

Philosophy and Politics: A Historical Approach to Marx and Dewey

If we begin with the political calamities of the last one hundred years and add, as at least part consequence of these, the upheavals in philosophy, literature, art and science, we can appreciate the present attractiveness of a political philosophy without foundations: There is no truth; only an endless "conversation" in a self-sufficient linguistic realm which is totally disconnected from any extra-linguistic reality - if such there be. Because God is dead, "human nature" has no content, and history is meaningless, the dream of creating a new kind of human society - the dream of utopian and revolutionary modern politics - is instead a nightmare. There is no knowable, objective, definable, transmittable common good; there are only "interests," not to be judged, still less to be accommodated. There is no responsible politics which is not impotent: Either we irresponsibly offer "the masses" ungrounded hope or, more responsibly, we reject the quest for "glittering triumph", perhaps even improvement, and settle for "the far more modest, though indispensable, concern to prevent 'catastrophes'." On this view of things, the belief that "everything is possible seems to have proved only that everything can be destroyed," that efforts "to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain."¹ With Camus, anguishing over Algeria, we may wonder how one can even write, knowing that what is said might provide an alibi for a Pol Pot or a terrorist willing to throw - or drop - a bomb.

The alternatives would seem to be these: Either one knows what is good and true, or one does not. If one does, then, must not one act on that knowledge, even if, finally, it turns out that one is wrong? On the other hand, if one does not know what is good and true, if perhaps there is no good and true, then, must we not be unwilling to act in the name of "the people," or history, or of our ideals? Instead, is it not the case that our commitment must be but to keep the conversation going?²

As "liberal," the anti-foundationalist alternative has an appeal. Indeed, it is just this which makes it a useful counter-revolutionary ideology. But the issue is misformulated. It is not that there is no basis for human solidarity - even if that basis is not to be discovered but created, nor that there is no "truth," even if like solidarity, it too is a social product. Nor is violence, as such, the problem. Like inaction, it is sometimes justified and sometimes not justified. For, unnoticed by the anti-foundationalist is the possibility of a politics which needs no foundations, a politics which does not guarantee success and does not presuppose that some person or party has a truth not shared by those in whose name they act. Put in other terms, the problem of modern politics is less the lack of "foundations" and more the absence of a genuinely democratic politics, a politics which aims at the creation of communities by the active participation of interdependent individuals, a politics in which "interests" become shared goods, a politics which insists that truth can only be our truth. In what follows, I argue that Marx and Dewey offered versions of this. On this view, we are "sculptors" or crafters, but we lack blueprints. On this view, we are actors in history, but we can-- and must -- write our own scripts.

I. Recovering Marx

Marx had some clear and definite ideas about democracy, ideas which remain unrealized, but *which* cannot be dismissed as utopian or as youthful extravagances or cynical subterfuge. Marx consistently held that participatory democracy was the goal of revolutionary transformation, that what we call modern democracy, though a form of alienated politics, was genuinely progressive, and finally - and most critically - that there could be no separation of revolutionary means from revolutionary ends. While the issues are contentious, I want to suggest that opposing views depend largely on an ahistorical reading of important texts and events. Critical in this regard is the persistent tendency to construe Marx's politics in terms of a misconstrual of the differences between Marx and the anarchists and to be anachronistic as regards later debates between revolutionary Marxists and social democrats.³

II. Marx's Analysis of the Democratic State

Characteristically, Marx' point of departure was criticism of Hegel, but while he rejected much in Hegel, he also found much of value. Hegel saw that the French Revolution had raised the problem of sovereignty in a critical way and that it was this problem with which "history is now occupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future."⁴ The problem was critical, because in the fully developed modern state the people could not be sovereign. On Hegel's view of the matter, "the sovereignty of the people" is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the 'people'. "Taken without its monarch and *the* articulation of the whole ... the people is a formless mass and no longer a state."⁵

In the fully developed modern state, there was a bifurcation of civil society and the state. Individuals live private lives and relate anonymously. It was thus that, unless articulated, the people are a "formless mass." On the other hand, the government the king, parliament, the bureaucracy and the police became the mode by which "the whole" was articulated and expressed. Failing to grasp the full force of the American "solution" to the problem of sovereignty, Hegel opted for a reactionary , solution, a constitutional monarchy.

Marx agreed fully with the Hegelian analysis of the bifurcation of civil society and the state, but he saw also that the Americans had, in a remarkable way, already solved the problem which Hegel believed had still to be solved. That is, Marx saw that the fully realized modern state would be a democratic state. The "solution", however, required that in the fully realized modern state, the alienation of individuals would be fully realized and at the same time fully obscured. In the democratic state, every adult is a "citizen" with full civil and political rights. Moreover, in virtue of the mechanisms of representative government, the people are "sovereign". But for Marx the reality was otherwise: Each citizen is "an imagined member of an imagined sovereignty, divested of his actual individual life and endowed with an unactual universality." In the democratic state, "liberators reduce citizenship, the political ..community, to a mere means for preserving [the] so-called. rights of man." "But this means man in his uncivilized and unsocial aspect, in his fortuitous existence and just as he is, corrupted by the entire organization of our society, lost and alienated from himself, oppressed by inhuman relations and elements."⁶

To say that in the democratic state individuals are "uncivilized" and "unsocial" and that they have "fortuitous existences" is not to say that individuals are barbaric, or nasty or motivated by greed - though this may also be true. It is to say rather that they live private lives, that they are isolated, that they relate anonymously, that their situations are "accidental" like their sex or race, and that while their powers are social, they are not socially realized. This is the result 'of "the entire organization of society," but in particular of the market structure of bourgeois society and the alienating structures of the modern state. As Thomas points out, "the state becomes a fetishistic personification of political potential, very much as the concept of capital designates the separation between the conditions of labor and the producer. Both are the members of society's own real force set up against them, opposed to them, and out of control."⁷ The people" are sovereign but they have no power over the conditions of their lives. As sovereigns in an illusory community, they are in reality controlled by "inhuman relations." A number of critical implications flow from Marx' analysis.

First, the problem for Marx is first and last political, of what has to be done and to happen if people are to gain control of the circumstances -- now alienated -- which structure their lives. This problem was not to be solved "economistically" nor by perfecting the instrumentalities of the democratic state. This distinguished Marx' view from e.g., Proudhon on the one hand, and on the other, from republicans. Second, to achieve the goal is to overcome the duality of civil society and the state, and this means, as Marx writes, that "in true democracy, the political state disappears (*untergeht*)." This view, of course, has its Rousseauian intimations and suggests the critical point of comparison to nineteenth-century anarchisms and social democrats. But third, in contrast to anarchisms which share with Marx the idea that state power must be broken, if this was to be achieved, it had to be achieved by an agency which did not reflect the alienated relations of private property. As he wrote, it was the work of "a class with radical chains, a class in civil society that is not of civil society, a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering."⁸

These ideas lead directly to the 1848 *Communist Manifesto* where, recurring to the Aristotelian lineage of the idea that democracy was class rule by the poor, Marx and Engels write that "the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to establish democracy." In this democracy, to be sure, "the political state" has not disappeared, for as a statist form, this democracy was still a "dictatorship," albeit a dictatorship of the majority, the proletariat, against the minority - the owners of the means of production. It was thus that it was but "a first step in the revolution of the working class."⁹

But it was the Paris Commune of 1871 which seems to have given Marx a paradigm for what might be, a paradigm which, prefigured in actuality, has earlier intimations of "true democracy." As he said, the democracy of the Commune was a "historically new creation" and "the glorious harbinger of a new society."¹⁰ Still, it is vital to be clear about what Marx saw in it and why also that, for him, it was a premature and finally unwise act of heroism.

III. The Commune and Democracy

For us "democracy" refers to statist electoral politics and "anarchism" refers either to a silly utopianism or to terrorist politics. If in the nineteenth century, these terms had not yet been thoroughly appropriated by the enemies of rule by the *demos*, it was already the case, as Marx noted, that "it was generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterpart of older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they bear a certain likeness."¹¹ In what sense, then, was the Commune "a completely new historical creation"?

On the one hand, it was anarchist in the sense that it broke state power. As he wrote: "The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the communal Constitution and to become a reality by the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence."¹² But it was not anarchist in the sense of Stirner, Proudhon or Bakunin. Marx took these writers seriously--with due cause -- but because, on his view, they lacked an adequate understanding of political economy, they were mistaken both as regards their vision of a good society and as regards the means of attaining it. Putting the matter as briefly as possible, for Marx, anarchists were inverted statist. Since on their view the state was the problem, once rid of it, all would be well. Because for them there was little point in discriminating between forms of the state, transformative activity, whether the anti-revolutionary activity of Proudhon or the conspiratorial activity of Bakunin, had to wash its hands of the state. As Proudhon said, "to indulge in politics is to wash one's hand in dung."¹³

Marx saw the matter very differently. His view of the Commune gives us a start in seeing how. In the first place, the Commune was

a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class ...¹⁴

We must be clear what this means. The Commune had fashioned the first "government" -- the word must be used gingerly -- which aimed at realizing full control over the circumstances of life by ordinary citizens. It was in this sense "expansive" in contrast to those forms which took for granted the conditions of ordinary life. Even the best case, e.g., the democracy of ancient Athens, took these for granted. Previous democracies, like non-democracies, were "repressive" in that they aimed but to replace the rule of one class for another - without altering the alienating conditions which called for class rule in the first place. For example, in the ancient *polis*, "politics" regarded the struggle between rich and poor over decisions of law and war, but the poor were not social revolutionaries in the sense that they either did or could aim at reconstituting society. This idea, which was owed to the French Revolution, regarded the perception, now familiar largely through the thought of Hegel and of Marx, that human history was radically unlike natural history in being the product of human activity. For Marx this meant that

Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all natural premises as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjects them to the power of united individuals.¹⁵

Political democracy was "a great step forward" because it acknowledged "the sovereign people," but it was but "the final form" of emancipation "within the prevailing order of things."

Indeed, it was just for these reasons that the Commune could not have succeeded: "Apart from the fact that this was merely the rising of a city under exceptional circumstances, the majority of the Commune was in no way socialist nor could it be."¹⁶ The "exceptional circumstances" which produced the Commune left the full machinery of the repressive French State in place, and insofar, the Communards faced formidable odds. But in addition, because the Communards were not organized, politically active workers, their political capacities were undeveloped.

The problem was not that the Communards lacked revolutionary consciousness, for they surely knew how to die on the barricades, nor was the problem economic, regarding their incapacity at the existing stage of economic development to conquer scarcity, but that an alienated citizenry was in no position to reabsorb their alienated social powers. They were still isolated, "private" persons who, as not yet thoroughly interdependent, could not organize themselves so as to realize fully the powers which they had. As Edwards says: "the Communards belonged more to the past tradition of Paris revolutionaries than presaging the industrial struggles of the future."¹⁷ As an alliance of artisans, of workers in craft industries, of petty bourgeois shopkeepers and traders, it was impossible for them to overcome "the contradiction between public and private life, between general and particular interests." It was thus that "with a modicum of common sense ... [the Commune] could have reached a compromise with Versailles useful to the whole mass of the people the only thing that could have been reached at the time."¹⁸

The anarchists saw and celebrated the fact that the Commune was not made by "the proletariat" and was instead an alliance of "the people," and they saw and celebrated the spontaneity and disorganization which was a critical mark of the Commune. But, for Marx, their failure to see that unless the Communards were to have a long period for self-education in self-rule -- an impossibility in the circumstances of Civil War-- the Commune had to fail.

A second point of comparison between Marx' understanding of the Commune and anarchist thought regards the question of "government." For us, either there is a government or there is "anarchy" - no authority, no coercive organization. The idea was surely reinforced by a great deal of anarchist polemics - especially in the nineteenth century, but the confusion is deeper, depending on the eighteenth-century identification of rule with government.

In the ancient *polis*, there was, strictly speaking, no government; there was rule by

one, few or many. Political power was unmediated. In the modern state, however, there are always governments, the executive, parliament, bureaucracies and the police, and they always claim to "represent" the "governed". It is easy then to suppose that the middle ground between self-rule and rule by others is modern political democracy, "representative government". But for Marx (and Dewey, as we shall see), this was not the only alternative. The institutional novelty of the Commune was in just this.

There would be "functionaries" of the people, "agents" in the strictest of senses, and these would be under strict "instructions" from those whom they represent. These functionaries would not be as in bourgeois democracy merely "authorized" to rule those who elect them, but would be as ambassadors or military commanders, "responsible" and "revocable" at the pleasure of those who elected them. "Sovereignty", as in Rousseau, would not be alienated. Accordingly, it would not be illusory. As Marx wrote:

Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business. And it is well-known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic investiture.¹⁹

It is hard to know how to classify this arrangement. Is it a "government" with power but no authority or with authority but no power? It would "manage" but it would be, like the police and the courts - which are not to be abolished - "elective, responsible, and revocable". We need to emphasize here that the rejection of bourgeois democracy did not involve the rejection of its patently most critical democratic features: free elections, free communication, *etc.* Marx never questioned their indispensability. His criticism, like Dewey's, was that democracy required something more, not something less. For Marx, it meant a form of real participation consistent with "government."

We should note also that Marx' analogy is nearly perfect. A "company" could be "operated" by "workmen and managers", and no one supposes that the owner of the company has lost his "sovereignty". It was but elitist propaganda to believe that the same principles could not apply to a "commune." The only real question was whether a commune, like a company, could agree on the goals of the association. This problem, of course, relates to the first point regarding the question of whether the citizenry is or is not alienated.

Finally, as already suggested, we must not assume that a full-fledged democracy would be totalitarian, that "the people" ruling themselves would trample "personal freedom." As Aristotle and Madison both saw, this assumption was warranted where "personal freedom" meant "the rights of property", freedom of the exploiters to exploit the exploited. Insofar as the Commune was "expansive" and not "repressive," it would be different from previous democracies. It is true, of course, that Marx did mock liberal

constitutional theory and did not himself pay heed to the institutional problems of true democracy, but it is clear that he profoundly valued "personal freedom," saw, rightly, that "only in community do the means exist for every individual to cultivate his talents in all directions," and assumed, optimistically, that individuals in a community would act so that, in contrast to previous forms, all would realize "personal freedom." The absence of concern to institutional detail here stems from his commitment to a democratic politics, to his repeated contention that no one could write scripts for others - still less for future others who will need to solve just those problems which they have.²⁰

It is also clear that if "the unity of the nation" was not to be broken, some sort of federation was involved, and while this was not to be a "federation of small States, as dreamt of by Montesquieu and the Girondins," it is not clear what Marx has in mind. There are, from Marx' point of view, two possible objections to "small States." First, if they are states, then they still embody an alienated politics. Second, if they are small, "the unity of the nation is broken." This second problem is critical, but it is hard to say whether, as he suggests, "the nation" is the smallest unit for social production in the modern world, or whether, perhaps as part of this, if we are to think of moving progressively towards the future and be realistic, we need, in a world of aggrandizing nation-states, to think in terms of nations?

The problem is resolvable, however, if we return Marx' discussion to its context. Marx' conclusion, that had the Commune shown "a modicum of common-sense," it would have tried to reach "a compromise with Versailles," powerfully reinforces a host of evidence that Marx' politics were gradualist. This means, in this context, that the best that one could have hoped for, in these circumstances, was the best possible compromise consistent with the continuing existence of the French State. To suppose that the Communards could have mapped out and realized the future is the worst kind of utopian thinking.

IV. Marx's Gradualist Politics

It may be doubted that Marx' politics were gradualist. But a gradualist politics is not necessarily "reformist" nor is it necessarily antirevolutionary. It is a politics which seeks to realize what is at the time realizable. Marx surely wanted society to be revolutionized and he surely also believed that, at the right moment, a revolution would occur; but there is strong evidence that Marx was never naive about "the right moment" and that, in contrast to anarchist-inspired politics, he was always perfectly prepared to work within the state -- if it was a liberal democratic state.²¹

Already against Stirrer, he had argued that "it is only in the mind of the ideologist that [the 'will' to abolish competition and with it the state and law] arises before conditions have developed far enough to make its production possible."²² And to emphasize, the conditions referred to are political, regarding the political capacities of the people whose activities had sustained "competition" and "law and the state." But perhaps the clearest statement of his position is his speech, given upon resigning from the Central Council of the Communist League:

The minority have substituted the dogmatic spirit for the critical, the idealist interpretation of events for the materialist. Simple willpower, instead of the true relations of things, has become the motive force of the revolution. While we say to the working people, "You will have to go through fifteen, twenty-five years of civil wars, and wars between nations not only to change existing conditions but to change yourselves and make yourselves worthy of political power," you on the other hand, say "We ought to get power at once, or else give up the fight." ... Just as the democrats make a fetish of the word 'people' you make one of the word "proletariat." Like them, you substitute revolutionary phrases for revolutionary action.²³

We can be reminded that, writing in 1852, he held that "the carrying of universal suffrage in England would ... be a far more socialist measure than anything that has been honoured with that name on the continent." He continued, optimistically, that "its inevitable result ... [would be] the political supremacy of the working class."²⁴ And his mind had not changed, after the Commune, when in 1871, he wrote that:

The ultimate object of the political movement of the working class is ... the conquest of political power for this class; and this naturally requires that the organization of the working class, an organization which arises from its economic struggles, should previously reach a certain level of development. On the other hand, however, every movement in which the working class as *a class* confronts the ruling classes and tries to constrain them by pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt by strikes, *etc.*, in a particular factory or even in a particular trade to compel individual capitalists to reduce the working day, is a purely economic movement. On the other hand, the movement to force through an eight-hour, *etc.*, law is a political movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a class movement, with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force. While these movements presuppose a certain degree of previous organization, they are in turn equally a means of developing this organization.²⁵

V. The Redefinition of Marxian Politics

Events did not proceed, however, as Marx had thought they would. While, on the one hand, industrialization in England and then in Germany did promote an increasingly politicized labor movement, radicals were by no means able to agree on either strategy or tactics. During his lifetime, Marx had had some success in negotiating the differences and in maintaining the extraordinarily diverse elements of the International on a course of gradualist change. But the events which led to the effective demise of the First international (in 1872, formally in 1876 in Philadelphia) were critical in the subsequent Internationalist movement, in Marxist politics and in our retrospective understanding of Marx's politics.

Oversimplifying a very complicated story, instead of being, as Thomas puts it, "a form of doctrine having some vague and, as far as Marx was concerned, irksome appeal,"

anarchism became a movement "having a considerable, and widespread, appeal across national boundaries."²⁶ Because Marx wanted not merely that there should be a revolution, but that it be the right sort of revolution, he fought the anarchists tooth and nail. He did not fight them, if the foregoing is correct, because he believed in the state, or in centralized authority, or worse, in a revolution made by revolutionaries in the name of the people. For Marx, the First International and the Paris Commune did in fact prefigure the future, yet the repression which the Paris Commune provoked, itself a critical factor in the demise of the International, and Marx' role in this collapse, had serious consequences. Instead of being a pluralist, ideologically heterogeneous vehicle for the transformation of the international order, subsequent Internationals were monolithic and ideologically doctrinaire. Indeed, Marx's machinations versus Bakunin became the alibi for this and at the same time confirmed as "prophetic" the anarchist suspicion that Marx and Marxism were authoritarian, offering but a new version of absolutist politics. Finally, failing to grasp what the Commune was and why it failed, instead of being for radicals a premature glimmer into a historically novel form of society, for some, because it lacked "centralization and authority," the Commune became an apocalyptic and hopelessly degenerative fit of revolutionary madness. For others, it was the very model of revolution, "of the spontaneity of the masses." For many anarchists, the Commune proved that revolution did not require a "vanguard working class," still less, "organization;" or, quite oppositely, as in Bakunin and the Blanquists, it showed the need for a conspiratorial revolutionary party to provide the match which would light the fire of revolution.

But events continued to undermine Marx' hopes. The destruction of Internationalism, of social democracy in Germany²⁷ and the collapse of Tsarist Russia, all sparked by the World War, completed that redefinition of Marxist politics which had begun with the violent end of the Commune. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Marxist struggles to transform society will rapidly collapse into two poles, between a Blanquist-style demand for a revolutionary conspiratorial vanguard of the working class aimed at "smashing the state" and reformist social democracy, aimed not at a gradualist transformation of the political conditions for revolution, but at winning economic concessions from the capitalists.²⁸

By the turn of the century, it had already become clear to Marxists that while "economic development" was creating the conditions for "socialist production," it was not creating a revolutionary consciousness among the workers. Writing in his enormously influential - and often misunderstood - "What is to be Done?" (1902), Lenin noted that "'everyone agrees' that it is necessary to develop the political consciousness of the working class." "The question was," he continued, "how is that to be done and what is required to do it?" For Lenin, "economism" - the effort to win economic concessions - and terrorism "have one common root, *subservience to spontaneity*". For Lenin, both views presumed historical inevitability and were thus apolitical. While as with Marx and the social democrats, "the working class" remained the center of a mass-based social revolution, Lenin insisted that "we must 'go among all classes of the population' as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators and as organizers"; and while he protested against Blanquism and against "confining the political struggle to conspiracy," he also insisted that this did not deny "the need for a strong revolutionary organization" - if the

workers were to be politicized.²⁹ But it was easy to read this tract in the light of the Bolshevik Revolution and to hold that it had already set out the principles of socialist revolution, not as a movement of workers, nor of workers allied with other classes, but of an authoritarian organization of dedicated professional revolutionaries, a minority acting for "the workers."³⁰

It is exactly here, then, where we can begin our analysis of Dewey's version of a democratic politics.

VI. Dewey's Vision of Democracy and His Analysis of the Democratic State

Dewey was born in 1859, the year that Marx published the *Critique of Political Economy*, but Dewey did not turn explicitly to political philosophy until his 1915 *German Philosophy and Politics*. Moreover, while it is well-known that Dewey was a critic of Marxism, especially in his writings beginning in the 1930's, Dewey could not at that time have read Marx' critique of Hegel's philosophy of state and the tracts on alienation, nor what we call the *Grundrisse*, nor even the critically important *The German Ideology*. For Dewey, Marxism was philosophically what may be called "Second International Marxism," a variant which was powerfully influenced by the monist philosophy of history of Georgi Plekhanov. Politically, Marxism was, by that time, defined largely by Lenin -- by then understood as the promoter of the "vanguard Party." Dewey's philosophical roots, of course, like Marx', trace to Hegel - a fact of some importance; but his political sensitivities were shaped not by the revolutions of 1848 or the Paris Commune, but by New England localism and an understanding of this which in critical ways was Jeffersonian.

In *German Philosophy and Politics*, Dewey traced the philosophic basis of patriotic statism in Germany and concluded that "the present situation presents the spectacle of the breakdown of the whole philosophy of Nationalism, political, racial and cultural." Dewey rejected the sufficiency of "arbitration, treaties, international judicial councils, schemes of international disarmament, peace funds and peace movements". He called for "more radical thinking" of the problem.³¹ The problem of statist politics was also present in *Democracy and Education*, published the next year. He asked: "Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?"³² Dewey thought that the answer could be yes, if, to be sure, we were talking about education "in and for a democratic society." In *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), he argued that despite wide differences, political philosophies were "agreed upon the final consummating position of the state" and he concluded that assumptions regarding the "unique and supreme position of the State in the social hierarchy" had solidified into dogma.³³ By 1927, these ideas found expression in two brilliant tracts, "Nationalism and its Fruits" and *The Public and its Problems*. In the former he wrote:

Patriotism, National Honor, National Interests and National Sovereignty are the four foundation stones upon which the structure of the National State is erected. It is no wonder that the windows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that its inmates are fear, jealousy, suspicion, and that War issues regularly from its portals.³⁴

In *Democracy and Education*, democracy had already been construed by Dewey as both "a mode of associated living," and as "a form of government." In that book, the two ideas went hand in hand. Education in a political democracy had as its aim "sustaining and extending" democracy as a mode of associated living, of "conjoint communicated experience." As a way of life, democracy was "the extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own." "The widening of the area of shared concerns" breaks down "barriers of class, race and national territory." Such widening was not, he had written, "the product of deliberation and conscious effort." On the contrary, it was the result of "the development of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, migration and intercommunication which flowed from the command of science over natural energy."³⁵ Just as Marx had supposed that capitalist modes of intercourse would destroy national boundaries, make for international proletarian solidarity, and politicize workers, Dewey hoped that these forces would propel democracy as a way of life.

But the critical eleven years which separated *Democracy and Education* and *The Public and Its Problems* forced Dewey to different conclusions. Not only had he developed a critique of democracy as "a form of government," but it was now clear to him that democracy as a way of life was not being fostered by the new interdependencies and the new capacities of technological society. On the contrary, democracy as a mode of associated living was being profoundly undermined by these same forces.

In terms familiar to the anarchism of Gustave Landauer and Martin Buber, Dewey argued that democracy was not "an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community itself." Community requires that "the consequences of combined action [be] perceived and become an object of desire and effort." "Immediate contiguity, face to face relationships have consequences which generate a community of interests, a sharing of values ... " Within a community, "the state is an impertinence."³⁶

Turning his attention to democracy as a form of government, Dewey argued that the democratic state had emerged at a specific period in the development of the modern state for reasons largely unrelated to the goal of realizing democracy, understood as a form of association in which people collectively govern themselves. At best, political democracy "represents an effort ... to counteract forces that so largely determined the possession of rule by accidental and irrelevant factors, and ... an effort to counteract the tendency to employ political power to serve private instead of public ends." But political democracy had failed even to realize these limited goals. "In a word", he concluded, "the new forms of combined action due to the modern economic regime controls present policies, much as dynastic interests controlled those of two centuries ago. They affect thinking and desire more than did the interests which formerly moved the state."³⁷ The analysis compares easily to Marx, but especially insofar as it suggests that the constraints on policies, as on "thinking and desire," are structurally rooted.

Dewey's analysis showed that the problem of constituting democracy as a way of life had no easy solutions, since critically, it did not involve perfecting the institutions of

political democracy. In America, most people, at least, could vote; there was a free press and parties which competed for the vote. The problem was very much deeper and regarded the disintegration of the conditions for democracy as a way of life: the incapacity of interdependent people even to perceive the consequences of "combined action," still less to be able to perceive shared goods and to act on them:

[T]he machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of indirect consequences, has formed such immense and consolidated unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself.³⁸

Dewey's indictment of America's alienated politics is persistent in his writings of the period.

In *Individualism Old and New* (1929), he spoke of "the lost individual," lost because while "persons are now caught up in a vast complex of associations, there is no harmonious and coherent reflection of the import of these connections into the imaginative and emotional outlook of life." "Rapacious nationalism" is seen to result from the fact that, detached from "their old local ties and allegiances," individuals lack "a new center and order of life." Where "armies and navies exist to protect commerce, to make secure the control of raw materials, and to command markets," and peace cannot establish "a common life," "the emotions are mobilized in the service of a war that will supply its temporary simulation."³⁹ In *Freedom and Culture* (1939), he spoke of a kind of "molluscan organization, soft individuals within and a hard constrictive shell without." Turning on the schools and mass media, Dewey argued:

Schooling in literacy is no substitute for the dispositions which were formerly provided by direct experience of an educational quality. The void created by lack of relevant personal experiences combines with the confusion produced by impact of multitudes of unrelated incidents to create attitudes which are responsive to organized propaganda, hammering in day after day the same few and relatively simple beliefs asseverated to be the "truths" essential to national welfare.⁴⁰

What, then, was to be done?

VII. Dewey's Rejection of Class Politics

Dewey visited the Soviet Union in 1928, the year after he published *The Public and Its Problems*. In no sense was Dewey an ideological anti-Marxist. He had assessed the Bolshevik revolution as "an experiment to discover whether the familiar democratic ideals --familiar in words at least -- ... will not be most completely realized in a social regime based on voluntary co-operation, on conjoint workers' control and management of industry."⁴¹ Dewey saw, it is clear, that socialism was inconceivable without democracy and that, as the foregoing suggests, democracy in its complete sense demanded socialism. Nevertheless, his analysis of the democratic state made it plain to him, though not to the Marxists, that in the United States, at least, proletarian revolution was not on the historical agenda. For him, the critical issue was the very idea of class.

A great deal of what Dewey wrote during this period sounded like a Marxian class analysis. In addition to what has already been noted, consider *Individualism Old and New*. In that critical text, Dewey argued that the issue which Marx had raised, "the relation of the economic structure to political operations -- is one that actively persists." "Indeed", he continues, "it forms the only basis of present political questions." In the pages which follow, Dewey gives an account of the crisis which could have come from *Capital, Vol. III*. He writes:

There are now, it is estimated, eight billions of surplus savings a year, and the amount is increasing. Where is this capital to find its outlet? Diversion into the stock market gives temporary relief, but the resulting inflation is a "cure" which creates a new disease. If it goes into the expansion of industrial plants, how long will it be before they, too, "overproduce"?

There is even a clear reference to the upshot of the Marxian labor theory of value:

That the total earnings of eight million wage workers should be only four times the amount of what the income-tax returns frankly call the "unearned" income of ... eleven thousand millionaires goes almost without notice.⁴²

Perhaps even more Marxist sounding is his claim that "large and basic economic currents cannot be ignored for any length of time, and they are working in one direction". Indeed, "economic determinism is now a fact, not a theory." His account concludes with a text that could have been written by Engels:

... There is a difference and a choice between a blind, chaotic and unplanned determinism, issuing from business conducted for pecuniary profit--the anarchy of capitalist production--and the determination of socially planned and ordered development. It is the difference and the choice between a socialism that is public and one that is capitalistic.⁴³

Finally, Dewey also sees the relation between this theoretically informed analysis and the problem of the "lost individual". "We live," he writes, "politically from hand to mouth."

The various expressions of public control ... have taken place sporadically and in response to the pressure of distressed groups so large that their voting power demanded attention. They have been improvised to meet special occasions. They have not been adopted as parts of any general social policy.

It is clear enough why this is the case. Under present arrangements, "financial and industrial power, corporately organized, can deflect economic consequences away from the advantage of the many to serve the privilege of the few." The political parties themselves, the ostensible vehicles of mobilization for change, "have been eager accomplices in maintaining confusion and unreality."⁴⁴

This analysis, as pertinent today as when it was offered, is not untypical of Dewey. It suggests that Dewey's understanding of the political possibilities of democratic politics in capitalist America was anything but naive, and that, in important ways, it was close to Marxism. But for all this, there is evidence that he sometimes lost sight of the critical issue. An instance is the book which some have taken to be one of Dewey's more radical political tracts, *Liberalism and Social Action*, written in 1935. As is well-known, Dewey there insisted that

Liberalism must become radical, meaning by "radical" perception of the necessity of thorough-going changes in the set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring changes to pass.⁴⁵

Dewey emphatically rejected reform that dealt with but "this abuse and now that without having a social goal based on an inclusive plan," but he was less clear what that goal and plan was. One thing was clear: Dewey rejected Marxism, but especially "the idea of a struggle between classes, culminating in open and violent warfare as being the method for production of radical social change."⁴⁶

Dewey had a clear and adequate instrumentalist view of violence. In another place he had written that "what is justly objected to as violence or undue coercion is a reliance upon wasteful or destructful means of accomplishing results."⁴⁷ In *Liberalism and Social Action*, similarly, it was not violence as such that was the issue. He recognized, with the Marxists, that "force, rather than intelligence is built into the procedures of the existing social system," and that even free expression will be tolerated "as long as it does not seem to menace in any way the status quo of society."⁴⁷ When it does, he wrote, the state will be quick to use official violence in the name of protecting "the general welfare." Dewey had learned from his experience with the Palmer raids and the tragedy of Sacco and Vanzetti.

What then was his objection to the class war notion of the Marxists? Dewey might have argued, though he did not, that the Marxist analysis was substantially correct, but that for good historical reasons, the idea of struggle between classes, culminating in open warfare, had to be rejected. The argument for this conclusion would be complicated, but it would be fully consistent with Dewey's own analysis of the democratic state.

In agreement with the anarchists of his day, for Dewey, "the workers" were not to be agents of social change. It was not that there was no oppression and inequality in America, that workers were not exploited, nor that they were happy with their lot. One did not hear their "angry voices," Dewey wrote, but that was not because they were drowned out by "shouts of eagerness for adventurous opportunity." Rather, "the murmurs of discontent are drowned" by "the murmurs of lost opportunities, along with the din of machinery, motor cars and speakeasies."⁴⁹ The metaphor, suggestive of the much later writings of Marcuse or Foucault, was employed in the context of Dewey's brilliant analysis of America individualism. It was not roast beef, but "repressive needs", "normalization" and "atomization" which had disintegrated class consciousness.

As I argued, Marx knew that the struggle would be long and hard, but he could not

have anticipated the fantastic flexibility of capitalism in the liberal democracies, and especially in America, the fragmenting effects of race and ethnicity. In America, then, "workers" had become a politically useless category. But if so, then, "class struggle" was, at its worse, a slogan for assuring the faithful or, at its best, an abstraction at a different level of analysis.

The issue is complicated, but I must be brief. In Marxism, classes are not defined by a set of empirically given characteristics, e.g., income, social status, or occupation. Rather, "class" is a theoretical concept, grounded in the central concept of mode of production. Marx's *Capital* provides a theoretical and abstract account of the capitalist mode of production. Abstractly considered, there are but two classes, the owners of the means of production and the producers of surplus value, the proletariat. This analysis, the core of any Marxism, provides an understanding of capitalism as a mode of production. It shows what problems need to be solved if it is to be reproduced -- including thus an explanation of why capitalist relations need to be mystified, the famous "fetishism of commodities." It shows that capitalism is "irrational," that it is subject to periodic crises, and it gives an argument for socialism by showing that as long as the means of production are not jointly controlled, there is no way to end domination and alienation - including the alienated politics of the modern state.

But of course the real world is not just a mode of production. It is comprised of societies with modes of production. Like all others, societies with a capitalist mode of production have state structures, churches, gender and racial conflicts, schools and mass media. They have housewives, "professionals", civil servants, and all sorts of "workers" who are not proletarians -- defined as producers of surplus value. But this means that Marx's projection into the future of the effects of the capitalist mode of production could well be wrong -- as, indeed, it was.

In the nineteenth century, it was still possible to keep things simple by identifying the growing class of industrial workers with a growing and increasingly organized proletariat, to suppose, as the *Manifesto* had it, that "the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants -- all these sink gradually into the proletariat." "The workers," now "the immense majority," now organized, now pauperized, would become a revolutionary class. But close as that had come to being prophetic, just before World War I, that time had now passed. More generally, then, since Marxist revolutionary class politics was predicated on the assumption of global capitalist transformation, of increasing polarization and immiseration, and on the consequent development of the political capacities of organized workers, and since these had not obtained as Marx had hoped, Marxists might well have abandoned the idea of proletarian revolution. The problem, then would not be to find or make a revolutionary class, but as Hindess writes, "to mobilize effective support around socialist objectives out of the forces, struggles and ideologies operative in particular societies."⁵⁰

The Marxists of the inter-war period did not, of course, see this; nor, given that their Marxism was the monocausal Marxism of the Second International, was it surprising that Dewey would reject Marxist analysis.

He observed that "according to the Marxians ... the economic foundations of society consist of two things, the forces of production on one side and, on the other side, the social relations of production." Further, for Marxians, scientific technology is part of the forces of production. It is dynamic while the social relations are static; they "lag behind". Dewey here was ready to admit that "what was happening socially is the result of the combination of these two factors," and thus it would seem that here, as above, Dewey had fully appropriated the extremely influential *Preface* account of what came to be called "historical materialism."⁵¹ But Dewey then insisted that it was but "a truism" to call this combination "capitalism" and to say that "capitalism is the 'cause' of all the important changes that have occurred". On his view,

Colossal increase in productivity, the bringing together of men in cities and large factories, the elimination of distance, the accumulation of capital, fixed and liquid -- these things would have come about, at a certain stage, no matter what the established institutional system. They are the consequences of the new means of technological production.⁵²

The text is a startlingly clear expression of technological determinism, but if indeed, for "orthodox" Marxists, "technology" produces changes in the relations of production and thus explains the emergence of capitalism, Dewey saw what they did not, that once one holds that technology directly defines the labor process and, through this, the wider social relations, "historical materialism" entails that there need be little real difference between "capitalism" and "socialism"!⁵³

Dewey's concrete approach should have put him on guard. While he often succumbs to the high abstraction, "industrial society", he seems also to have seen that the logic and consequences of the accumulation of capital was a fundamental cause of the way changes occurred in the West, of the particular application of technologies and the particular distribution of wealth and resources, that had capitalism been other than what it is -- and here we are indebted to Marx -- technological production could surely have been different. Putting the matter as briefly as possible, insofar as the relations of private property define the accumulation of capital, the state is preferably liberal. This means not just that private and public are bifurcated but that government will be predictably limited in addressing problems thrown up by the process of capital accumulation. At the very least, it must be constrained to activities consistent with the maintenance of the system of private accumulation.

Dewey's claim that "the release of productivity is the product of cooperatively organized intelligence" is correct. As Marxists point out, production is socialized in capitalism. Moreover, if one wants the productivity associated with industrial societies, there is no alternative to that. But Dewey's idea that "coercion and oppression on a large scale exist" because "of the perpetuation of old institutions and patterns not touched by scientific method" is patently fallacious. Indeed, in the text already quoted from *Individualism Old and New*, he had it right: "There is a difference and a choice between a blind, chaotic and unplanned determinism, issuing from business conducted for pecuniary

profit, and the determination of a socially planned and ordered development," between "a socialism that is public and one that is capitalistic." This difference, of course, is exactly the extension of political democracy to the economy, the elimination of the contradiction between socialized production and private appropriation, and finally, as Marx insisted and Dewey surely seemed also to see, the reappropriation of social powers by united individuals.

Once Dewey lost touch with the root of the problem, he could no longer offer plausible solutions. He offered:

The question is whether force or intelligence is to be the method upon which we consistently rely and to whose promotion we devote our energies. Insistence that the use of force is inevitable limits the use of available intelligence ... There is an undoubted objective clash of interests between finance-capitalism that controls the means of production and whose profit is served by maintaining relative scarcity, and idle workers and hungry consumers. But what generates violent strife is failure to bring the conflict into the light of intelligence, where the conflicting interests can be adjudicated on behalf of the interests of the great majority.⁵⁴

The argument is a bad argument for at least three reasons. First, Dewey's absolutist either/or, either force or intelligence, is unwarranted. No serious revolutionary, not Marx, not Lenin, not even Bakunin, so tied his hands in the way that Dewey suggests, even if, for them, violence was inevitable. One would have supposed that Dewey's fine understanding of the use of violence by the state in defense of the status quo would have led him to the conclusion that as regards radical social change, some violence would, at some point, be necessary.

Second, whatever the difficulties of a Marxian analysis, Marxists were not so foolish as to suppose that the lions, the finance capitalists, would sit down with the lambs and "adjudicate" away their privileged power. The "objective clash of interests" which Dewey rightly acknowledged was neither temporary nor negotiable. Rooted in the capitalist system as such, it left the parties locked "in a death clutch."⁵⁵

Third, Dewey here presupposes that publics exist, for it is only then, as he here implies, that "cooperative intelligence" can be a mode of social reconstruction. Immediately after he condemns Marxists for "a rigid logic," he says: "The 'experimentalist' is one who would see to it that the method depended upon by all in some degree *in a democratic community* can be followed through to completion."⁵⁶

It will not be easy to explain Dewey's continuing optimism that creative intelligence can be effective even where it so patently lacks institutions. It is easier to explain his decisive turn against Marxism. By 1928 at least, Dewey had given up on the Socialist Party.⁵⁷ By this time, the Soviets had already severely abused, perhaps irreparably, the idea of "socialism." They would, in the years coming, disillusion still more. As noted, Dewey's notion of Marxism was essentially the Marxism of the Second International, a Marxism flawed in more ways than one. In his 1939 *Freedom and Culture*, Dewey attacked

Marxism as unscientific on grounds that it had "a monistic block-universe theory

of social causation." The monistic theory of history was a disaster: Social causation was plural and reciprocal. As I have suggested in this essay, the actual course of history is the cluttered product of contingencies that no theory could assimilate.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Dewey --like the Marxists -- had never himself been clear on the causal questions regarding capitalism, industrial society and the modern state. If anything, he shared with them a tendency toward technological and economic determinism. Similarly, he was fully correct to charge that no one was less scientific than the "scientific" Soviet Marxists: "Scientific method in operating with working hypotheses instead of with fixed and final Truth is not forced to have an Inner Council to declare just what is the Truth ... "⁵⁹ Finally, Marxists had all too often argued that capitalism was the only evil and that therefore, once rid of it, all would be lovely. One would have thought that the Thirties proved otherwise.

Still, by 1939, Dewey had definitely shifted his emphasis -- if not worse. After reminding his readers that he had "from time to time pointed out the harmful consequences the present regime of industry and finance had upon the reality of democratic ends and methods," and that he had "nothing to retract," he went on to say that the Marxists were wrong in holding that "government in the so-called democratic states is only the organ of a capitalist class." Now if this meant --as by then Marxists had supposed -- that the state could not be used by revolutionary socialists, then Dewey was surely correct. But as I have argued, Marx would have agreed with Dewey here. Yet Dewey seems to mean more than this:

the effect of constant criticism of governmental action; of more than one political party in formulating rival policies; of frequent elections; of the discussion and public education that attend majority rule, and above all the fact that political action is but one factor in the interplay of a number of cultural factors, have a value that critics of partial democracy have not realized.⁶⁰

Though admittedly "partial", he was now prepared to defend what he took to be a characteristic American "looseness of cohesion and indefiniteness in direction of action."

We take for granted the action of a number of diverse factors in producing any social result. There are temporary waves of insistence upon this and that particular measure and aim. But there is enough democracy so that in time any one tendency gets averaged up in interplay with other tendencies. An average presents qualities that are open to easy criticism. But as compared with the fanaticism generated by monistic ideas when they are put into operation, the averaging of tendencies a movement toward the mean, is an achievement of splendor.⁶¹

But from the fact that what happens in history is the product of complex multiple factors working in unpredictable ways, it did not follow that American "pluralist" politics generated some splendid "movement toward the mean," that conflicting "interests" somehow get "averaged up," that "the equilibrium in social affairs" was desirable. Indeed, how "pluralist" could a politics be when, as he had argued in 1927, the public was lost? Finally, it was true that "political action is but one factor," but does not this mean, as in 1929 he also had seen, that in a capitalist society, this left a free hand for "financial and industrial power, corporately organized"?

Dewey could accept "the criticism that much of our political democracy is more formal than substantial, provided," he now insisted, "it is placed in contrast with totalitarian political control."⁶² To be sure, one does not need a very good society to compare well with Nazism and Stalinism. One might argue here that the despair of politics, so characteristic of our day, had by then infected Dewey and that, like Sidney Hook and later pragmatists, he was now prepared to celebrate bourgeois democracy. But this would be most unfair to Dewey.

Not only was he unflinching in his rejection of the "new kind of Stoicism" which had gripped post-war Europe, but he was unflinching in his recognition of the profoundly troubled situation and in his commitment to the idea that things could be made better - a great deal better. As Lothstein writes:

The central point for Dewey was that while suffering and setback suffused the total human endeavor, it was neither daemonic or unremitting. Rather suffering and celebration ... were experimental correlatives, happiness supervening upon their conjoint and dialectical origination. Although nested in a radically contingent and indeterminate world, our situation, Dewey argued, was not that of Sisyphus or Job, our fate sealed by divine fiat or historical obsolescence. He saw us instead as freewheeling sculptors of meaning in a world bereft of ultimate guarantees, but open to experimental improvement.⁶³

Nor, despite his unflinching optimism, was it the case that Marx had ever expected miracles. There are, he once remarked, "no ready-made utopias to introduce *par decret du people*, and if so, then surely there were none to be instituted by "a vanguard party" wreaking death in the name of the people. If we are to be emancipated, we need "to work out our own emancipation" and "to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and [people]."

This returns us to the question of "foundations." Whatever his blind spots, Dewey's was a politics that needed no foundations. While Marxists did find a foundation for politics in an eschatological philosophy of history, I have argued that this is much less clear as regards Marx. But, however that may be, what is now needed, it seems to me, is to renew the possibilities of democratic politics which acknowledges the insights of Marx but yet strips Marxism of the idea that history is on the side of emancipation. We need, that is, to combine the best in Marx and Dewey.

The public, lost and eclipsed, has not been found. For those of us living in a democratic state, finding it is the primary imperative. But how to do this? Dewey's answer might go as follows: Try, by taking advantage of any opportunity which presents itself, to bring into existence publics; try to give direct experience and educative quality by informing it; try to create from our atomized relations incipient communities which can be fostered and enlarged, and try to do this by identifying common goods which can call for active support and participation. Of course, this is not to say much, even if, as I think, it is true and important. Still, armed with a Marxist understanding of what is happening to us and why, it may be possible to take advantage of opportunities and to try, as Dewey

offered, to build some incipient but progressively growing democratic publics.

Notes

¹ Cf. Norman Jacobson, *Pride and Solace, The Functions and Limits of Political Theory*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. Jacobson's book is perhaps the most systematic effort to examine the implications of a foundation-less politics, but his moral is equivocal. See my review, "The Crisis of Contemporary Political Theory," *Interpretation*, 9 (September 1981). The texts quoted are from Arendt, as quoted by Jacobson, Chapter V, *passim*.

² An anti-foundationalist politics need not reflect despair. Rorty suggests a version when he writes that "we should be more willing than we are to celebrate bourgeois capitalist society as the best polity actualized so far, while regretting that it is irrelevant to most of the problems of most of the population of the planet" ("Method, Social Science, Social Hope," in *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, 210). But of course, ideological certitude is an obvious feature of those American policies which, in the pursuit of triumph in what can only be called a Holy War, are as limitless in their means as any which Orwell, Camus or Arendt condemned. Indeed, "bourgeois capitalist society" is not "irrelevant" to most of the problems of most of the population of the planet exactly because it is a large part of the problem of these peoples - whether the societies are capitalist "miracles", e.g., Korea, or "socialist" disasters, e.g., Nicaragua.

³ An excellent contextual reading of Marx's politics is Alan Gilbert's *Marx' Politics: Communists and Citizens*, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press. Gilbert, following a path marked by Michael Harrington (in his *Socialism*, Bantam, 1973), shows that Marx persistently altered his political strategies in the light of experience and that he was no economic determinist, inflexibly committed to pat formulas -- unlike most of his later epigones. Paul Thomas' *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) is an indispensable account of Marx' relations, ideologically and politically, to nineteenth-century anarchism. See also his "Alienated Politics," in Terence Ball *et al* (eds.), *After Marx*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984. Martin Buber's *Paths in Utopia* (Boston, Beacon, 1949) remains valuable. Barry Hindess offers a crisp account of the critical debates between Lenin, Kautsky, and Bernstein. Unfortunately, he does not discuss Rosa Luxemburg, who was perhaps closest to Marx on the critical issues. See "Marxism and Political Democracy," in Alan Hunt (ed.), *Marxism and Democracy*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980. On Luxemburg, see Norman Geras, *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg*, London, NLB, 1976.

⁴ G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, J. Sibree, trans., New York, Dover, 1956, p. 452.

⁵ G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, T.M. Knox, trans., London, Oxford, 1952, par. 279.

⁶ "On the Jewish Question," in Easton, L. and Guddat, K. (eds.), *Writings of the*

Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, New York, Doubleday, 1967, pp. 225f., p. 231.

⁷ Thomas, *Marx and the Anarchists*, p. 196.

⁸ *The German Ideology*, in Easton and Guddat, p. 263f.

⁹ *Communist Manifesto*, in David McClellan (ed.), *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 237. This is not to say that there are not difficulties and ambiguities in Marx' writings on the critical issues. An excellent treatment is Frederic L. Bender, "The Ambiguities of Marx's Concepts of 'Proletarian Dictatorship' and 'Transition to Communism'," *History of Political Thought*, II (November, 1981). See also, Harrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-60; Gilbert, *op. cit.* Chapter VIII.

¹⁰ Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in *On the Paris Commune*, Moscow, Progress, 1971, p. 97. As Bender points out, Engels confirmed that for them, the Commune was a new type of polity. In an 1875 letter to Bebel, Engels wrote: "The whole talk about the state should be dropped [from our party's statements] especially since the Commune ... was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word [because it was a state in-the-process of dissolving]... We would therefore propose to replace *state* everywhere by *Gemeinwesen*, a good old German word which can very well convey the meaning of the French word 'commune'" (cited by Bender, *op. cit.*, p. 549).

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 73.

¹² *Loc. cit.*

¹³ Quoted from Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

¹⁴ 'Civil War in France', p. 75.

¹⁵ *The German Ideology*, in McLellan, p. 179.

¹⁶ Marx to Domela-Nieuwenhuis, 1881, in *On the Paris Commune*, p. 293.

¹⁷ Stewart Edwards, *The Paris Commune 1871*, New York, Quandrange Books, 1971), p. 360.

¹⁸ Marx to Domela-Nieuwenhuis, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

¹⁹ "Civil War in France," p. 73. For an extended development of these ideas in the American Confederation period, see my *War and Democracy*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, Part V, and "The Foreclosure of Democracy in America," *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 9, (Spring, 1988).

²⁰ Of course, insofar as he ignored the very real dangers of usurpation of power and violation of individual rights, Marx was, as Bender notes, to this extent "responsible" for

later vanguard interpretations.

²¹ Harrington, Thomas and Gilbert each provides ample evidence on this critical point.

²² *The German Ideology*, cited by Thomas, *Marx and the Anarchists*, p. 343.

²³ Quoted from Thomas, p. 331.

²⁴ Quoted from Thomas, p. 345.

²⁵ Quoted from Thomas, p. 347. See M. Levin, "Marx and Working-Class Consciousness," *History of Political Thought*, I (Autumn, 1980).

²⁶ Thomas, p. 249.

²⁷ Cf. Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism*, Cambridge, Ma., Harvard, 1955 and my *War and Democracy*, Chapters 11 and 12.

²⁸ See F. Claudin, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Lenin and Kautsky," *New Left Review*, 107 (Nov./Dec. 1977).

²⁹ *Essential Works of Lenin*, New York, Bantam, 1966, p. 112, p. 109.

³⁰ This is hardly the place to survey the literature on Lenin and Leninism. My views are influenced by Roy Medvedev, *Leninism and Western Socialism*, London, NLB, 1981; Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, New York, Knopf, 1974. See also my *War and Democracy*, Chapter 11.

³¹ *German Philosophy and Politics*, New York, Henry Holt, 1915), p. 130. See also this volume, Chapter 8 where I argue that World War I forced Dewey to change his mind about democracy in America.

³² *Democracy and Education*, New York, The Free Press, 1966), p. 97.

³³ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1957), p. 201.

³⁴ In *Characters and Events*, Two Vols., edited by Joseph Ratner, New York, Henry Holt, 1929, II, p. 803.

³⁵ *Democracy and Education*, p. 87. Compare, of course, Marx and Engels: "National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the developments of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto" (*Communist Manifesto*, in McClellan, p. 235).

³⁶ *The Public and Its Problems*, Chicago, Swallow Press, 1954), p. 148, p. 151, p. 39, p. 41. I have examined Dewey's political philosophy from the vantage point of anarchism in 'John Dewey, Anarchism and the Political State', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, Vol. XVIII, 2 (1982), reprinted in this volume, Chapter 9. But the most extensive treatment of Dewey as a "vestibular" anarchist, "in the American grain", is Arthur Lothstein's excellent 'From Privacy to Praxis: The Case for John Dewey as a Radical American Philosopher', PhD Dissertation, NYU, 1979. See also his 'Salving From the Dross: John Dewey's AnarchoCommunalism', *The Philosophical Forum*, 10 (Fall, 1978).

³⁷ *The Public and Its Problems*, p. 83, p. 108.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 126.

³⁹ *Individualism Old and New*, New York, Capricorn, 1962, p. 85f., p. 61f.

⁴⁰ *Freedom and Culture*, New York, Capricorn, 1963, p. 46. Compare Orwell, who longed to hear a human voice, instead of "fifty thousand gramophones ... playing the same tune."

⁴¹ *Characters and Events, I*, p. 424.

⁴² *Individualism Old and New*, p. 103, p. 109, p. 107.

⁴³ *Ibid.* pp. 119f.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 114f.

⁴⁵ *Liberalism and Social Action*, New York, Capricorn, 1963), p. 62.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 78.

⁴⁷ "Force and Coercion" (1916), in *Characters and Events, II*, p. 789.

⁴⁸ *Liberalism and Social Action*, p. 63, p. 65.

⁴⁹ *Individualism Old and New*, p. 78f.

⁵⁰ Barry Hindess, *op. cit.* p. 42. Hindess argues that the series of critical debates between Kautsky, Lenin and Bernstein, from 1891 to World War I, are "variations on a single theme", viz., where to locate the boundaries "for non-economic, non-class determinants of political life and stop it from getting out of hand" (p. 37). Thus, while none of these writers was simply class-reductionist and while even Bernstein does not break completely with the conception that the economy is ultimately determining, they differ enormously on what and how much of what is political is not determined by the economy. But on Hindess' view, the debate between them is irresolvable because "there is no one general mechanism of connection between politics and the economy that is

characteristic of capitalism as such--or for that matter, of particular historical phases of its development" (p. 41). In other words, as in Marx' own political practice, political questions must always be posed concretely, considering the particular details of the particular society under consideration. A "revisionist" politics becomes plausible, then, at the point where, in the liberal-democratic state, socialism is no longer primarily a class issue.

⁵¹ The phrase "historical materialism" is not used by Marx at all. Engels first employed the term "materialist conception of history" in a review of Marx *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* which has the famous *Preface* which became the authority for Second International versions of "historical materialism." For a recent defense of this view, see G.A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, New York, Oxford University Press and the critique by Andrew Levine and Eric Olin Wright, 'Rationality and the Class Struggle', *New Left Review*, 123 (Sept./Oct., 1980).

⁵² *Liberalism and Social Action*, p. 81. In *Individualism Old and New*, Dewey had chastized Marx for reasoning "too much from psychological economic premises" and depending "too little upon technological causes" (p. 102).

⁵³ See Phillip Corrigan, Harvie Ramsay and Derek Sayer, *Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory: Bolshevism and Its Critique*, New York, Monthly Review, 1978; Marc Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism*, London, Allison and Busby, 1978.

⁵⁴ *Liberalism and Social Action*, p. 79f.

⁵⁵ The expression is C. Wright Mills'. Mills made a similar critique of Dewey in his *Sociology and Pragmatism*, New York, Oxford, 1966.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80, my emphasis. See James Campbell, "Dewey's Method of Social Reconstruction," *Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society*, XX (1984).

⁵⁷ See Dewey, "The Need for a New Party," "Who Might Make a New Party?" and "Politics for a New Party," *New Republic*, Vol. 66 (1931); "The Future of Radical Political Action", *Nation*, Vol. 136 (1933); 'The Imperative Need for a New Radical Party.'" *Commonsense*, II (1933). For a general account of the Socialist Party and its relation to the Dewey-led League for Independent Political Action, see Frank A. Warren, *An Alternative Vision: The Socialist Party in the 1930's*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1974, esp. Chapter V.

⁵⁸ See my *A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Oxford, Blackwells, 1987.

⁵⁹ *Freedom and Culture*, p. 97.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 94.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 94 f.

62 *Loc. cit.*

63 Arthur Lothstein, "From Privacy to Praxis," p. 80. Lothstein points out that the criticism of "a new kind of Stoicism," was made a month after Dewey's eighty-eighth birthday, in 1947. Dewey argued that on this view, "existence reduces 'pretty well to what the individual can make out of it on his own hook," and added, "I think they are reactions of people who are scared and have not the guts to face life" (*ibid.*, p. 60f., quoting from a letter to William Daniels, "Letters of John Dewey to Robert V. Daniels, 1946-50," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XX (October-December, 1959)).