

*Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (Spring 1982)

## **John Dewey: Anarchism and the Political State**

### *Introduction*

John Dewey's social and political philosophy has been as much interpreted as it has been praised and condemned. Thus, to merely illustrate the spectrum of opinion, his philosophy of democracy has been called "a Jeffersonian provincialism," nostalgic and irrelevant, *and* a pluralist federalism fully pertinent to the prevailing American political order. His theory of inquiry is construed as essential to his social philosophy, as independent of it, and as inconsistent with it. Finally, his basic philosophy is understood as an independent elaboration of "the best elements in Marx's thought" and, remarkably, as "the philosophy of American imperialism."<sup>1</sup>

Dewey is not altogether blameless. There are many strands in his thought, sometimes conflicting strands. He is sometimes unclear, sometimes just where one wants a clear statement most of all. But these are not the main problems in coming to grips with Dewey as a social philosopher. Rather, most of the difficulty derives from the style and range of his thought. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to associate him in a clear way with any of the "isms" by which we tend to identify a political and social theory. And, in turn, this makes him fair game for ideological purposes. Political writing, after all, is itself a political act.

Dewey was, of course, both a liberal and a democrat, and he was not a Marxist. Yet, as I shall argue, his liberalism and democratic philosophy were decidedly *radical*, more socialist than libertarian, indeed, more anarchist than communist or liberal.

But let me not be misunderstood. Dewey was no anarchist (however amusing it is that Sidney Hook should have written 'that, in looks at least, Dewey resembled "a cross between a philosophical anarchist and Robert Louis Stevenson"). Dewey was not, for example, exactly clear on the future role of the state and he seems to have had little taste for anarchist "direct action"--however peaceful. I do not argue, accordingly,

that he was an anarchist without knowing it or that anarchism is itself so vague that his thought, as he worked it out, is easily subsumed. Nevertheless, we can advance our understanding of Dewey and of the problems of political philosophy, if we take a fresh look at his writings from the vantage point of anarchism.

This will be the main aim of this paper. Still; there is a historical argument to be made, an argument which seems to me to be very important, but which can be but hinted at here. That is, not only is it not farfetched to juxtapose Dewey and anarchism, but perhaps more fundamentally, on the present view, the first World War and the period immediately following were crucial years for radical political thought. Dewey was caught up in this, and as I shall suggest, it left decided marks on his thought.

We need, perhaps, to be reminded that Dewey was twenty-seven when the bomb was thrown at Haymarket Square (1886), already fifty-eight when the Great War was coming to an end and the Bolshevik revolution erupted. Active in public issues at least from his Chicago days (from 1894-1904), Dewey nonetheless wrote no political philosophy until perhaps 1908, the several chapters which he wrote as part of *Ethics*, with James H. Tufts. World War I seems to have been critical for him, as for many others.

In *German Philosophy and Politics* (1915), his first systematic political work, Dewey traced the philosophic basis of patriotic statism in Germany and concluded that "the present situation presents the spectacle of the breakdown of the whole philosophy of Nationalism, political, racial and cultural" (p. 130).<sup>2</sup> Opening a theme to which he returned repeatedly, he attacked the idea of "national sovereignty" and argued that "the situation calls for a more radical thinking," more radical than "arbitration, treaties, international judicial councils, schemes of international disarmament, peace funds and peace movements" (*ibid.*). Dewey was correct in calling for "more radical thinking" of the problems, but unfortunately, he was entirely wrong if he hoped that statism was dead. As is well known, of course, Dewey supported the allied war effort, as did Kropotkin and a host of other "internationalists" in the radical parties of Europe. Indeed, patriotic statism and imperialist war had hardly run its course.

In 1919, a host of radicals, including the anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, became the victims of a virulent Americanism and were deported. With Dewey, Norman Thomas, Clarence Darrow,

Roger N. Baldwin and others as founders, the American Union Against Militarism became, in 1920, The American Civil Liberties Union. The Red Scare was by now in full flower.

Dewey had known Goldman and Berkman, having shared platforms with them on several occasions. Baldwin has reported that "she had a very high regard for [Dewey's] ideas," a view which, as I shall argue, is hardly surprising given the coincidence of so many of their ideas. For his part, Dewey found that Emma Goldman's "reputation as a dangerous woman was built up by a conjunction of yellow-journalism and ill-advised police raids" --a fact which Dewey would find increasingly ominous as the decade proceeded.<sup>3</sup> It was during this time, as Hook has noted, that Dewey "made the great turn" and came to believe in the essential correctness of socialist diagnoses of America's ills.<sup>4</sup>

The ACLU was hardly sufficient. The 1921 trial of the acknowledged anarchists, Sacco and Vanzetti, and their subsequent execution in 1927 --for their beliefs and not for the unproved charges against them -- had a profound effect on Dewey. As he saw it, the events had put America On trial.<sup>5</sup> Almost certainly, they forced him to considerably temper whatever optimism he might have had regarding the use of intelligence in conditions where emotions are so easily mobilized and manipulated in the service of reactionary politics. As I shall develop, these considerations became an increasingly important part of Dewey's incisive analysis of the failures of present arrangements.

In 1928, Dewey visited the Soviet Union and reported that his "own antecedent notions--or, if you will, prejudices, underwent their most complete reversal (C&E, I, p. 425). Assessing the revolution as "an experiment to discover whether the familiar democratic ideals --familiar in words, at least--... will not be most completely realized in a social regime based on voluntary cooperation, on conjoint workers' control and management of industry..." Dewey concluded enthusiastically that "'its future is of less account than is the fact of this achieved revolution of heart and mind, this liberation of a people to consciousness of themselves as a determining power in the shaping of their ultimate fate" (*ibid.*, p. 424, p. 380).

Two key books were written during this period, *The Public and Its Problems* (1927) and *Individualism Old and New* (1929). But with the Great Depression and the failure of the existing major political parties to respond to the challenge, Dewey--as a *radical*-- faced a dilemma.

The socialist and anarchist radical traditions, reflective of their nine-

teenth century European roots, had always been *revolutionary* in the sense that radical social change was seen to involve a mass insurrection against the prevailing order of things. But in contrast to socialists, communists, anarchists and most American radicals of the 1920's and 30's, Dewey saw no evidence for this view. As he put it, "I do not... hear the noises of an angry proletariat" (ION, p. 78£.). But--and this must be understood--it was *not* because they were drowned out by "shouts of eagerness for adventurous opportunity"--however much this was the official gospel of America. Rather, for Dewey, "the murmurs of discontent are drowned" by "the murmurs of lost opportunities, along with the din of machinery, motor cars and speakeasies" (*ibid*).

These are powerful metaphors and suggest an analysis, to be developed below, which is far more subtle than the ones offered by the mechanical formulas of the period's revolutionaries. But if so, then Dewey's question at this time was, how to be radical and *still* be relevant?

This question has always been especially difficult for Americans and it was so for Dewey. His own quandaries on this score go some way, indeed, toward explaining his efforts--ultimately unsuccessful--to generate (beginning in 1931) a genuine radical, mass-based, third-party alternative. Although it may be now forgotten, Dewey was arguing, by the 1929 writing of *Individualism Old and New*, that 'our presidential elections are upon the whole determined by fear' and that neither of the major parties could be vehicles for radical change --even if this change was to be incrementally won. On the other hand, Dewey could not align himself unambiguously with the Socialist Party either. Like the anarchists, the socialists too were isolated.<sup>6</sup> Kropotkin's sadly prophetic letter to Lenin, written in 1920, identified a significant reason, a reason which Dewey fully appreciated. Kropotkin wrote: "If the present situation continues, the very word 'socialism' will turn into a curse. ..."<sup>7</sup> Indeed, in one sense, the problem of the present essay, and, I believe, still a problem of our time, is to recover an *idea*: Dewey referred to it as "the idea of democracy," but others have called it "socialism," and still others have called it "anarchism." In this regard, Dewey's idea of democracy is neither a nostalgic Jeffersonianism nor a liberal pluralism. I shall argue that it is *anarchist* insofar as it contains:

- (1) a view of an ideal, noncoercive, nonauthoritarian society;
- (2) a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this antiauthoritarian ideal;
- (3) a view of human nature that

justifies the hope of significant progress toward the ideal; and (4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of noncoercive, nonauthoritarian and decentralist alternatives.<sup>8</sup>

*Dewey's Critique of Existing Society and his Vision of the Good Society*

In his most systematic work on the state, *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey attempts a generic and empirical approach to the question, What is the State? Disavowing the utility of a series of traditional doctrines, he argues that associated action --a universal trait-- has consequences, sometimes confined to those who directly share in the transaction and sometimes not. When those "indirectly and seriously affected...form a group," we can speak of "The Public" (p. 35). And when this public "is organized and made effective by means of representatives" who "care for" its special interests, then and in so far, we may speak of the state.

This analysis, made rich by Dewey's knack for illustration and sometimes brilliant but not immediately relevant asides, is both important and badly misleading. The analysis is important because it allows us to see that "in no two ages or places is there the same public" (p. 33). Moreover, it allows us to see that State and Society are not the same, that *in* states, there are governments --agencies which "represent" individuals *in* society. Finally, it allows us to see that "a state" is only as good as its public and that there *is* no "model pattern" which makes a state a good or true state (p. 45).

But the analysis is seriously misleading insofar as it leads us to think of *states* as universal entities. Dewey's concern, as a long footnote makes clear, *is* with functions, not structures. He is thus quite ready to admit that "the state" is a "very modern institution." Yet, he insists, "all history, or almost all, records the exercise of analogous *functions*" (p.65f.note7).

In a sense, of course, this is true. The idea that "special agencies and measures must be formed" if "extensive and enduring consequences" are to be 'attended to' has a general applicability --depending crucially on what *is* concretely meant by "special agencies and measures." But as Dewey sees, these "special agencies" and the public which they "represent" are open to an almost infinite range of possibilities. For better or for worse, "state," "government," even "public" are very modern terms with very definite modern connotations. Moreover, while we use the term "state" to refer indiscriminately to any sort of political body, from

primitive clan organizations to *poleis*, to the Roman Empire, the word "state" properly denotes what are very modern political bodies. However great are the differences between (modern) states, between e.g., the Absolutist State which emerged in the 17th century, contemporary capitalist or communist states, liberal democratic states and totalitarian states, all of them are states in the quite clear sense that they are legally defined entities claiming sovereignty and a monopoly of legitimate force. Each circumscribes an *extended* territory and a very *large* and heterogeneous population. Each has a *centralized* organizational apparatus engaged in continuous administration and having both the "authority" and, especially in this century, the ability to dramatically affect the conditions of life of its population --for better or for worse.

Now Dewey recognized this. Not every association is a state or even has state-like characteristics. At one extreme are associations "which are too narrow and restricted in size to give rise to a public" (p. 39). "Immediate contiguity, face to face relationships, have consequences which generate a community of interests, a sharing of values, too direct and vital to occasion a need for political organization" (*ibid.*). Indeed, within a community, "the state is an impertinence" (p. 41).

"Villages and neighborhoods shade imperceptibly into a political public" (p. 43) and there may or may not be agencies which are specifically its instrument. Kropotkin could still refer to the Medieval commune and Dewey to the early New England town. Further along the continuum of historical associations is perhaps the *polis* of the ancient world, where as Dewey says, "much of the intimacy of the vivid and prompt personal touch of the family endures while there has been added the transforming aspiration of a varied, freer, fuller life, whose issues are so momentous that in comparison the life of the neighborhood is parochial and that of the household dull" (p. 44).

Still of a very different sort, we can identify "empires due to conquest where political rule exists only in forced levies of taxes and soldiers; and in which, though the word state may be used, the characteristic signs of a public are notable for their absence" (p. 43.). Finally, as Dewey argues, but which needs emphasis, "for long periods of human history ...the state is hardly more than a shadow thrown upon the family and neighborhood by remote personages. ...It rules but it does not regulate. ...The intimate and familiar propinquity group is not a social unity within an exclusive whole. It is; for almost all purposes, society itself" (p. 41.).

These points are not peripheral to comprehending the problem of *The Public and Its Problems*, even if Dewey's effort to treat the state generically tempts us to treat them as historical asides. As Kropotkin and others in the anarchist tradition often argued, the state *as we understand it*, is a very modern phenomenon. And there is nothing necessary about it. Moreover, as Dewey and the anarchists saw, the development of the modern state meant also the emergence of an entirely new organization for war, the *obliteration* of community and the *suffocation* of the personal and the intimate. Both were concerned to address the questions and to offer analyses and programs in these terms. But this need not be a nostalgic irrelevancy--unless, of course, we uncritically accept the framework assumptions of the modern state and *then* proceed to political inquiry.

Methodologically, Dewey was committed to a fully historical and contextual mode of inquiry and he recognized that the problems of contemporary political arrangements were not those of the past. Nor accordingly would past solutions suffice. At the global level, Dewey deeply appreciated the problem of the modern state. In *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), he extended a central theme of *German Philosophy and Politics*, and diagnosed the failure of "many schools of thought, varying even more widely in respect to method and conclusion, [yet] agreed upon the final consummating position of the state. ...They do not question the unique and supreme position of the State in the social hierarchy." Dewey concluded: "Indeed, that conception has hardened into *unquestionable dogma* under the title of sovereignty" (RIP, p. 201). But perhaps he put matters most graphically in his 1927 essay, "Nationalism and Its Fruits." He there wrote:

Patriotism, National Honor, National Interests and National Sovereignty are the four foundation stones upon which the structure of the National State is erected. It is no wonder that the windows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that its inmates are fear, jealousy, suspicion, and that War issues regularly from its portals (C&E, II, p. 803).

Except for explicit anarchist thought --and even then, not all of it -no one saw more clearly than Dewey that for the modern age, the State was not part of the solution, but was, instead, an essential part of the problem.

The structural dynamics of inter-state relations were not his only concern, however, for there were effects on the relations *within* states. This is a fundamental concern of *The Public and Its Problems*, in particular as regards the most progressive form of the modern state--the Democratic State. Although it is often overlooked --or downplayed-- Dewey had no illusions about it. As in many other places, he sharply distinguishes democracy as an *idea* or *ideal* and democracy as a *mode of government*. On Dewey's analysis, all states *have* governments and all governments "represent" some public. But there are different institutional arrangements by which governments exist and "represent" some public. For Dewey, then, political democracy is "a specified practice in selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials" (PP, p. 82).

Dewey argued that political democracy emerged at a specific period in the development of the modern state and that "it emerged as a kind of net consequence of a vast multitude of responsive adjustments to a vast number of situations..." (p. 84). Indeed, in no sense did Dewey succumb to the mystifying rationalizations of liberal democratic political theory --to the idea, e.g., that democratic institutions function so as to implement something called "the will of the people." He said:

Instead of individuals who in the privacy of their consciousness make choices which are carried into effect by personal volition, there are citizens who have the blessed opportunity to vote for a ticket of men mostly unknown to them, and which is made up by an under-cover machine in a caucus whose operations constitute a kind of political predestination (PP, p. 120).

Political democracy, or better, *modern* political democracy, is a *statist* form and, no doubt, it has consequential merits. But as Dewey writes, it is a means, *not* for realizing the *idea* of democracy, but "to counteract the forces that have so largely determined the possession of rule by accidental and irrelevant factors and..., to counteract the tendency to employ political power to serve private "instead of public ends" (PP, p. 83). For Dewey, the "full reality" of political democracy was not that painted by patriotic publicists, nor did it meet the goals, limited as they were, which had brought it into existence. His indictment was severe: "In a word, the new forms of combined action due to

the modern economic regime control present policies, much as dynastic interests controlled those of two centuries ago. They affect thinking and desire more than did the interests which formerly moved the state" (p. 108).

In the next year (1928), even more in the spirit of Marx and left anarchism, Dewey observed that the fusion of political and economic liberalism, the attainment of political rights and guarantees of private property which liberal democracy represents, had "emancipated the classes whose special interest they represented, rather than human beings impartially" (PP, p. 270). The text continues:

The notion that men are equally free to act if only the same legal arrangements apply equally to all --irrespective of differences in education, in command of capital, and the control of the social environment which is furnished by the institution of property --is a pure absurdity, as facts have demonstrated (*ibid.*, p. 271) .

Dewey's analysis of the Democratic State *is* radical and called for radical solutions. In his terms, the problem was not with the *instruments* of the public, but with the public itself. The public was "inchoate and unorganized," "lost," "eclipsed," "confused" and "bewildered." This theme, expressed in many different ways and in many different places is at the basis of his radical critique of the political state.

In *Individualism Old and New*, he attacked the ideology of individualism, repeating earlier indictments of its mythological character, and he spoke of "the lost individual," lost because while persons "are now caught up in vast complex of associations, there is no harmonious and coherent reflection of the import of these connections into the imaginative and emotional outlook on life." Blunted, if not impossible, is "the give and take of participation, of a sharing and significance of the integrating factors." Instead, we have conformity, "a name for the absence of vital interplay; the arrest and benumbing of communication" (ION, p. 85£.).

Moreover, here as in other places also, Dewey attributes our "rapacious nationalism" to a situation in which "corporateness has gone so far as to detach individuals from their old local ties and allegiances but not far enough to give them a new center and order of life". While "modern industry, technology and commerce have created modern

nations in their external form" and "armies and navies exist to protect commerce, to make secure the control of raw materials, and to command markets, ...the balked demand for genuine cooperativeness and reciprocal solidarity in daily life finds an outlet in nationalistic sentiment." Finally, "if the simple duties of peace do not establish a common life, the emotions are mobilized in the service of a war that will supply its temporary simulation" (*ibid.*, p. 61f). Indeed, the windows of *our* building are also closed to the light of heaven.

In *Freedom and Culture* (1939), he spoke of a kind of "molluscan organization, soft individuals within and a hard constrictive shell without" (p. 160). In this text, the problem is put in terms of "culture": "The problem is to know what kind of culture is so free in itself that it conceives and begets political freedom as its accompaniment and consequence" (p. 6). Dewey is clear that present culture militates *against* such a consequence and that "the situation calls emphatic attention to the need for face-to-face associations, whose interactions with one another may offset if not control the dread impersonality of the sweep of present forces" (p. 159). Nevertheless, as John McDermott has rightly noted, "Dewey expresses deep reservations about the external signs of progress, whether of material or intellectual accomplishment."<sup>9</sup> McDermott calls our attention to the following:

Schooling in literacy is no substitute for the dispositions which were formerly provided by direct experiences of an educative quality. The void created by lack of relevant personal experiences combines with the confusion produced by impact of multitudes of unrelated incidents to create attitudes which are responsive to organized propaganda, hammering in day after day the same few and relatively simple beliefs asseverated to be 'truths' essential to national welfare (F&C, p. 46).

But *this* problem, the problem of the public, was not for Dewey to be reduced to that of private property and to the domination of politics by "the modern economic regime." To be sure, "the philosophers of 'individualism' predicted truly" when "they asserted that the main business of government is to make property interests secure" (PP, p. 105f.). Nevertheless, "economic determinism" was not the whole story for Dewey. On the other hand, the problem was not to be solved either by changes in the organization of government. "The problem lies

deeper," he wrote. "The search for the conditions under which the public may find and express itself "is necessarily precedent to any fundamental change in the machinery" (p. 146).

What, then, are the conditions which need to be brought into existence to rediscover the public? According to Dewey, it is simply democracy. But we must repeat, this doesn't mean "that the evils can be remedied by introducing more machinery of the same kind...or by refining and perfecting that machinery" (p. 144). It means democracy "in its generic social sense" (p. 147). Democracy here refers to the *idea* of democracy, the idea of democracy *as* community. What needs to be done is to identify the conditions of *community* and to bring them into existence.

The identification of the idea of democracy and the idea of community may be Dewey's most characteristic doctrine. He seems to have arrived at it early and to have never abandoned it. And he gave it a clear and special meaning. .

*Democracy and Education* (1916) gives one of the better statements of democracy as "more than a form of government" and as "primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 87). Dewey points out that "we cannot set up, out of our heads, something we regard as an ideal society" (p. 83). The problem, rather, "is to extract the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist. ..." From two such traits, Dewey derives "a standard": "How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared?" and "How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?" (*ibid.*).<sup>10</sup>

These themes are more fully developed in *The Public and Its Problems* where Dewey reasserts that "regarded as an ideal, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community itself" (p. 148). Dewey is here at pains to emphasize the task of *knowledge* and *participation* in the constitution of the democratic community.

The complexities and scope of indirect consequence had destroyed communities. Although as individuals we are *interdependent*, community exists only when "the consequences of combined action are perceived and become an object of desire and effort" (p. 151). It is then that "a distinctive share in mutual action is consciously asserted and claimed" (p. 152). It is then that "I" can become "We." Moreover, as Rousseau had already seen, "interdependence provides just the situation which makes it possible and worthwhile for the stronger and abler to exploit

others for their own ends) to keep others in a state of subjection where they can be utilized as animated tools" (p. 155).

But if as Dewey reads Rousseau, the solution is "a return to the condition of independence based on isolation," then asserts Dewey, "it was hardly seriously meant" (*ibid.*). "The only possible solution" is nevertheless indicated. It is "the perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action" (p. 155). This too can define the idea of denocracy:

Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy (p. 149).

Community requires communication and it requires knowledge, but crucially, the kind of knowledge which is "the prime condition of a democratically organized public is a kind of knowledge and insight which does not yet exist" (p. 166). For Dewey, such knowledge is a knowledge which is *shared*, which funds experience with *common* meanings, transforms needs and wants into *mutually understood* goals and which thereby *consciously* directs *conjoint* activity. As it is, knowledge is merely technique: "knowledge goes relatively but little further than that of the competent skilled operator who manages a machine. It suffices to employ the conditions which are before him. Skill enables him to turn the flux of events this way or that in his neighborhood. It gives him no control of the flux" (p. 166).

Dewey fully recognized, both as *ideal* and as *possibility*, that the idea of returning to some barricaded and *provincially* defined context was misconceived. On the other hand, he persistently demanded that the *basic* and *fundamental* locus of life had to be the neighborly community. He asserted:

In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse.... The Great

Community, in the sense of free and full communication is conceivable. But it can never possess all the qualities which mark a local community. It will do its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience of local associations (p. 211).

Indeed,

Whatever the future may have in store, one thing is certain. Unless local community life can be restored the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify itself (p. 216).

For Dewey, deliberative participation in conjoint activity, the shared communication of goals and outcomes of that activity, the communication of meanings which that presupposes, is generalizable to the Great Community, but inevitably, at an increasing degree of abstraction and dilution. If "in its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse" --for there to be *genuinely* deliberative participation, *immediate* recognition of shared meanings, and *concrete* satisfaction of purposes consciously aimed at -- then as one moves away from the *local* community, "community" becomes increasingly shallow and more watery. *On the other hand*, at every *increasingly inclusive* level there must be *some* "ordering" and *some* sharing.

This, however, is the anarchist image of the good society. Thus Martin Buber:

The collectivity is not a warm, friendly gathering but a great link-up of economic and political forces inimical to the play of romantic fancies, only understandable in terms of quantity, expressing itself in actions and effects --a thing which an individual has to belong to with no intimacies of any kind but all the time conscious of his energetic contribution...

An organic commonwealth --and only such commonwealths can join together to form a shapely and articulated race of (persons) -- will never build itself up out of individuals but only out of small and ever small communities: a nation is a community to the degree that it is community of communities.<sup>11</sup>

There remains, however, a legitimate question and an ambivalence in Dewey, even given that his image of the Great Community and his criticism of existing societies is profoundly anarchistic. It is the question, whether and in what sense, the idea of government may be still relevant? There are two questions. First, what constitutes an anarchist answer to this question? Second, what seems to be Dewey's answer?

Different anarchists have given different sorts of analyses of the relevant issues, but it may be that the main tradition of anarchist thought is best described not as "anarchy," but as Buber put it, as "anocracy" (*an-ak-racy*) --"not absence of government but absence of domination." This cuts two ways, meaning not only that non-governmental forms of domination are to be rejected, but also that non-dominating "government" may be tolerated, indeed required.

Anarchists are anti-state insofar as we keep in mind that the state is a particular kind of political entity which because of its nature, constricts and disallows democracy as a mode of life. Its institutions are inherently structures of domination. But "government" is consistent with anarchist principles if by "government" one means roughly what the Greeks and Rousseau had in mind; namely "a commission" or an "employment" which serves--now to use Dewey's extremely useful language --active and articulated *publics*. An articulated public could still use, might very well *need*, "agencies" in this sense. "Government" a modern word which in this context must now be stripped of its modern connotations --will not *rule*, and the holders of "office" will not be *rulers*--if by that one means that they will not be in a position to *legitimately dominate* those they "represent."

This position can be re-posed in terms of the question of *legitimacy* of law and government.<sup>12</sup> Dewey's stance in this regard is strikingly similar to the one advanced by William Godwin in his classic *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* ( 1793) , perhaps the first systematic effort at anarchist theory.

Godwin began with a dialectical criticism of liberal political philosophy, and especially with the familiar idea that obedience to and the authority of government derive from contract. Finding unsurmountable difficulties in this theory, Godwin shifts to a utilitarian ground and finds that justice is the key. Three kinds of authority are distinguished: to one's judgment, to specialized knowledge and to sanctions. On this view, then, if a rule is just, it should be complied with --but because

one can *see* that the rule is just, *not* because of some mythological contract. Similarly, for Dewey, the question, "Why should the will of rulers have more authority than that of others?" and "Why should the latter submit?" are *spurious* questions, the "dialectical consequence of ...theories...which define the state in terms of an antecedent causation..." (*Public*, p. 53). Dewey was quite correct in holding that *it* was these sorts of theories which dominated modern political thought. But in rejecting the very formulation of the question, Dewey came preciously close to the anarchist Godwin.

Thus, "the regulations and laws of the State are misconceived when they are viewed as commands" (p. 53). Commands presuppose a commander. If so, we can then ask the question, what gives the commander the right to command? What grounds my duty to him? For Dewey, however, laws are *but* instruments: "the institution of conditions under which persons make their arrangements with one another" (p. 54). They are "a means of doing for a person what otherwise only his own foresight, if thoroughly reasonable, could do" (p. 56). Evidently, on *this* view, as Godwin had also insisted, rules are good or bad *only insofar* as they are means for doing what reasonable people *would* do and for assisting them in getting those things done. Their justification needs nothing else. Indeed, it is the *spurious* theories of law and the state which lead us to look elsewhere and which, ultimately, cause us to *blindly* follow rules which are not so justified.<sup>14</sup>

"Anarchism," a transliteration from the Greek, means literally "without a ruler" and because in some contexts, *in* the absence of a ruler -- a commander or someone to *give* orders --there is disorder, anarchy can also denote chaos. Anarchists do not, of course, assume that this must be so and believe that ideally at least, individuals can be *self-* governing. Indeed, they believe that *it* is primarily the *mystified complexity* of the state, as Godwin put\$ it, "the craft and mystery of governing," "the pernicious notion of an extensive territory," "the dreams of glory, empire and national greatness" which prohibit such self-governance. Even worse, *it is* the myth of *popular sovereignty* which, paradoxically, has so successfully propelled the mystification of the state. Compare here Godwin and Dewey. First Godwin:

Too much stress has undoubtedly been laid upon the idea, as of a grand and magnificent spectacle, of a nation deciding for itself upon some great public principle, and of the highest

magistracy yielding its claim when the general voice has pronounced (p. 115).

And Dewey:

The familiar eulogies of the spectacle of "free men" going to the polls to determine by their personal volitions the political forms under which they live is a specimen of the tendency to take whatever is readily seen as the full reality of the situation (PP, p. 101).

Dewey could no doubt agree with Godwin, that in his society, like Godwin's, too many revere too many established institutions and bad laws, that "as supernatural matters have progressively been left high and dry ...the actuality of religious taboos has more and more gathered about secular institutions, especially those connected with the nationalist state" (PP. p. 170). Indeed, "if 'holy' means that which is not to be approached nor touched, save with ceremonial precautions and by specially anointed officials, then such things are holy in contemporary political life" (*ibid.*).

David Wieck has perceptively observed that "the values which Dewey hoped to realize in a democracy...are realizable only in something approaching anarchy." But he may be correct in saying that 'about decentralism...Dewey hadn't paid heed to Kropotkin.'<sup>15</sup> Still, we may wonder.

As early as 1918, Dewey wrote that "if we are to have a world safe *for* democracy and a world *in* which democracy is safely anchored, the solution will be in the direction of a federated world government and a variety of freely experimenting and freely cooperating self-governing local, cultural and industrial groups" (C&E.II, p. 559f.). Forty years and *two* World Wars after he had called for "more radical thinking" about the sovereign state, Dewey wrote (in his 1946 Afterword to *The Public and Its Problems*) that "the *State* is a myth." He there offered "as a working principle," 'the idea of Federation as distinct from both isolation and imperial rule" (PP, p. 255).

Dewey did not, it seems, get clear about what this might mean concretely. Nevertheless, *if* we take the restoration of the local community as his point of departure, his vision is indeed powerful:

Territorial states and political boundaries will persist; but they will not be barriers which impoverish experience by cutting man off from his fellows; they will not be hard and fast divisions whereby external separation is converted into inner jealousy, fear, suspicion and hostility. Competition will continue, but it will be less rivalry for acquisition of material goods, and more emulation of local groups to enrich direct experience with appreciatively enjoyed intellectual and artistic wealth (PP, p. 217).

And the *material basis* for such a Great Community is within reach:

If the technological age can provide mankind with a firm and general basis of material security, it will be absorbed into a human age (*ibid.*).

Buber noted that "the socialist idea points of necessity, even in Marx and Lenin, to the organic construction of a new society out of little societies inwardly bound together by a common life and common work and their associations" (p. 99). But how much more is it true that the main and most distinctive themes in Dewey's social philosophy point --of necessity --to such a vision?

In the next part, I will seek to reinforce the foregoing claim by arguing that Dewey, along with the anarchists, parted ways with the Marxist-Leninists for approximately the same reasons and with approximately the same conclusions.

#### *Human Nature and the Problem of Social Change*

Dewey's social and political philosophy is close to anarchism as regards his view of social change. Both sharply contrast with Marxism in rejecting the idea that a "social revolution" could be made by the few for the many and in rejecting the idea that the "proletariat" must be the agent of an insurrectionary revolution.

The anarchist, as Dewey, does not deny the existence of class division in society and both affirm that a good society could not be class divided. But it was a mistake, on both of their views, to suppose that progressive change could have but one agent or that anyone agent of change could be sufficient. As Hook rightly pointed out, Dewey spoke of "class

struggles in their plural form."<sup>16</sup> Anarchists tended to speak more vaguely of "the people" or "the masses."

The matter of insurrection is more complicated. In the first place, some anarchists did believe in insurrection and in the use of such violence as had to attend insurrection.<sup>17</sup> Bakunin saw this in apocalyptic terms; Kropotkin believed it to be unavoidable, but hoped that the violence could be kept to a minimum. Tolstoi, at opposite poles from Bakunin, was consistently pacifist. But more important, anarchists tended to be undocinaire about the problems of revolutionary change, to orient programs to specific contexts and to emphasize pedagogic means. These emphases are, of course, wholly congenial to Dewey.

The emphasis on pedagogic means was implied by the most characteristic criticism by anarchists of Marxian politics. For the anarchist, *there could be no separation of the revolution process from the revolutionary goal*. Thus, Alexander Berkman:

It is only by growing to a true realization of their present position, by visualizing their possibilities and powers, by learning unity and cooperation, and practicing them, that the masses can attain freedom.<sup>18</sup>

Or Gustav Landauer:

One can throw away a chair or destroy a pane of glass; but those are idle talkers and credulous idolaters of words who regard the state as such a thing or as a fetish that one can smash in order to destroy it. The state *is* a condition, a certain relationship among human beings, a mode of behavior between (people); we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another....We are the state, and we shall continue to be the state until we have created institutions that form a real community and society of (persons).<sup>19</sup>

All this could be Dewey. But especially noticeable are Dewey's arguments, which parallel and often supplement and enrich the anarchist position.

Most anarchists have not been so naive as to suppose that persons are naturally *good*. Nor have they based their hopes or, more important, their *programs* on such a postulate -even if, unfortunately, they are

too frequently read that way. Some, e.g., Landauer, were influenced by romanticism and especially by Nietzsche. Others, e.g., Kropotkin, were influenced by the naturalism of Darwin. While I cannot here assess these different views of human nature, there is little doubt that Dewey was deeply concerned with the question and that his approach has considerable force.

Dewey did not think that human beings were *naturally* good, *naturally* intelligent or *naturally* free, since as is well known, on his view, human *impulses* and capacities were always realized socially. This meant that institutional arrangements were decisive: "Social arrangements are means of creating individuals" (RIP, p. 194).

But at the same time, Dewey did not find himself caught up in what he called "a vicious circle." For him, individuals, beginning from where they were, could change themselves *as* they change society. As Arthur Lothstein has rightly pointed out, Dewey dropped the self-enclosed metaphor of the circle for the dynamic and open-ended metaphor of the spiral. Dewey wrote, e.g.:

We are not caught in a circle; we traverse a spiral in which social customs generate some consciousness of interdependencies, and this consciousness is embodied in acts which in improving the environment generate new perceptions of social ties, and So on forever (HNC, in McDermott, p. 721).

This was possible since, in Dewey's terms, habits and customs could be deliberately transformed. "Habits," he argued, were the "mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for the most part under the influence of the customs of the group" (PP, p. 119). We are never "habitless," to be sure, but customs are nothing but the social "grooves" which are the result of previous habituations. At the social-psychological level, habits can be altered through *acting* differently; and because custom and social structure are themselves the product of repeated and multiplied acts, acting differently changes them too. Acting differently thus creates new conditions as it changes our perceptions, beliefs and desires.

For Dewey, the problem was essentially pedagogic. Purposive and progressive change in society, however, has to be *directed* and there must be definite *goals* in mind. Dewey was perfectly clear about this as regards education: "The conception of education as a social process and

function has no definite meaning, until we define the kind of society we have in mind" (D&E, p. 97). And in *Human Nature and Conduct* as in many, many other places, Dewey put great emphasis on educating the young:

...the cold fact of the situation is that the chief means of continuous, graded economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and desire. The young are not as yet as subject to the full impact of established customs (HNC, p. 127).<sup>20</sup>

Dewey was optimistic in his assessment that *the school* could be "the chief means" of social rectification. On his own premises, the school --like the experimental anarchist community --was not and could not be independent and disconnected from the large society. It is *inevitable*, accordingly, that it would tend to *reproduce* the habits and ideas of the larger society, since especially in the case of the schools, they depended for their existence on institutions interested explicitly in maintaining the *status quo*.

But the school was not the only place where changes could be wrought. Indeed, in terms of Dewey's theory, since *all* "habits" and *all* "customs" were sustained by repeated activities, any of them could be changed by changing these acts which sustain them. Nevertheless, if the alteration of activities and thence of habits and customs was not to issue in chaos --into merely a breakdown of the prevailing order of things, it had to be directed and unified, and as with the schools, there had to be definite goals in mind. There are but two alternatives. Either one *imposed* the change on individuals *or* one took advantage of opportunities to encourage and develop tendencies on the part of those affected to make the changes themselves. The former route, of course, is the method of revolutionary vanguard parties; the latter is the method. of democracy. It is possible to discern in Dewey's writings at least three "powerful objections to the strategy of imposed change.

First, and very generally, for Dewey, if intelligence is to be brought to bear on progressive social change, not only must we consider goals, but as well, we must consider the *particular* conditions and *particular* context and assess the *complex* possible consequences of possible strategies

for change. Imposing change *may* produce the desired outcome, but even *if* it does, it doesn't produce just *that* outcome. As Dewey summarized the point:

Doctrines, whether proceeding from Mussolini or Marx, which assume that because certain ends are desirable therefore those ends and nothing else will result from the use of force to attain them *is* but another example of the limitations put on intelligence by any absolutist theory (PM, p. 139) .

But Emma Goldman --with some of the same "doctrines" clearly in mind, would seem to concur heartily:

Anarchism is not...a theory of the future to be realized through divine inspiration. It is a living force in the affairs of life, constantly creating new conditions. The methods of anarchism therefore do not comprise an ironclad program to be carried out under all circumstances. Methods must grow out of the economic needs of each place and clime, and of the intellectual and temperamental requirements of the individual...Anarchism does not stand for military drill and uniformity; it does, however, stand for the spirit of revolt, in whatever form, against everything that hinders human growth.<sup>21</sup>

A second and related objection regards the difficulty --if not impossibility --of all-at-once, totalist, attempts at change. Dewey concluded:

The revolutionary radical...overlooks the force of ingrained habits. He *is* right, in my opinion, about the infinite plasticity of human nature. But he is wrong in thinking that patterns of desire, belief and purpose do not have a force comparable to the momentum of physical objects...Habit, not original human nature, keeps things moving most of the time (PM, p. 190).

Imposed change cannot be *sustained* because habits cannot be dramatically altered. That is why revolutionary societies tend to revert to *older* ways of activity, and worse, to reproduce the old structures but

in new institutional forms. Similarly, anarchists write of the "preparation" for the revolution to anarchistic society and emphasize the *pedagogic* problem of changing people--a problem not solvable by "divine inspiration," by violence and authoritarian tactics. Such changes will take time and if they are to be sustained, must be deeply rooted. This is suggested by the previous text quoted from Emma Goldman; it reoccurs with a different emphasis in this earlier text, almost in the language of Dewey:

The true criterion of the practical...is not whether (some scheme) can keep intact the wrong or foolish; rather is it whether the scheme has vitality enough to leave the stagnant waters of the old, and build as well as sustain, new life.<sup>22</sup>

I am suggesting here, of course, that anarchists do *not* have a utopic conception of *social change*, that they realize full well, that their *ideal* could not *come* into existence by means of some totalist transformation, as Goldman put it, through "divine inspiration." The idea that anarchists must reject anything short of their ideal as unjustifiable and *therefore* deserving of *immediate* destruction is not anarchism but nihilism. And this means that the new social forms, new habits and customs will be but painfully and slowly evolved. Daniel Guerin, a contemporary French anarchist writer notes:

Proudhon, in the midst of the 1848 Revolution, wisely thought that it would have been asking too much of his artisans to go, immediately, all the way to 'anarchy.' In default of his maximum program, he sketched out a minimum libertarian program: progressive reduction in the power of the State, parallel development of the power of the people from below....It seems to be the more or less conscious purpose of many contemporary socialists to seek out such a program.<sup>23</sup>

The anarchist, like Dewey, can have a vision of the good society without being lacking in programs. And if Dewey and the anarchists are correct, it is not the doctrinaire revolutionaries who are "practical," but as Goldman suggests, those who seek programs which are vital enough "to leave the stagnant waters of the old, and build as well as sustain new life."

It is hardly assumed here that the commitment of the anarchist tradition --and of Dewey --to a revolutionary process consistent with genuine democracy settles any of the difficult questions which will still need to be asked, or that Dewey and particular anarchist writers would necessarily or even likely agree on particular plans of action. Indeed, there is a very great difference between Dewey's emphasis on the methods of political democracy and the anarchist emphasis on what is called "direct action." However, as April Carter has correctly pointed out, while direct action "must be distinguished from constitutional and parliamentary styles of activity on the one hand, and from guerilla warfare on the other," not only do forms of direct action shade into parliamentary styles, as e.g., in sit-ins, strikes, and "civil disobedience," but as well, they may be best construed as a kind of crude and creative form of *direct* democracy. Insofar, accordingly, direct action may be entirely consistent with, indeed, a logical implication of, Dewey's social philosophy. As anarchists have often argued, such tactics are essentially *pedagogic* because they are vehicles by which persons learn and *practice* democratic participation.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, there may be considerable disagreement on whether the *state* is itself to be used and if so how, whether, e.g., as some anarchists have argued, one should entirely reject the vote, or political parties, whether one should seek alternative and parallel forms or whether it is possible to effect progressive change through existing structures.<sup>25</sup>

Nor finally, need there be agreement on the prospects and probability of change toward the ideal of democracy. Perhaps Dewey should here have the last word:

The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in human intelligence and the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not because these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to generate progressively the wisdom needed to guide collective again (D&EA, p. 402).

*Queens College, City University Of New York*

#### NOTES

1. C. Wright Mills, *Sociology and Pragmatism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 443f. and more recently, Charles Frankel, "John Dewey's Social

Philosophy," *New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977) have found Dewey's thought to be nostalgic. Alphonso I. Damico, *Individualism and Community, The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey* (Gainesville, Fla.: University Presses of Florida, 1978) discusses some of the literature relevant to "pluralistic democracy" and some of the problems regarding the relation of Dewey's theory of inquiry to his social philosophy, See also Mills on this point, pp. 318ff. and Chapters 20 and 21. George Novack in *Pragmatism Versus Marxism* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975) cites Maurice Cornforth as one example of the view that "pragmatism, particularly in the form which Dewey has given it, is the philosophy of American imperialism" (p. 275). Novack rejects this (silly) view even though he finds that Sidney Hook's uneven political career, including his defense of American imperialism, stems from pragmatism's "promiscuousness" (p. 82). It was Hook, of course, who attributed to Dewey "the best elements of Marx's thought" (*Reason, Social Myths and Democracy*: New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 132).

2. References to Dewey's writings will be indicated with abbreviations and page numbers within parenthesis. Bibliography and abbreviations follow the notes.

3. Quotations from Baldwin are from Paul Avrich, *The Modern School Movement: Anarchism and Education in the United States* (Princeton Press, 1980, p. 38) from an interview with Baldwin.

4. Sidney Hook, *John Dewey An Intellectual Portrait* (New York: John Day, 1939). See also Arthur Lothstein's excellent dissertation, "From Privacy to Praxis: The Case for John Dewey as a Radical Social Philosopher," New York University, 1979, Ch. 4.

5. For a discussion of Dewey's response to the trial and execution, see George Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind Of John Dewey*,. edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbon-Dale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Press, 1973).

6. See Frank A. Warren, *An Alternative Vision* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974). For Dewey's analysis of the need for a third party, see Bingham and Rodman (eds.), *Challenge of the New Deal* (New York, 1934) which reprints Dewey's important *Common Sense* essay, "Imperative Need for New Radical Party." See James Campbell's very useful account, in his dissertation, "Pragmatism and Reform: Social Reconstruction in the Thought of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead," SUNY, Stony Brook, 1979.

7. P. A. Kropotkin, *Selected Writings on Anarchism and Revolution*, edited by Martin A. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), p. 337.

8. The foregoing criteria for an anarchist social philosophy are quoted from John P. Clark, "What is Anarchism?" in *Anarchism: Nomos XIX*, edited by J. R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (New York, NYU Press, 1978), p. 13.

9. John J. McDermott (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (New York, Capricorn Books, 1973), p. 679.

10. In this book. Dewey identifies the dire consequences of Identifying "the civic function" of education with *The State*, and concludes that the very

idea of national sovereignty gives rise to a contradiction "between the wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and the narrow sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile pursuits and purposes" (p. 97).

11. Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 42. This indispensable little book may be the best single treatment of the dilemmas of the statist/ anarchist tensions, theoretical and practical, in the radical tradition. Buber and Dewey have very much in common and, perhaps, not surprisingly, Buber's anarchism is overlooked.

12. I have discussed the question of the legitimate state in *The Death of the State* (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1974), chapter II.

13. William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, abridged and edited by K. Codell Carter (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1971).

14. On this view, the problem of "civil disobedience" is misconceived, as Godwin, Thoreau --and Dewey, show. That is, whether in any given case, one should or should not comply with a law depends upon its justness *and* the consequences of complying or not. Cf. Dewey's little essay, "Conscience and Compulsion" (C&E, pp. J67-J80).

One should also note that Godwin, as most anarchist writers, conceives of the problem of coercive sanctions in straightforward consequentialist terms and argues that only at the *limit* of the anarchist ideal are they unjustifiable. Cf., e.g., Godwin, *op. cit.*, Book VII.

15. The first text is from David Wieck, "Anarchist Justice," in *Nomos XIX*, p. 235, the second is from his review of Paul Goodman's *Drawing the Line*, *Telos*, No. 35 (Spring, 1~78),

16. Lothstein carefully examines the pertinent literature in his "From Privacy to Praxis," Chapter IV. He rescues Dewey from Dewey's "right-wing epigones" and responds with force to some of Dewey's more mechanically-minded left critics. But Lothstein is himself critical.

17. This is as good a place as any to comment on the unfortunate association of anarchism with terrorism. Terrorism must be distinguished from violence as such. Understood as the idea that acts of violence against individuals or groups: assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, etc., are *means* of revolutionary change, terrorism has been rejected by *almost all* anarchist writers, yet it is true that one can identify a period of terrorist activity in several national histories. On this see, James Joll, *The Anarchists* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964) and Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* (Princeton University Press, 1967). The identification of anarchism with terrorism has, of course, had enormous consequences and, no doubt, goes some way toward explaining the discrediting of anarchism. For a perceptive account, see Emma Goldman, "The Psychology of Political Violence": (1910?), in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (New York: Dover, 1969). Dewey, we should recall, argued that "the only question which can be raised about the justification of force is that of comparative efficiency and economy of use" and "what is justly objected to as violence or undue coercion is a reliance upon wasteful and destructful means of accomplishing results" ("Force and Coercion" (1916) in C&E, II, p. 789).

18. Alexander Berkman, *What is a Communist Anarchist?* with an Introduction by Paul Avrich (New York: Dover, 1972), originally published as

*New and After: The ABC of Communist Anarchism* (1929). This is a very clear exposition of many of the key points of difference between anarchism and (the prevailing) Marxism.

19. Quoted by Eugene Lunn, *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 226, translated from "Schwache Stattdmänner, Schwacheres Volk" *Der Sozialist*. June, 1910.

20. American anarchists also put enormous emphasis on educating the young. The Spaniard, Francisco Ferrar, was a more direct influence on early 20th century efforts, but the pertinence of Dewey's view were fully recognized. For discussion, see especially, Paul Avrich, *The Modern School Movement*. It is interesting to notice that Dewey was not especially interested in educational experiments conducted within anarchist colonies, although he did visit the Stelton Colony and school in Stelton, N.J. On the other hand, many anarchists had little confidence in this route. Berkman said, "I myself...have little faith in colonies. You cannot build the new society that way" (quoted from Avrich, *ibid.*, p. 306).

21. "Anarchism: What it Really Stands for," in *Anarchism and Other Essays*

22. Goldman, *op. cit.*, p. 49. See also Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935), esp. pp. 62f.

23. Daniel Guerin, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), in Marshall S. Shatz (ed.), *The Essential Works of Anarchism*. (New York; Quadrangle, 1972), p. 550.

24. See April Carter, *Direct Action and Liberal Democracy* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).

25. Much recent radical theory has come to the conclusion that in the advanced capitalist states where liberal democracies exist, the only strategy to be pursued --consistent with a genuine socialism --requires an answer to this question:

How is it possible radically to transform the State in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy...are combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies? (Nicos Poulantzas. *State, Power and Socialism* (London: Verso, 1980).

Dewey's Writings. cited:

GPP *German Philosophy and Politics* (New York: Henry Holt. 1915) .

D&E *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1966, Enlarged Edition)

RIP *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

HNC *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Henry Holt, 1922) .

PP *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1954).

PF "Philosophies of Freedom," in R. J. Bernstein (ed.), *Experience, Nature and Freedom* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960) .

C&E *Characters and Events*. Two Vols., edited by Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1929)

LSA *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: Capricorn, 1963).

ION *Individualism Old and New* (New York: Capricorn, 1962).

F&C *Freedom and Culture* (New York: Capricorn, 1963) .

DB&EA "Democracy and Educational Administration," in Joseph Ratner (ed.), *Intelligence and the Modern world* (New York: Modern Library, 1939),

PM *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946).