction of Ka'ahumanu. This legitimation could be disseminated through the many schools which she had opened. Boki, cousin of Ka'ahumanu, had travelled to Britain, and saw that the Calvinists in Hawai'i did not represent European culture. He profoundly resented the new set of Calvinist *kapu* being enforced by Hawaiians on Hawaiians and while he was strongly conservative in his commitment to Hawaiian values and institutions, he also eagerly promoted the new commerce and new luxuries being introduced by the merchants who, understandably, supported his politics.² Indeed, it is very often a mistake to speak of "the Hawaiians" or "the *haole*" as if there were not critical differences among them. Of "the Hawaiians," this was true not only among *ali'i* [chiefs], but between *ali'i* and *maka'ainana* [common people]-as we shall see.

But we need not jump to the conclusion that the Queen's adoption of Christianity was a cynical ploy on her part, or that either she or the *maka'ainana* rejected their culture or the old belief system. It

seems that not only were many indigenous practices incorporated into the new religion, but perhaps two thirds of the common people adhered to their former gods (Kirch and Sahlins, p. 73). Indeed, even today, in the absence of the old land system, a system which depended profoundly on the distinct culture of the Hawaiians, deep elements of Hawaiian culture are still very much alive. (See Trask.) Having now an appreciation of the consequences of Ka'ahumanu's actions, we might well find them unwise, but we can, in any case, understand them as an effort to restore *pono*.

...

The central concern of Kame'eleihiwa's book is what Western treatments call "the Great *Mahele*." But because it was such a great disaster for the Hawaiians, she rightly prefers to refer to it as "the 1848 *Mahele*." Broadly, the *Mahele* involved the transformation of the traditional system of land use into a system of alienable private property, a giant step from the pre-capitalist subsistence economy of the Hawaiians (sketched by Blaisdell) to capitalism. We have some details of the *mahele* in Trask's essay and they need not be repeated here. Here we can emphasize two things.

First, the conventional interpretations need to be decisively rejected. Here again, Kame'eleihiwa along with even more recent studies provides a rich source. Second, throughout the world, pre-capitalist societies have been transformed to capitalist societies. Sometimes, as in Western Europe, this transition was so gradual as to be nearly imperceptible. In the Hawaiian case, it was both rapid and recent. We can see how it occurred and its consequences in remarkable detail. Again, only a sketch can be provided.

Why did the *ali'i* accept what was a profoundly revolutionary change? Some western writers have argued that it was motivated by greed on their part; others have implied that the Chiefs simply did not understand what was involved, and still others have suggested that they were already dominated by *haole*, and quite literally had no choice. (Thus, this may explain the often uncritical use of the idea that they were "forced.") As should be expected, things were not so simple.

Kame'eleihiwa notes, first, that while westerners have defined *mahele* to mean "to divide," it also connotes "to share." She argues that it was never the aim of the *ali'i* to deny Hawaiians unrestricted access to the land and that their decision was motivated by a number of converging factors. We have noted that after 1825, the ruling chiefs had incorporated the Christian God into their belief system. A further consequence of this was acceptance of the idea by many *ali'i* that key *haole*--Gerritt P. Judd is an outstanding example--should rightly be considered *Kahuna*. Notice that was possible only insofar as the Hawaiian cosmological scheme was

still compelling. If Judd was a *Kahuna*, his advice had to be taken seriously.

Two arguments seem to have been made by the *haole*. There was, first, the argument that unless the land was secured by sanctions of the western legal system, it would be vulnerable to appropriation by "foreigners." The threat was indeed real. French and British imperialism proceeded apace, in the Marquesas, Tahiti and New Zealand. Indeed, in 1843, Lord George Paulet of Her Majesty's Ship Carysfort turned his guns on Honolulu. With the advice of Judd, Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha III) ceded the kingdom to the British. (A residue of this is the Union Jack in the Hawai'i state flag!) Admiral Thomas very shortly restored the sovereignty of the Hawaiian nation. But one can only speculate what the nineteenth century would have looked like had Hawai'i remained a British colony. (As Kame'eleihiwa points out, the restoration was the occasion for Kauikeaouli's famous proclamation: "*Ua mau ke ea o ka 'aina i ka pono* (the life of the 'aina is perpetuated by *pono*)."

Second, the Calvinist *Kahuna* argued that "once they held their taro patches and house lots in fee,...the *maka'ainana* would have the incentive to become industrious, hard working, and Christian, because they alone would receive the benefit of their labor" (p. 202). This argument was as old as John Locke who, writing in 1690, had insisted that "God gave the earth to the industrious and rational." It had been used by the Pilgrims in justification of their appropriation of the lands used by Native Americans in maintaining their way of life. Thus with reference to the indigenous people of New England, John Winthrop, founder of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, had proclaimed:

This savage people ruleth over many lands without title or property... Any why may not Christians have liberty to go and and dwell amongst them in their wasteland and woods (leaving them such places as they have manured for their corn) as lawfully as Abraham did among the Sodomites (Segal, 1977)?

Like Hawaiians, Native Americans lacked both the idea of private property and "the piece of paper" which alone, for Europeans, could give title. One might say, putting the best possible interpretation on the motivations of Judd and the other leading *haole*, that it was their hope that the *Mahele* would convert the *kanaka maoli* into yeoman farmers cast firmly in the mold of Thomas Jefferson! Such an assumption implies both a stunning Euro-centrism and ignorance of social process. But it was not just that *Mahele* established private property in land, but, with the *Kuleana* act, the chiefs allowed that it could be bought by foreigners.

Kame'eleihiwa writes: "In traditional Hawai'i, 'Aina was not owned but held in trust. In Native Hawaiian culture, if an *Akua* cannot be owned, then one cannot buy and sell and *Akua*, such as the 'Aina, unless the rules surrounding *Akua*, or the symbolic meaning of 'Aina, are changed" (p. 10). Thus, not only did the legislation of the *Mahele* put into tension the most fundamental assumptions of the culture of the Hawaiians, already severely weakened by the adoption of Christianity, but more obviously, modern capitalism, the development of plantation agriculture, the dominance by *haole*, the stunning loss of control over the land by Hawaiians, and the destruction of Hawaiian sovereignty were among its consequences--all realized in less than fifty years.

But if the small group of *haole* did not coerce the ruling Ali'i, why then did they agree? Kame'eleihiwa points to one possible reason: "For the *Ali'i Nui*...the *Mahele* was a chance to join the foreign merchants in the pursuit of capitalist enterprise..."(p. 11). The chiefs were surely cash poor and land rich, but there was little evidence that, unlike the *haole*, the chiefs thought the land was something that one could exploit for capitalist profit. Like the Bourbons of the *ancien régime*, they remained "rentiers," and their status depended upon their capacities to accumulate and consume--not to invest in productive, money-making enterprise (Kirch and Sahlins, p. 57). But they were already in a commodified economy where cash was critical. As Kelly makes clear in her essay, the pre-contact, pre-capitalist subsistence economy had already begun to unravel when trade, but especially trade in sandalwood, a precious if exhaustible resource, offered new possibilities of enrichment. The King and the chiefs, eager to buy ships, and accumulate the new treasures of Europe and the Orient, ordered the cutting of the sandalwood (at considerable cost in labor), and in the course of this, they ran up huge debts. Kelly notes: "The value of the goods received by the Hawaiians had been paid for, perhaps several times over. With the sandalwood resources exhausted, recovery from debt within any foreseeable future was impossible." Alienable land was then an obvious possibility.³ Still, one might well wish that the *Ali'i* were "entrepreneurs" and instead of selling the land they had sought to make it profitable. At least, then, it would have remained in the hands of Hawaiians.

On the other hand, it is also worth emphasizing that one's position in the social structure made a huge difference as regards the assessment of the *Mahele*. Hundreds of petitions were produced by *maka'ainana* from all over the Islands. Kame'eleihiwa reports a typical petition of 1845 from 300 citizens of Kona which protested against chiefs selling land to the white men. They argued: "If you wish to sell or lease the lands you should sell or lease them to your own people" (p.

193). Another group of 1600 from Maui pointed out that *maka'ainana* were:

...not prepared to compete with foreigners. If you, the chiefs, decide immediately to sell land to foreigners, we shall be overcome... we, to whom the land has belonged from the beginning, shall all dwindle away (*ibid.*).

Kame'eleihiwa notes that the Ali'i Nui, tragically, did not listen to them: "What the *maka'ainana* did not understand was that Kauikeaouli and the other Ali'i Nui trusted their Christian foreign advisors because under the new religion they had learned to doubt themselves and to be afraid of making decisions contrary to the advice of their Christian *kahuna*" (p. 197). As Kehaulani Kealoha-Scullian (1995) argues in her study of the hundreds of petitions, the *maka'ainana* "reinvented themselves," but by this time, their reinvention made the King, like them, innocent victims. The consequences, she argues, are of continuing historical importance.

Viewed from a different perspective, Stauffer (2003) has pointed out that much of the land that was awarded to non-resident landlords was undeveloped, and although the *maka'ainana* received only 1% of the entitlements, their land was productive and could have sustained many. It is striking that had these *kuleana* lands been made unalienable, as in other parts of Polynesia, they would not have been lost—or stolen. Indeed, he shows that in the ensuing years, much of this land was stolen in the clear sense that the *haole*-influenced government made questionable law (in 1874) that quite literally did force the small landowners off the land.

This raises another set of contentious questions, recently addressed by Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio (2002). This is the debate over the role of "naturalized" *haole* in Hawai'i and more specifically, their role in the new constitutional governments, from 1840 on. As regards the *Mahele*, Osorio offers that "the ulterior motive of giving the *haole* land was to secure (at last) their obedience to the laws granting such ownership" (p. 52). He examines the struggle of power between *haole*, *ali'i*, and *maka'ainana*, "represented" in the Lower House. His account should also be compared with Stauffer's (2003).

...

In 1846 William Little Lee and Charles R. Bishop arrived in Honolulu. As partners they began the Lihu'e sugar plantation on Kaua'i. Amos Cooke, who headed the Chiefs Children School, began a partnership with Sam Castle, a partnership which, as the world knows, was a stunning success. In 1851 Castle, a good Christian, wrote:

While the natives stand confounded and amazed at their privileges and doubting the truth of the changes on their behalf, the foreigners are creeping in among them, getting their largest and best lands, water privileges, building lots, etc., etc.

The Lord seems to be allowing such things to take place that Islands may gradually pass into other hands.⁴

And pass into the hands of the *haole* they did. The sugar plantation was the decisive fact for the dramatic changes that followed. We can consider its development and consequences as falling into two main periods, from 1850 to the overthrow of the Monarchy in 1893 and then the so-called "territorial" period, from 1900 to statehood, in 1959, the beginning of the end of plantation agriculture in Hawai'i.

With the Hawaiian population decimated, the culture undermined and land now in hands of *haole*, all that was left was the Kingdom. Kelly (Chapter 3) gives us a sketch of the "Bayonet Constitution," the Overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani and the subsequent Annexation, and Noenoe Silva (Chapter 4) offers a perspective not available before her important work. As she says: "Our ancestors, save the Monarchs, are absent from our history books, though they haunt the pages in hints and footnotes." They become vivid in her essay as *Kanaka Maole* women, finding enormous strength in their traditions, organized to resist.

In her larger work, soon to be published, Silva traced what must be called a massive display of resistance following the Overthrow. While there were but some 40,000 Hawaiians remaining, Silva has unearthed and identified petitions of protest with some 38,000 signatures. Given this stunning activity and the earlier energy of the petition movement directed against the Mahele, the picture of passive Hawaiians awed by foreigners must be firmly rejected. In her book, *Hawai'i's Story*, Queen Lili'uokalani is clear that the Hawaiians were betrayed by those whom they nourished, and that "if we did not by force resist their final outrage, it was because we could not do so without striking at the military force of the United States."⁵

...

Plantation agriculture requires a large and manageable labor force. According to Lind (Chapter 5), in 1853 there were 1828 foreigners in Hawai'i, a meager 2.5% of the total population. In 1852, 293 Chinese men, imported as contract laborers, had arrived. In the next ninety years, some 400,000, some with their families, would come to Hawai'i. Sugar cultivation was, of course, an obvious choice for the *haole* entrepreneurs, but, as Beechert (Chapter 10) argues, it was the American Civil War that

created an immense new demand. Up to that point, Hawai'i's production had been modest and, as Beechert writes, perhaps two-thirds of the workers were Hawaiian. They would no longer suffice. The first major group to come were the Chinese. Between 1852 and 1897, some 56,000 Chinese were brought to Hawai'i. The first Japanese arrived in 1868. By 1897, there were some 45,000. But between 1898 and 1907, an additional 114,000 had come. The third largest group was the last to come. Between 1907 and 1932, some 119,000 Filipino men arrived to work on the plantations. Throughout both periods, smaller numbers came from other places, including Portuguese, Koreans, Spanish, South Pacific Islanders and others. Between 1881 and 1890, even a contingent of some 1337 had come from Germany. (See Lind's summary.)

Several of the essays reprinted in what follows deal with various aspects of Hawai'i's multi-ethnic population and several deal directly with it as regards plantations, changing attitudes of workers and, then, with the consequences of unionization. These essays concentrate on the period from World War I to just after World War II.

Again, several points need emphasis here. First and most obvious is the way that *ethnic conflict* became structured by the needs of the owners of the plantations. Plantation work is stunningly arduous, backbreaking and monotonous. It is work done under a burning sun without even the redeeming features of sociality--except during breaks. As unskilled labor, it pays little and requires a highly disciplined labor force. In the American south and in the Caribbean, of course, slave labor was the alternative solution. It should have been clear to the *haole* planters that it would not be easy to persuade sufficient *kanaka maoli* to do this work. To the extent that the Hawaiian had alternatives, he balked. Not only was he still deeply enmeshed in his subsistence way of life, a way of life which did not involve working beyond satisfaction of immediate material needs, but he could, after picking up some extra cash, easily quit. Viewed with *haole* eyes, of course, this was a sign of his "innate" laziness--a stereotype which remains with us today. Indeed, as Beechert points out, "each group of workers in turn was hailed as the 'solution' to the need for an adequate, low-cost, docile labor supply." And each would be, in some respect, deficient: the source for a host of other "racial" stereotypes: "They" are too smart, or "they" are sneaky, or cheat, or are ambitious, or stick together, etc., etc.

As Trask observes, the fact that the "First World" (Western Europe and America) modernized first became a resource for conceptualizing Third World people—"people of color"-- as people who could rightfully be dominated. "Colonization," as Trask writes, involved an implicit and usually explicit racism. Of course, racism is not unique to "whites," but the evidence powerfully suggests that modern, biological

racism is a product in part, at least, of modern imperialism. The "laboratory" of Hawai'i provides an excellent chance to see racism in construction.

...
Two brief essays, written in 1936 for the second issue of *Social Process in Hawai'i* begin this discussion. Done as a research project for their introduction (!) to sociology, Virginia Lord and Alice Lee offer a fascinating account of a phenomenon now long gone, that of the taxi dance hall, a place where males could "hire" a female dancing partner. The way that race, gender and the particular situation of the single Filipinos constructs choices for persons is vividly clear. Jane Dranga provides further insight into the construction of gender and ethnicity in her account of the employment of women in Hawai'i during this period. The stereotypes then available are stunning.

There is good reason to assume that ethnic groups have spontaneous suspicion of other different groups. Indeed, difference is always troublesome, perhaps always an easy potential to be exploited. This was surely the case in Hawai'i where the Hawai'i Sugar Planter's Association quickly came to see that they could achieve greater effective control over workers if they were divided, beginning with the construction of plantation camps in which ethnic groups lived separately.

Beechert (Ch. 10), Kawahara Lane and Ogata (Ch. 11), and Ikeda (Ch. 12) show how racism and then paternalism were used to control the plantation workforce. Following the pattern on the plantations, the first unions were ethnically organized, making it easy for owners to employ strikebreakers. Beechert provides an overview of the struggle to overcome "ethnic consciousness" and replace it with "class consciousness," an idea powerfully promoted by the two important mainland labor unions, the CIO and the ILWU, which began organizing in Hawai'i just before World War II. What is most stunning here is just that while these unions were largely successful in breaking down ethnic divisiveness among the workers of Hawai'i, unions on the mainland largely did not integrate black workers—until, indeed, the very recent past.⁶

Paternalism, explicitly introduced by the Hawai'i Sugar's Planters Association, was a concurrent and seemingly benign form of social control. Its effects are with us, even today. Kawahara Lane, writing in 1946, and Ikeda, writing in 1951 provide illuminating analyses and evidence of how the policy worked—and how following the War, it began to break down. Worth emphasizing, the seeds of "local" are found in the Ikeda's observation that unionization altered the relation between ethnic groups, creating a new common identity for them which put them

in ethnic opposition to their *haole* bosses. Indeed, one cannot underestimate the class dimension of the emerging idea of "local."

...

But before turning to the developments produced by World War II, one further point regarding immigration needs to be emphasized. Speaking very generally, two factors are especially critical as regards the capacity of immigrants to succeed in their new environment. First, there is the question of what opportunities for employment are available and second, there is the question of the resources available to the immigrant. *When* he (or she) comes and *what he comes with* are critical. We can see this very dramatically in Hawai'i.

We should distinguish first those relatively few, both *haole* and Asians, who did *not* come to Hawai'i as workers in the fields and who, generally, came with education and/or critical skills. Thus, the 1828 foreigners in Hawai'i in 1852 comprised one tenth of the population of Honolulu. Many, especially the *haole*, were well educated; some but especially Portuguese and Chinese were independent artisans or were able to establish small shops. There has been since a continuous immigration to Hawai'i of people of this sort, increasingly in the period after 1965. Some, of course, have been enormous successes, in the earlier period, for example, William Lee and Charles Bishop (see above). Some have had more modest success, establishing businesses in, e.g., Chinatown and, more recently, in establishing restaurants, small firms and corporations in Honolulu. But when taken together, these immigrants, new and old, are hardly representative.

Nearly all of the 400,000 who came prior to World War II, came to work on plantations. With the exception of the Germans, these workers were peasants or farmers. Some had been dependent, quasi-serfs in their homeland, some more nearly approximated independent farmers who had modest entrepreneurial skills. Most hoped to return to their homelands and some did. But all struggled to leave the plantation. Indeed, it is fair to say that they left in the order that they came. The importance of this cannot be overstated. For as they left the plantation and found work in the modernizing urban environment of Honolulu, they, along with those who had already established themselves, became the foundation for an emerging middle class. Another difference needs to be noted.

The first Chinese plantation workers came without families but many married Hawaiian women, establishing what became well-respected families. Most of the first immigrant Japanese also came without families, but many then took "picture brides" and after 1907, families pre-dominated. This was important for several reasons. First, concentrations of families could seek to reproduce inherited cultural

forms. This in turn provided the basis for solidarity, always a resource for individuals. This also explains the relatively late out-marriage rates for Japanese in Hawai'i. Second, because women could also produce income, working alongside males in the fields, or in canneries, laundries and the like, families had combined incomes. Hawai'i has a long history of women in the paid work force. Finally, as the second generation came to maturity and acquired education and skills, the path was opened for "upward mobility." Because the Japanese generated a second-generation in Hawai'i, school was possible for them. At McKinley, often called in the 1930s, "Tokyo High," some 43% of its 1929 student body of 2,339 were *Nisei* Japanese and a remarkable number of these went on the higher education. Kamehameha Schools, founded in 1887 and restricted to Hawaiians, was single-mindedly vocational in its goals--an attitude which remained well into the 50s.⁷

As Soriano (Chapter 9) explains, Filipinos in Hawai'i were challenged in a different way. By the time they came, not only had opportunities in Hawai'i's rapidly changing economy been exploited by the earlier immigrant groups, for example, in Mom and Pop stores, in small shops and farms, but without Filipino wives and families, there was no second generation to send to school. Until after World War II, Filipino plantation workers lived an ambivalent existence, often not able to earn and save sufficient money to return home, yet not fully committed to establishing for themselves a life in Hawai'i. Filipinos, late to come for plantation work, have been late in achieving status in Hawai'i.

The contrast with the Germans who came to work the plantations makes the point dramatically. Not only were they white and Protestant, but they came with all sorts of skills. They were city-people who were machinists, blacksmiths, and had other craft trades. And they came with families. At Lihu'e, they established a community, a school and a Lutheran Church. Their stay as plantation workers was predictably short-lived. For Germans in Hawai'i, becoming part of the dominant *haole* community was easy. Many of the names of streets in Honolulu bear names of members of these highly successful immigrants.

The Portuguese were in a different position than all the other groups. Neither WASP (White, Anglo-Saxon Protestant) nor Asian--Caucasians who were not "*haole*"--they were "encouraged to believe that their role as *lunas* (supervisors) over the Orientals was permanent." Geschwender and his colleagues argued that this became "an ethnic mobility trap:" Once the plantation disappeared, rural and propertyless "Portugee" were ill-prepared to enter the modern political economy.⁸

How do the Hawaiians fit into the picture of ethnic social mobility in Hawai'i? As noted, Hawaiians were never integrated into the

plantation economy. Rather, many *maka'ainana* maintained themselves by more or less reproducing their older mode of life in the changed conditions. They continued to plant taro and to fish. Many also found employment in public works or other low-skilled occupations. Few attended college. This was perhaps not disastrous until the turn to tourism and rapid development which began in the 1950's. As Blaisdell points out, "in the 1960's rural Native Hawaiian communities, already economically exploited, were besieged by rapid encroachment on remaining agricultural lands." As land values and the cost of living skyrocketed, the shift to tourism produced mostly low-paying jobs. Most Hawaiians again found themselves dispossessed.

...

World War II was, of course, extremely critical as regards social change in Hawai'i. There were a number of reasons for this: the huge influx of military and construction workers from the mainland which established a clear difference between "locals"--understood as those who were "born and raised in Hawai'i," and those who were not (see Lind), the dip in sugar profits which led the Big Five to look for alternatives (Beechert), the change in attitudes among plantation workers (Lane and Ogata), the boom of the Honolulu economy and military rule. But perhaps foremost was the problems that entry into the war set for the Japanese of Hawai'i.

At the time of the war, the Japanese were a very-well established diaspora community which represented some 37% of the total population. The capacity of the Japanese in Hawai'i to maintain their culture was not without its difficulties or its politics, especially among the *Nisei*, or second generation. Chapter 8, by Kimie Kawahara and Yuriko Hatanaka, offers a contemporary account of the impact of the bombing of Pearl Harbor on the Japanese in Hawai'i. This gives both a real flavor for the quality of the community, and for the pressure put on them. As they write, the Japanese in Hawai'i were given a forced choice: Were they "Americans" or were they "Japanese?"

This is most dramatically seen in the experience of the famed 442nd Regimental Combat team. Given the opportunity to comprise a segregated Japanese unit, perhaps 10,000 "local" Japanese enlisted, many from the National Guard unit at the University (which subsequently became the 100th Battalion). They were joined at their training camp in Shelby, Mississippi by mainland *Nisei* Japanese, whose families were then interred in the US version of concentration camps. While there were plans to "secure" Hawai'i in this way, these were rejected for the obvious reason that one could not lock up a third of the population and still have the society function. As the 442nd became the most decorated unit in US military history, reports of their exploits electrified the community back in Hawai'i.⁹

But indeed, if their choice was "forced," we need to notice that it was a choice not between Japan and the dominant WASP version of America (as was the choice of mainland American-Japanese) but between Japan and the Hawai'i version of being an American. When the 100th battalion got to the mainland, they were quite amazed by what they saw, but they also could see clearly that Hawai'i was distinctive in many, many ways. Not only did they experience forms of racism they had not seen, they saw also that they were very unlike the mainland born Japanese--known by them as "Kotonks." At Shelby, Mississippi in 1943, one soldier explained:

I didn't know what racial prejudice was until I hit the South. There was the "white" toilet and the "black" toilet. I'm brown. Where do I go? (Matsuda, 1992: 66)

Of course, it was not that Japanese in Hawai'i had not experienced racism.¹⁰ Yet, it was not the racism of the apartheid south. And while racial attitudes and behaviors could be vicious, Japanese were not, for example, excluded from McKinley High School--at that time, perhaps the best of Hawai'i's public schools. Nor indeed, were they entirely excluded from prominent positions in government. As Stauffer (2000) notes, in 1929, Wilfred Tsukiyama was appointed deputy attorney for the City and County of Honolulu, where he served for many years.

As regards their Japanese "cousins," Fred Ida noted:

Hawaii boys were more informal, while Mainland Japanese were more competitive....

The kotonk style was altogether difference from ours. The Hawaiian style was share and share alike, while the kotonks were more for themselves (Matsuda: 69).

Senator Daniel Inouye recalled the hostility between the two groups and how it was eliminated.

The lines between the kotonks and Hawaiians were drawn almost immediately. Physically, we looked different. We were darker, they were lighter; in general much fairer. They had come out of winter hibernation. Secondly, once you opened your mouth, Hawaii and Mainland, it was like night and day.

...

We were always the aggressors. They were the ones getting bloodied. We outnumbered them. And we were not discriminating. We would hit a private as well as a Sergeant.

...

Finally, somebody, somewhere--an unsung hero--had a brilliant idea. He arranged to have the residents of the internment camp at Rohwer, Arkansas invite the members of the 442nd to spend the weekend at camp.

...

I remember the trip from Hattiesburg to Rohwer took about six hours in the truck convoy. Starting out early in the morning, you could hear men singing with ukuleles--typically Hawaiian.

When they arrived at their destination, they were stunned to see men in uniform guarding fenced-in Japanese Americans. The Senator continues:

I think all of us were just sitting there, thinking about this unbelievable experience. It was all mind-boggling--American citizens! The thing that went through my mind constantly was: "I wonder what I would have done? Would I have volunteered? ...Overnight the situation at Camp Shelby changed because the word went out like wildfire."¹¹

The passage is rich in meaning, not only, to be sure, as regards the stunning difference between the conditions of the two groups, but also, and often unnoticed, the self-perception and practices of "the Hawaiians." Inouye knows very well that he is not a Hawaiian--but as the experience attests, like his comrades, he was a new kind of Japanese *and* a new kind of "American"--a Hawaiianized AJA.

But the war also gave the Japanese of Hawai'i an unprecedented opportunity. First, by virtue of their stunning achievements in the US military, the *Nisei* established that they did not have to take a backseat for any American. Indeed, they do not have to be "American" to be as good any American. Second, when they returned to Hawai'i with the benefits of the GI Bill, they returned to a Hawai'i ready for change.

...

The last essays in the volume, Chapters 13-17, all treat aspects of what has occurred as regards social change in Hawai'i since Statehood. Aoude (Chapter 14) offers an excellent overview of this, but if there is one essay sorely missed here, it is a full-fledged account of the early years of the Democratic party.¹²

During the Territorial period (from 1900 until nearly statehood), the government of Hawai'i--the instrument of the Big Five--was

constituted only of *haoles* and Hawaiians: Until the *Nisei* came to voting age, they were the only ones who could vote. The passage of the McCarran Act in 1952 entitled *Issei* Japanese to become citizens. At this point, Japanese became a plurality, perhaps 40% of the potential electorate. The prospect that they would use their electoral power had been a persistent worry of the ruling Republicans. But their fears were not realized until 1954. George Cooper and Gavan Daws (1985) have provided some striking numbers.

From 1960 to 1980, Japanese averaged 50% of the total membership of both houses. From 1955 to 1980, the percentage of Japanese Democrats in the legislature was twice the percentage of Japanese in Hawai'i's population...In 1980, with 25% of the population, they were 60% of democratic legislators (1985: 42).¹³

Similarly, *haoles*, Hawaiians and Filipinos were dramatically under-represented. As noted, eligible Filipino voters could be discounted by both parties. In the territorial election of 1934, there were but 102 registered Filipinos. The relatively small percentage of well-educated middle and upper-class Hawaiians who were active politically were still very much part of the *haole* territorial regime which was thoroughly Republican. As Stauffer (1994) writes: "by the 1920s and 30s, Hawaiians had gained a position of political power, office and influence never before--nor since--held by a native people in the United States." After the Democratic takeover, since the new regime had to work with the old landed oligarchy, elite Hawaiians could maintain their status--and its benefits. But as Aoude notes, the majority of Hawaiians were the big losers in the post-World War II transformation. This required no conspiracy. At this time, Hawaiians were conceived by the ruling elites as part of the more inclusive "local" community and put into the fuzzy background. Their political self-consciousness had not yet emerged. (See Trask.)

Cooper and Daws summarize:

So a picture emerges of the typical successful legislator of the post-World War II period: a Burns Democrat; of Japanese background, *nisei*; likely to have been born on an outer island, meaning essentially in a plantation community; an attorney, often with war service (p. 43).

Aoude, in this volume, and Cooper and Daws, argue that these same Democratic legislators used their new-found power to advance their interests, which fortunately, for them, happened to coincide with the

landed interests of the Old Oligarchy and trans-national capital.¹⁴ While they had promised land reform as essential to their project to "modernize" Hawaii, this was quickly abandoned in favor of a developmental strategy which would promote tourism. (Aoude, Ch. 14) Indeed, in typical American fashion, "growth" would be the answer not only to prosperity but to injustice as well.

Understanding these choices and outcomes is surely a challenging responsibility. Stauffer (Chapter 13) argues that through foreign investment, tourism has propelled a loss of control over Hawai'i's future and that except for the very rich at the top of the income distribution, most residents of Hawai'i have had a precipitous decline in their real incomes. His account is important in that he offers a mechanism which tries to explain how this has worked. Aoude and Kelly (Chapter 3) pursue some of these themes, showing that as foreign investment accelerated, the cost of living has continued to increase and opportunities for good jobs have continued to shrink. Kelly's essay shows also the critical importance of Japanese investment and argues that the speculative boom of Japanese investment, given the historical concentration of ownership of land in Hawai'i, from the *Mahele* on, goes some way to explaining the extraordinary costs of land in Hawai'i.

...

There is one last very important test as regards Hawai'i as a "laboratory." It is too often assumed that whatever happened had to happen, that there is something inevitable about social process and social change. But if we argue that whatever happens *because* people make choices, there is a contingency or openness about what happens in history. Things might have been otherwise. Consider here Ka'ahumanu's problem or the decision of the *ali'i* to adopt the *Mahele*. To be sure, actors always work with materials at hand and in this sense their options are always limited. One always chooses from among *some* alternatives, but one does not choose the conditions *or* the alternatives which are made potentially available by those conditions. The test, then, regards the question of whether, with "the new politics" after World War II, there were alternatives to what has happened.

Stauffer (2000, and below) and Noel Kent (1993) believe that there were alternatives; Beechert (this volume) does not, and, at least as far as the present is concerned, for Aoude, the choice having been made now disallows a viable alternative. Beechert argues that "the impetus to develop Hawai'i's tourist industry came initially from local investors, anxious to reverse the losses incurred after World War II." Promoting this initiative was the fact that successful unionization had secured impressive benefits for workers and that Hawaiian sugar had now to compete with sugar produced elsewhere under conditions of severe labor

exploitation. The development of the Boeing 707 was also important, Although ideally suited for tourism, Hawai'i, for the first time, became a possible choice for lower-income tourists.

This much would likely not be contested. Nor would Beechert deny that we make history. Indeed, quite the opposite. He would, however, insist that given the situation, a "natural" coalition of groups existed and that this group could not have done other than what they did. For him, the Big Five (Castle and Cook, Alexander and Baldwin, American Factors, Theo E. Davies and C. Brewer) saw clearly that their future was in a development strategy based on tourism. The ILWU, having achieved success with plantation workers, saw that "the basic employment opportunity remaining in Hawaii [was] in what has been called the secondary market --the preserve of dead-end, low paid, casual labor." It was, he concludes, "to that arena that the ILWU turned in 1958..." The construction unions and the other important interests--including the Dillingham construction and transportation businesses and the Bishop Estate also saw profits in this strategy. Moreover, political legitimation and leadership was provided by the Democratic party, a new party in power which had come to power with a strong base among a plurality of middle-class Japanese-Americans and Chinese who were themselves in a position to profit from tourist development. Finally, he argues that what was true of Hawai'i was more generally true of the American economy at this juncture, that "Hawai'i, like the rest of the United States, has been moving toward a structure of employment ever more dominated by jobs that are badly paid, unchanging and unproductive."

This is, to be sure, a powerful argument; but it remains open to considerable criticism especially since it assumes not only that these were the only possible players, but that all of the groups did act in their best interest, or at least in what they perceived to be their best interest. It is just this which is contested by Stauffer and Kent. For Kent, the ILWU "sold out" exactly in the sense that they did not act in the best interests of their constituents. Similarly, Stauffer argues that the strategy harmed not only wagedworkers, but local big and small business as well. Although he does not develop the idea in the essay reprinted here, one could argue that with appropriate leadership, land reform and a strategy of diversified development was possible. That is, it was not a choice between tourism and no tourism, but of a tourism integrated into a development which encouraged other uses of the land, including sustainable agriculture, and small-scale diversified manufacturing. This is substantially the position taken by Rohter (Chapter 15) who insists that this remains possible—given sufficient political will.

But who will exercise the required political will? The Democrats who led tourist development were surely the party of "locals" and the heyday of tourist development was in many ways the heyday of the idea of "the local," represented eloquently by Eric Yamamoto's 1978 essay. As he saw, the loss of control to "outsiders" who neither "belonged to" nor had "an appreciation of" Hawai'i surfaced as the critical problem.¹⁵

The State Constitutional Convention of 1978 (Con-Con) acknowledged this and expressed "Palaka Power," named for the cloth used for the work clothes of the working men and women of Hawai'i. As Okamura notes, this was "local" advocacy, but, unfortunately, while it recognized the Hawaiians by creating the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, a much debated victory, and made Hawaiian an official language of the state, Palaka Power failed to congeal into a political force. Explaining why it did not will be complicated. But the effort, well beyond the scope of this introduction, surely needs to be made. Likely, following the lead of Beechert, it will need to include analysis of the effects of accelerating globalization and the attending ideology of neo-liberalism.¹⁶

And perhaps as part of this, it was not clear in the 1970s that continuous immigration from the US mainland would undermine the conditions which had generated and sustained local culture in Hawai'i, nor that the sovereignty movement would separate locals and Hawaiians and throw a wild card into the politics of Hawai'i.

...

The ethnic situation in Hawai'i, not surprisingly, is very different from the situation on the US mainland. But the difference is not that Hawai'i is true "melting pot," or that there is no racism nor ethnic divisiveness. Rather, on the US mainland, putting aside the somewhat different agendas of Native Americans, there is no sovereignty movement of indigenous peoples, "local" refers only to long-standing location in a place, and the main dichotomy is the pseudo-racial white/black. In Hawai'i, by contrast, there are Hawaiians, "locals," and "*haoles*."

Consider first Hawaiians. As Trask argues (Chapter 1), Hawaiians, *unlike* "locals," have a special relation to the land, and for her and many others, this must be understood genealogically. Many find this problematic, but perhaps especially those who struggle to find identities with which they can be comfortable. The genealogical criterion is, to be sure, accepted in the Akaka Bill, now (Jan 2004) shelved in the US Congress. The evidence suggests that most "locals" have no trouble with the idea that a genealogical criterion is appropriate, and that Hawaiian sovereignty and special programs for Hawaiians are appropriate responses to historical injustice. Indeed, in a recent survey, 78% of non-Hawaiians approved of a status for Hawaiians "similar to the special

recognition given to Native Americans and Alaska Natives," and 82% of non-Hawaiians supported Federal programs for Hawaiians.¹⁷

If passed, the Akaka bill would legitimate the status of Hawaiians as a "nation," and create a relationship of "nation-within-a-nation" status for Hawaiians. While there remains considerable disagreement over the Bill, it remains, perhaps, the most significant real possibility. If passed, it would also resolve the current dilemmas regarding the status of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and special claims made by Hawaiians, e.g., in pursuing affirmation action policies for Hawaiians. Kelly (Chapter 3), rightly but perhaps optimistically argues that a sovereign Hawai'i would have the capacity to control investment so as to counter the disastrous consequences of untrammelled investment, both as regards the people and the environment. She does not comment on what might be the capacities of the more limited nation-within-a-nation, but these are surely worthy of consideration.

But if "Hawaiians" today tend to distinguish themselves from "locals," they still share very much with them. As evidenced in the remarks of those members of the 442nd quoted above, and as former Governor John Waihe'e put the matter: "What glues it all together is the native Hawaiian culture" (Okamura, 1994: 246). "Local" makes no sense without the native Hawaiian culture—the tradition of *aloha*, music, dance, ritual celebration, and, indeed, "Pidgin."

"Pidgin," properly understood, provides considerable evidence for this. On the standard view, Hawaiian played a relatively minor role in its development. Thus, Takaki held that "plantation managers recognized the need to teach immigrant laborers a functional spoken English" which early on "became 'the language of command' on the plantations." Accordingly, "workers were able to respond in a pidgin that incorporated peculiarly Japanese, Portuguese, Chinese or other elements in their speech" (1983: 118).

Sarah Julianne Roberts (1995)(following lines set out by Derek Bickerton) has persuasively argued that this picture must be abandoned. Briefly put, *haoles* learned Hawaiian, and pidginization of Hawaiian began. While Hawaiian remained the official language until the overthrow, a pidgin based on the Hawaiian language was the dominant tongue on the plantation until late in the nineteenth century. With the arrival of large numbers of Asians, plantation Pidgin gradually became re-lexified with a predominantly English vocabulary reflecting the new political realities of dominant *haole* business and authority. With the Overthrow in 1893, Hawaiian was suppressed and the vernacular Pidgin became creolized or the first language of many speakers, hence technically known as Hawaiian Creole English (HCE), a mix of Hawaiian, English, Chinese,

and other tongues. HCE and English became the dominant languages. What was true of language was also true of culture.

Still, it is one of the special virtues of the ethnic category, “local,” that it allows for a plurality of subcultures. The earlier generation of assimilated Asians could affirm their “roots” in Japan or the Philippines and still affirm that they were, together with the other local subcultures, a special kind of American. So, too, could Hawaiians. Thus, locals, including Hawaiians, often spoke “Pidgin” as their first language, sometimes had Japanese or Korean as their second (and until recently, rarely Hawaiian) and often had a faltering grasp of standard English, even as some did achieve, after World War II, positions of power.

Still, it seems also that “local” as a constructed ethnicity is losing something—it hard to say how much—in a process I have elsewhere termed “Los Angelisation.” It is easier to see this if we note, first, that “local,” like “American” or “Dutch” can refer to either an identifiable culture or to those who embody it. Following Yamamoto, we can, accordingly, begin with the idea that “local” is a cultural category and ask questions about its reproduction/transformation, including an account both of the pertinent mechanisms and about who is reproducing it (or not). The argument is simply put: Globalization is undermining local culture, a Hawaiianized version of multiculturalism in a place of magnificent natural beauty.

The first fact is straightforwardly demographic. By 1990, for the first time, *haole* comprised the largest plurality in Hawai‘i. Using the State Health Survey classification, they represented 24.1% of the total with mixed non-Hawaiian at 20.6%, Japanese at 20.4%, mixed, part Hawaiians at 18.8% and Filipinos at 11.3%. This trend has continued with some 30,000 mainlanders arriving annually. (From all other countries, there were, by comparison, some 6,056 arrivals to Hawai‘i in 2000). In 2000, 56.9% of the residents of Hawai‘i were born in the Islands, down from 65.8% in 1990. Moreover, these *malihini haole* fill critical cultural roles: media and mass communications, higher education, art, music, and key posts in advertising, marketing and public relations.

Accordingly, with well over one fifth of the current population as recent immigrants, it is not implausible to say that the culture of this place is increasingly being defined by “*malihini haole* residents!”

Perhaps, contrary to this assertion, these *malihini* are assimilating to local culture? In the standard case, of course, not only do “immigrants” assimilate, but, as noted, they also affect the culture into which they have immigrated. But in the standard case, there is a coincidence between the dominant majority and their culture (WASP America for most of its history). This is not true of Hawai‘i where “local” culture, the culture of perhaps the majority of residents, is in continual tension with an elitist

"*haole*" culture. Finally, in the standard case, it is by and large clear what "immigrants" should assimilate to, and there are both official mechanisms and imperatives for immigrants to assimilate. European immigrants to the US, for example, know who the "real" Americans are, and schools, to take but one example, are mechanisms which are committed to making immigrant children into Americans.

"Local" has none of these features. Consider this second aspect first. While the genesis of local culture antedates the relatively recent idea of a "local" as a means of self-identity, there was little in the material culture to represent this and no "official" mechanisms for reproducing it. One thinks of Pidgin, food, and celebrations, weddings, the first birthday party, the *luau*. Again, the case of "Pidgin" is particularly illuminating. It is not part of any curriculum, it is discouraged at all levels of instruction, and there are no longer Pidgin speakers who command mass media attention. A Pidgin literature appeared, but even here, there is no accepted written version of the language. Among young people, and very much owing to mass media, "Pidgin" is disappearing, replaced, ironically enough, by bad English. This is ironical since, contrary to widespread belief, Hawaiian Creole English (technically, not "Pidgin") is not "bad English," but is, instead, a perfectly valid language with a grammar, which, as the linguistic expression of Hawai'i's local culture, carries with it a host of distinctive features of the Hawaiianized local culture, e.g., "talk story."

Nor are there imperatives for *haoles* to assimilate to the vague and shifting norms and practices which define local culture. Unfortunately, in any class society, there are benefits and liabilities bequeathed on people just because of their race and ethnicity; those who suffer the liabilities are acutely aware of this. These liabilities are both structural and interactional: the quality of a neighborhood and its schools, the assumption made known that the person is not expected to be "smart" or ambitious, the contempt communicated to a Pidgin speaker by a person who thinks that *he* does not have an accent. Whether or not acknowledged, benefits derive in Hawai'i from being *haole*. In developing a powerful analysis of the mainland *haole*, Judy Rohrer's essay (Chapter 17) provides an excellent account of this.

Moreover, white Americans are ideologically unprepared to assimilate. They believe that they have no race and because they are assimilated Americans, their European ancestry, where it functions at all, is purely symbolic. Whittaker (1986) recognized this in her study. Of the mainland *haole*, she concludes: "The Caucasians seem to be saying through their objections that they dislike having ethnicity become their most identifying feature.... For the first time in their lives many of them face their own ethnicity. Previously it had been irrelevant. Now, however, ethnic recognition determines interaction" (1986: 153).

As Rohrer rightly argues, viewed from the side of Hawaiians *and* locals, for historically apt reasons, mainland *haoles* (unlike other non-white immigrants) are easy scapegoats who contribute substantially to their situation as scapegoats because they do not understand an ethnically pluralist society in which they are a minority! The mainland *haole* wants to be thought of as "an individual." Moreover, in a stunning lack of understanding, they compare themselves to African-Americans. Of course, as mainland *haoles*, they may well experience discrimination for the first time here in Hawai'i; but even if they do, they fail utterly to see that *unlike* African-Americans, they are, as whites, privileged persons who gain enormous benefits at the expense of non-whites.

The mainland *haole* attitude, often characteristic of the better educated, high-status, and best-intended of individuals, would go some way to explain the distress felt by mainland *haoles* to be called a *haole*, to be upset by what they take to be the extraordinary ease of local people to identify a person as, for example, "the Filipino who sits in the front of the room and who dates the Japanese," to be annoyed at having a local person served before them in a store, to be genuinely frightened by verbal hostility expressed by locals at a beachpark, to be outraged at tuition waivers being granted to Hawaiians "just because they are Hawaiian." All of this, of course, inhibits any real effort to accommodate oneself or family to the local culture. If anything, having identified locals as racists, legitimated in terms of liberal ideology, self-righteous "race-neutral" indignation is reinforced.

What then of the recent Asian and Latin American immigrants? Will they assimilate and if so, to what? This will be more complicated. Like *haoles*, there is little imperative to assimilate to local culture. That is, excepting those who try to maintain their heritage, the aspirations of immigrant families will be that their children be "American." *Haole* dominated neighborhoods and schools, and especially the private schools, will be preferred. For the relatively few who have the luxury of choice, Pidgin will be rejected. This may also reinforce tendencies to maintain imported cultural identities among recent immigrating Asians. Those who have resources and can acquire requisite skills will likely depart for the mainland where at least the cost of living is manageable. Indeed, the numbers here are also remarkable. For Hawaiians alone, in 2000, there was perhaps a 230% increase in emigration to the mainland over 1990.

Of course, even for the economically better-off, this aspiration will face obstacles. Euro-Americans were able to be assimilated to WASP America because for them "racialism" was overcome. Irish, Sicilians and Jews came to be seen as "white." This was possible, of course, exactly because some 14% of the American population is Afro-American, a caste minority in America (Ogbu, 1978). Afro-Americans are surely Americans,

but as long as racism exists, they are not assimilated. In Hawai'i, given increasing *haole*fication, the only real opportunity for assimilation for the new Asian immigrants in Hawai'i who lack significant resources will be to assimilate to a local culture which is increasingly being transformed to something much like the ghetto cultures of the US mainland.

Hawai'i was radically transformed after World War II and "locals" were key participants. Local elite took over the Democratic party and the key unions. *They then behaved like Americans*: Having a piece of the action, they took their piece of the pie.

But today's political economy is not the political economy of 1954, nor is the ethnic situation anything like what it was then. As globalization processes proceed, and Hawai'i becomes more and more a version of *haole* America, "local" has lost its class-edge, and Hawaiians, locals and non-white immigrants are disproportionately suffering increased inequality and decreased economic opportunity. Unions, once capable of restraining this, have been tamed. A Republican Governor, appealing to *malahini haole*, promises change, but so too did the Democrats of the recent past. The public schools have profound difficulties, exacerbated by the high percentage of students in Hawai'i's private schools. Short-falls in the budget require even larger classes for elementary students, less attention to pre-school programs, and increased costs for parents--precisely the worst things that one could do. In trouble for two decades, the University of Hawai'i, now with a high-priced senior administration, faces new and potentially fatal budget cuts. There is no hope that the balloon of speculative investment of the 1980s will repeat itself. Racial tensions are accelerating. On the mainland, while there is a significant African American middle class, African Americans remain a caste minority. A Hawai'i version of this is not impossible.

But the real wild card in this account is the Hawaiians. Much will depend, I believe, on how efforts of Hawaiians to reclaim this place are posed by Hawaiians and responded by both *haoles* and locals, whether or not winning a measure of sovereignty will allow for a richer inclusiveness or an impoverished one.

Peter T. Manicas

Endnotes

1. A complicated and provocative effort to come to grips with the epistemological issues involved is found in Kanalu G. Terry Young (1998). See also the debate between Gananth Obeyesekere (1992) and Marshall Sahlins (1992).
2. Boki's many efforts at resistance, which very nearly came to civil war, included the gathering of arms, efforts to reclaim lands for King Kauikeaouli, disputing the succession of the King, arranging that Kauikeaouli marry, in the traditional way, his sister Nahi'ena'ena. This culminated in the "large scale 'commotion' (*haunaele*) of 1833-34" when King Kauikeaouli "attempted to seize control of the kingdom and the lands from Kina'u, setting off a carnivalesque rebellion that proved to be the last hurrah of the ancient monarchy" (Kirch and Sahlins, p. 75). For a somewhat contrasting view, see Kehaulani K. Kealoha-Scullian (1995).
3. Boki's adventures are here also pertinent. He saw that the sandalwood trade had not been the boon that the *Ali'i* had supposed, that instead, they had put themselves deeply in debt. Hearing rumors of vast sandalwood forests in the New Hebrides, Boki decided to sail there and cut sandalwood. But it is not clear exactly what his intentions were, whether to establish his own Kingdom or to pay off the debts, once and for all. Accordingly, in 1829 he sailed with two ships manned by 429 anti-Christian *ali'i* and *maka'ainana*. (Kame'eleihiwa, p. 90). Both ships were lost at sea and there were but a handful of survivors. His wife Liliha carried on the struggle until she and her followers were disarmed in 1831 by the Ka'ahumanu chiefs. (Kirch and Sahlins, p. 76; Kame'eleihiwa, p. 90) It is an accident of Hawaiian history with potentially enormous consequences that all but a handful of these men were lost at sea, removing what was the strongest faction of the Hawaiian anti-Christians. Here again one can only speculate what might have been.
4. Quoted by Kame'eleihiwa, p. 301. While Judd opposed "foreign" ownership of the *'Aina*, William Little Lee gave arguments that would be repeated in contemporary Hawai'i, that "foreign investment would mean great wealth and miraculous prosperity for the kingdom" (p. 299). Can one apply Castle's argument to the present re-appropriation of Hawai'i: "The Lord seems to be allowing such things to take place that the Islands may gradually pass into other hands?"

5. Drawing on the work of recent scholarship of Silva and others, Tom Coffman's *Nation Within* (n.d.), offers an excellent overview of the annexation period. See also the film of the same title. The text quoted from the Queen is on p. 286 of Coffman's book.

6. As Beechert notes, the mainland unions brought the idea of "class consciousness" to the workers of Hawai'i. Jack Hall and many other of the leaders of the ILWU were "communists," but it is clear that they were "first, last and always" trade-union men, and "did not take orders from afar." An extremely good treatment is Sanford Zalburg (1979). Given cold war politics and hysteria, these associations did, however, figure hugely in the early history of the Democrats in Hawai'i. Jack Burns and Jack Hall could be allies; Hall and Tom Gill could not. Fuchs' (1961) account remains the best available. Not only were there deep ethnic tensions within the several fractions of the party, spawned by the influence of the 442nd Club, but anti-communism, provoked by the influence of the ILWU, combined with personality differences added to the divisiveness. See more recently, Coffman (2003).

7. In 1920, of the 41,350 in the public schools, 1,222 were haole. In 1924, unhappy that so many students came from homes where English was not spoken, haole parents forced the first "English Standard" grammar school, Lincoln, followed by others. Roosevelt became a "standard English" school in 1930. Admission required a passing grade in an English proficiency exam. In 1929, Frank Midkiff, the malahini principle of Kamehameha schools wrote Frank Atherton, President of the HSPA urging him to appoint a committee to work out methods "for directing thousands of our Hawaiian-born children into happy service in connection with our basic industries (Fuchs, p. 292). Fuchs' account of education in Hawai'i is indispensable).

In 1941, two of every ten students went to private schools. In 2003, 53% of lawmakers and 45% of public school teachers on O'ahu have their children in private schools.

8. See Geschwender *et al* (1988) and M. Weinstein, J.L. Leon and P.T. Manicas (1990).

9. An excellent account of the 442nd is Matsuo (1992).

10. For the best account of anti-Japanese racism in Hawai'i, see Okihiro (1991). For a view which enlarges the context in terms of the aspirations of Imperial Japan and the role of Japanese in Hawai'i, see also John Stephan (1984).

11. In 1940, there were a total of 157,990 Japanese in Hawai'i of whom 121,312 were citizens. Some 1446 Japanese in Hawaii were interred. On the US mainland, by contrast, nearly all of the 126,948 Japanese, of whom most were citizens, were interred.

12. See note 6 and Stauffer (2000), who offers a critical review of Dan Boylan and T. Michael Holmes's *John A. Burns: The Man and His Time* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

13. But it would be a huge mistake to suppose that in any sense, local Japanese ever got "control" of Hawai'i. Noel Kent puts the matter well:
The AJA elite never constituted *a legitimate ruling class in Hawai'i*. Instead, they have skillfully performed a multitude of roles—front men, middle men, mediators, agents, and power brokers—in the service of an authentic ruling class, much of which does not reside in the islands and which prefers invisibility as one element of its power (Kent 1989: 114)).

14. In standard interpretations, Japanese success in Hawai'i (surely the most successful of any non-white immigrant group in America), is attributed to the Japanese-ness of the Japanese. On this view, Japanese in Hawai'i succeeded because they are loyal and hardworking, because they respect all their obligations, but especially *Kodomo no tame ni*, because they are willing to sacrifice. Kobayashi Mackey (1995) rightly rejects this. Indeed, even given the best of personal attributes, success depends upon structured opportunities for groups as well as individuals, as sketched in the foregoing--and some good luck to boot. She goes on to argue, in a way similar to the position of Kent and Stauffer on the unions (below), that the returning veterans "sold out."

A former State Senator well expressed the distinctive American point of view on such matters:

I didn't think that I was doing anything unethical. Most of us had come through the war and the Depression and we didn't have anything. I thought getting ahead was what you were supposed to do in America (quoted from Markrich, 1992).

15. A November, 1997 *Honolulu Advertiser*/Channel 2 News poll "found a strong current of pride in Hawai'i's special qualities and a determination to make sure those qualities are not lost." Of interest here residents of long standing were strongly in agreement with the idea that Hawai'i will be the kind of place where they want their children to grow up. *Malahini*

(newcomers) were split on this (*Advertiser*, 9 November 1997). As I suggest below, lacking any clear sense of why this place is special, *malahini haoles*, especially, cannot see the problem.

16. Neo-liberalism generally refers to a set of ideas which emphasize the private sector instead of the public, thus cuts in social expenditures, "free" markets," and minimal government--as with "classical" laissez-faire liberalism. For an excellent critique of the administration of Governor Ben Cayetano which locates the policies of his administration into the context of neo-liberalism and globalization, see John Witeck (2001).

17. See *Ka Wai Ola OHA*, <http://oha.org>.

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