

Philosophy of Social Science, History of

If we are offer a history of the philosophy of the social sciences which begins prior to the twentieth century, we must admit some anachronism. Prior to this time, perhaps the only term in such a title with its present meaning is 'history'. Only in the nineteenth century was philosophy seperated from 'science', and only in the early years of the twentieth century did 'social science' emerge as a set of disciplinary practices which could become the object of 'philosophy'. This is more than a quibble over terms, since there never was a time when issues regarding the nature and methods of acquiring knowledge of the human condition was not contested.

In what follows, we admit the anachronism and make the effort to sketch what earlier writers said about such inquiry. Moreover, since the lines between a philosophy of social science, a social philosophy, and a social science is also blurred, we consider these matters rather broadly. Until lines were drawn, there were no boundaries--and even today the boundaries are fuzzy.

We can conveniently divide this history into four uneven periods, starting with the beginnings in the West of both science and philosophy--in the ancient Greek *polis* (city-state). The key writers are the pre-Socratic 'nature philosophers' and the Sophists who, very roughly, were on the *nomos* side of the critical *nomos-physis* controversy with, roughly, Plato (427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) on the other. This controversy was critical, for it cuts straight to many of the central issues in any theory of human science. The fundamental issue could be put thus: Is that which is required by *nomos* (law or convention) required by *physis* (nature)? While the Sophists sound like early 'social constructionists', it was the powerful voices of Plato and Aristotle which prevailed. They were the key influences in what follows, late antiquity and the medieval period--of course, in variant and often highly creative forms. The intellectual hegemony of Christianity in the West defined the character of inquiry into the human condition.

The second period begins with late Renaissance and extends to the French Revolution--the period of the emergence of modernity in the West. As feudalism yielded to capitalism and the early modern state emerged--along with the beginnings of modern natural science, we see, first, a thoroughgoing rejection of central assumptions regarding the character and aims of association. Critical in this new 'utilitarian' conception were Machiavelli (1469-1527), Bodin (1529?-1596), Hobbes (1588-1679), Locke (1632-1704), the Physiocrats and Adam Smith (1723-1790). Second, there was a self-conscious effort to articulate the idea of human science, inspired by, and modeled on the new physics. The critical idea was well put by Dupont de Nemours: 'All social facts are linked together in the bond of eternal, immutable, ineluctable, inevitable laws, which individuals and government would obey if they were once known to them' (Randall, 1962, p. 963). There were critics and alternatives: Vico (1688-1744), Rousseau (1712-1778) and Herder (1744-1803).

The third period, roughly the nineteenth century, is a battleground over both the idea of science and the idea of a human science. The paradigm provided by celestial mechanics was nearly overwhelming; even so, there was disagreement as regards its character, but especially as regards the question of causality and explanation. As regards human science, the nearly irresistible problematic of idealism vs materialism dominated. Thus while Comte (1798-1857) defended a 'positivist' anti-metaphysical theory of a human science, this was challenged by Hegel (1770-1831) and his descendents, including here Marx (1818-1883), Dilthey (1833-1911) and Weber (1864-1920). By the end of the century, a group of natural scientists turned philosophers (Passmore, 1957), including Ernst Mach, Karl Pearson and Pierre Duhem, vindicated the

fundamentals of Comte's theory of science. These writings, then, were the materials with which 'social scientists' in the US constituted the present disciplinary division of the human sciences.

The final period takes us the present. We offer here only a sketch, meant mainly to suggest the importance of the preceding history.

- 1 **Premodern Philosophy of the Human Condition**
- 2 **The Late Renaissance and Early Modern Period**
- 3 **Machiavelli and Bodin: Redefining the Polity**
- 4 **Two Views of Society: Hobbes, Locke and Adam Smith; Rousseau , and Vico**
- 5 **Progress and Positivism: Herder and Comte**
- 6 **Mill's Logic**
- 7 **Karl Marx: The One Human Science?**
- 8 **Dilthey and Historicism**
- 9 **Max Weber: Human Science as Concrete**
- 10 **Spencer and Engels: Two Monisms**
- 11 **Pareto and Durkheim: Two Positivisms**
- 12 **The Twentieth Century**

1 **Premodern Philosophy of the Human Sciences**

Everyone knows that both 'science' and 'philosophy' begins in the West in ancient Greece. The so-called 'nature philosophers', Thales to Democritus, had included in their inquiry concerns about humankind and 'society'. But this was the special concern of the Sophists, who emerged in fifth century democratic Athens as teachers who prepared men for political careers with instruction in rhetoric but also in 'wisdom' (*sophia*) and 'virtue' (*arête*). It was in this context that the *physis/nomos* debate arose.

Nomoi, 'norms', 'laws', 'customs' or 'conventions' establish what behavior is to be sanctioned by the community. *Physis* ('nature') was the object of inquiry of the Ionian 'scientists' but it also referred to the particular characteristics of things, for example, the nature or 'essence' of man. Aristotle summarized the debate: 'According to the ancients *physis* and *nomos* are opposites, and justice is a fine thing according to *nomos*, but not so according to *physis*'. The implications are many: If humans are alike 'by nature', then what explains the differences in *nomoi* among peoples and why in the same societies are they treated differently? Is the origin of *nomoi* divine? Is it due to the acts of legislators, or is it the product of agreements? Can we judge *nomoi* by appeal to *physis*? But what is the *physis* of man? Is understanding *physis* sufficient for human society, or should follow the sophist Protagoras, who argued that since *physis* could offer no clear prescriptions, human societies require humanly constructed *nomoi*. And if, as he also argued, all men (sic) are capable of sharing in the political (social) virtues, then perhaps the Athenians were right to allow everyman to offer his advice regarding the *nomoi* of the city?

For complicated historical reasons, the Sophists acquired a very bad name. Against them, Plato insisted that experience could not sustain an understanding of human society, still less an objective set of norms for the good human life. Plato did indeed raise some challenging problems for an empirical philosophy of man and elements of what we call 'platonism' still reverberate in discussions on the human sciences. Against the Sophists, Aristotle sought to found the human

sciences in nature. He insisted that 'the *polis* exists by nature' and 'a man that is by nature... cityless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (*Politics*, I).

Although Aristotle offers immense insight relevant to the idea of a human science, particularly his overall 'naturalistic' approach to inquiry, his most striking and probably most influential appeals to nature were, perhaps, those that reinforced the prejudices of his times. For example, 'authority and subordination' (*archai kai archesthai*) are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient; in some cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled' (*Politics*, I, ii). Those to be ruled were 'barbarians' and all women.

Most of the current vocabulary of the social sciences comes from Greek and Latin, but we must be careful about changing meanings. For example, 'democracy' and 'economics' share but faint resemblances to their original senses. Many other critical terms derive from Latin appropriations of Greek terms, for example, republic (*res publica*, *politeia*) and citizen (*civitas*, *politeian*). By the time of Polybius's *Histories* (ca. 150 BC), the Roman republic was huge by Greek standards. Similarly, the Roman citizens bore little resemblance to the Greek original. Roman citizens had what we would call 'civil rights', but lacked utterly what defined a citizen for a Greek: as Aristotle had put it, a right 'to participate in ruling and judging'.

We must forego examination of both Roman and Medieval discussions of matters relevant here, except to emphasize that Rome was a case study for early modern thinking and that Renaissance humanism sought to recover, in Christian terms, the Roman concept of *virtus*, total human excellence. The Christian eschatology of Augustine had dominated medieval thought, profoundly shaping all inquiry into the human condition. Because redemption depended on grace rather than knowledge, historical modes of explanation were rejected. The Arabic reintroduction of Aristotle found expression, especially in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Marsiglio of Padua (1275-1342). With Aquinas, it was impossible 'for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by natural reason'. Aquinas and Marsiglio shared with Aristotle the idea that existing things are arranged in natural hierarchies, including therefore humans and their communities, and had 'natures' which seek their *telos* or end.

2 The Late Renaissance and Early Modern Period

A great structural change had begun sometime in the late Medieval period. It would ultimately produce modernity: the modern state and a capitalist social order. This would be the condition and problem for all subsequent social thinkers. These remarkable changes forced reconsideration of the problems of the human condition and especially, reconsideration of what are the prime philosophical questions of relevance here: what is the object of inquiry in the human sciences and how do we study it?

We identify two major shifts, which both represent efforts to break with the past. First, there was a rejection of the set of ideas which presumed that human associations were 'natural communities' which existed for the sake of realizing human virtues, secular or saintly. The introduction of the terms 'society' and 'state' suggest this. Several points of difference between the new 'states' and older organizations can be noted. These new 'states' had 'governments', itself a new term, which became increasingly concerned to maintain their autonomy not only versus other organizations of similar types, but also as regards organizations within their territories. With the development of the idea of government, the problem of legitimation arose in new forms. Similarly,

societas acquired a new sense. Originally, a voluntary coming together for some purpose, 'civil society' could be used instead of 'community,' or 'republic' which carried ancient connotations.

The second huge shift regarded the aims of 'science' (knowledge) and a new concern with method. The modern writers sought 'inductively grounded' practical knowledge. God was still maker of the universe, but he was to be known through his works, not through contemplation and faith. Similarly, if everything was 'governed' by law, 'prevision' and thus control was possible. Method-conscious Descartes well expressed the Faustian aspect of the new learning:

...it is possible to attain knowledge which is useful in life, and instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature' (*Discourse*, 6).

3 Machiavelli and Bodin: Redefining the Polity

Exemplifying these changes, Machiavelli was perhaps the first modern 'social scientist'. Proceeding 'inductively' and convinced that men of virtue could tame *fortuna*, he began his *Discourses* with the complaint that for all their admiration of the ancient writers, his generation had failed to appreciate the examples provided by antiquity. But he sharply departed from ancient writers as regards the aims of political organization. It was, he insisted, securing the 'liberty' (independence) and 'security' of the body politic. Today an uncritical given, he seems to be the first to hold that this was *the* defining condition of associated life.

Machiavelli suggested a choice between two sorts of republics, one that 'desires to extend its empire, as Rome', the other, as Sparta or Venice, that 'confines itself merely to its own preservation'. But in the new environment, the only real choice was Rome.

It is in this context, as well, that his more famous *Prince* should be understood. Antiquity demonstrated that 'to found a republic, maintain states, to govern a kingdom, organize an army, conduct a war, dispense justice [and] extend empires', 'extraordinary means' were required. The message of the *Prince* is technical, not moral. For the Greek, the citizen *was* the government, for citizens ruled. But Machiavelli assumed that the state (government) and 'the people' are distinct. Public persons constitute a government which exists to serve the governed, persons in the private lives. Government may do this well or badly, but it cannot do it well if decisions are persistently opposed, and if it cannot act for the body as a whole. As he put the matter: 'Government is the management of citizens so that they are neither able nor inclined to oppose you'. Accordingly, the governors of *any* well-ordered, state will and should quite normally employ measures which, from the standpoint of common morality, are immoral.

What, however, was the character of this new kind of entity? Writing in 1576, Bodin answered:

...Ancient writers have called Common weals (*Republiques*), Societies of men assembled to live well and happily together. Which as it may serve for a description of a Citie, so can it not stand for a true definition of a CommonWeale (Bodin, 1962, p. 3).

It was not necessary that members of a commonwealth live 'happily' or even that they be well-governed. Moreover, as individuals pursue many ends, so do commonwealths. The proper definition of a commonwealth required only that members be 'governed by a puissant sovereign of one or many rulers; albeit that they differ in lawes, language, customes, religions, and diversity of nations' (p. 49). Missing entirely is the idea that a polity is a natural community, a 'family' which aimed at common ends.

4 Two Views of Society: Hobbes, Locke and Adam Smith; Rousseau and Vico

Although anticipated in the *nomos/physics* debate, we can now clearly identify two fundamentally different and still competing meta-theoretical assumptions regarding human associations, one 'holistic,' the other 'individualist'. The former idea will not lose its persuasiveness, reoccurring in variant forms in Vico, Rousseau, Herder, Hegel's variant descendents, and Durkheim. The newer conception, associated with liberal or 'utilitarian' social theory is presupposed by Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith, Bentham, Mill, Herbert Spencer, Pareto and, in its modern recent variations, rational choice theory (including here modern microeconomics.) The choice between the two entails a host of other important differences.

The idea that society is but an aggregation of individuals united by agreements to accept the authority of certain conditions for acting is brilliantly developed by Thomas Hobbes, who also broke decisively with the past in postulating both a universal human nature and the 'natural' equality of mankind. Postulating endless desire, individuals everywhere and everywhen 'seek power after power'. Accordingly, the 'natural condition of mankind' is a condition of war. But if individuals alienate their 'right to all things' to a sovereign power, peace can be secured. Since this is the 'rational' thing for mutually self-interested individuals to do, 'civil society' is 'explained' and sovereign power is justified as *the* cement of society. Hobbes was, accordingly, the first 'law and order' theorist.

Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are thought of as 'contract' theorists, but the differences are critical. Perhaps Locke's greatest achievement, usually not acknowledged, was his 'explanation' of private property, as far as I can tell, the only one available which is also a serious defense. Locke believed that God had 'given the earth to Mankind in common', but he rejected Hobbes's idea that the right to property was merely conventional. If our bodies and, thus, our labour was ours, what we 'mix our labour' with is ours. Although this is a highly problematic idea, neither Proudhon who believed that property was theft nor Marx would have cause to disagree. The problem comes when the two moral conditions imposed on the free appropriation from nature are put into question. We should not waste, nor can we appropriate when such appropriation puts others at a disadvantage. Locke argued that money was introduced by our consent. This allowed unlimited appropriation. What is produced in excess of need can be sold to those who are unable to appropriate freely from nature. Since it is their right to sell their labour power to landowners, no one, presumably, is put at any disadvantage. Class inequality, accordingly, was an unintended consequence of the voluntary introduction and use of money! And all this prior to the 'consent' which constituted 'civil society'.

Rousseau's views stand in marked contrast. He shared with Vico the view that one could not 'explain' society in terms of the 'contract' and he further suggested that the psychological qualities attributed to mankind by Hobbes and the liberals who followed him were social constructions. In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* (1755), Rousseau bitterly criticized his predecessors on just these grounds. For him, 'society' emerged 'naturally', the result of the development of language. The true founder of 'civil society', he ironically wrote, was the person who having staked out an area of land, declared, 'This is mine' and found people 'simple enough' to believe him! Rousseau seems to have been the first to argue that human history is largely the product of unintended consequences, and he is one of the very few who insisted that the changes were not progressive. For him, humans had unwittingly forged chains which imprisoned them. This

was largely the result of the interdependence which genuine humanness had brought. The solution was the social contract. Since sovereignty was for him inalienable, governments had only executive power. Rousseau was a *radical* democrat who insisted that unless people take collective control of the conditions of their lives, tyranny is quite inevitable.

We can here compare Vico's *New Science* (1725). For Vico, culture and its artifacts are all creations of human consciousness. He thus insisted, anticipating Dilthey, that humans can understand themselves and all that they had created. Like Rousseau, but no democrat, Vico rejected 'contract' theory as incapable of explaining society. He argued that history, which was cyclical, set different problems for different ages. Marx was impressed by Vico's view that an 'inductive' historical 'science' could emancipate people by emancipating them from superstition and by displaying their true nature.

Adam Smith's rational individualism puts him in direct opposition to Vico and Rousseau. If for Hobbes statutory law turns the violent competition of 'the natural condition' into peace, and if for Rousseau, the division of labour is the fundamental cause of human self-alienation, for Smith, by means of 'the invisible hand', the division of labour gives 'self-love' distinctly beneficial unintended consequences. Indeed, Smith made the effort to explain the division of labour with one universal psychological principle: the 'propensity to truck, barter and exchange'. By this time, Smith could take private property for granted, along with the idea, still uncritically assumed, of the market.

But if Smith was the founder of political economy, it is also important to notice that he did not conceive of its domain narrowly. When *The Wealth of Nations* was published in 1776, 'political economy' referred to 'the art or practical science of managing the resources of nations'. This is why some 60% of *The Wealth* is historical and sociological, and why from the point of view of modern economic thinking, this portion is utterly irrelevant. John Stuart Mill's 1829 essay, 'On the Definition of Political Economy; and the Method of Investigation proper to it' settled several of then unsettled questions. Thereafter, political economy would be thought of as an abstract, ahistorical science which treats of the 'laws' which regulate the production, accumulation and distribution of commodities.

5 Progress and Positivism: Herder and Comte

August Comte was an heir to the French Enlightenment, but between Turgot and Montesquieu and Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (1830-42) came the French Revolution and the rumblings of anarchism and communism. Not only was the thought of Rousseau and Montesquieu rendered irrelevant, but the events raised the question of whether there could be both order and progress. Comte said yes--if politicians would accept the truths of science, understood by him in distinctly positivist terms.

Comte held that there are three fundamental 'epochs of the mind of the race,' three stages: the Theological or Fictitious, the Metaphysical or Abstract, and the Scientific or Positive. The theological mind 'supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings'. The metaphysical mind 'supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces ...inherent in all things, and capable of producing all phenomena'. The positivist mind, by contrast, has not only 'given over the vain search for Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe,' but also 'the causes of phenomena'. Instead, it 'applies itself to the study of their laws, --

that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance' (Comte, 1875, I).

There is here a clear contrast between a positivist sense of law and causality and a distinctly realist conception--causes as productive powers. A realist conception, 'metaphysical' for the positivist, is common to ordinary thinking, and shorn of what are, today, unwelcome teleological commitments, it has been given increasing attention since the 1970's. According to positivists, we do not observe productive powers 'inherent in things'. Following Hume, we 'observe' relations of succession: if this, then that. A realist and teleological view is in Aristotle and in the tradition which followed him. It is beautifully illustrated, with many of its problems, in the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), one of those who articulated a philosophy of human science that fell by the wayside.

Influenced by Rousseau and Montesquieu, Herder expressed a desire to be 'the Newton of history'. He begins with the realist idea that 'whenever we observe a power (*Kraft*) in operation, it is inherent in some organ and in harmony with it'. But 'power as such is not open to investigation, at least not by our senses. It exists for these by its manifestations...' This is then applied: 'The human essence'--*Humanitat*-- is not ready made, yet is potentially realizable'(1969, p. 266). As with individuals, linguistically interacting people--*Volk*-- have environments, 'climates', with which they epigenetically transact. Moreover, 'whatever the climatic influence, every human being, every animal, every plant has a climate of its own; for each absorbs and adapts to external influences in its own organic manner'(Barnard, 1965, p. 120). A multiplicity of equally valuable *Volk*, each in transaction with its 'climate', has created a human world, many concrete realizations of our shared *Humanitat*. Indeed, there are no races since 'complexions run into each other...*in toto* they are, in the final analysis, but different shades of the same great picture which extends though all ages and all parts of the earth' (1969, p. 284). Herder's vision was anarchist and cosmopolitan, not statist and chauvinist: Each *Volk* has its own 'spirit', its own 'genius'. Herder emphatically rejected Eurocentric notions of progress, which for him were but 'figments', constructed from 'embroidered or invented facts'.

Herder lost. Comte's Eurocentrism and positivist conception of a human science carried the day. Comte articulated what are, appropriately, the *defining* ideas of positivism: Not only should we reject the search for causes as productive powers, but as well, 'what is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general facts...'--what is now called 'the covering law model of scientific explanation'.

But not all of Comte's views carried the day. Since humans are essentially social, there is no science between physiology and sociology. Second, not only is society not 'decomposable into individuals' but 'there can be no scientific study of society, either in its conditions or its movements, if it is separated into portions, and its divisions are studied apart' (Lenzer, 1975, p. 228). Comte would not have approved of the present disciplinary division of the human sciences, nor its 'methodological individualism'.

6 *Mill's Logic*

This is not true of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who was writing his *Logic* (1843) when he read Comte. While he accepted the inevitability of progress, he was dissatisfied with Comte's law of progress. If it was a law, then, it had to be 'invariant' and therefore there had to be as Comte

had said, 'a necessarily invariable development of all humanity'. Mill could not see how this was possible.

Mill distinguished 'laws of nature' from 'empirical laws'. With Comte, Mill would leave to the metaphysicians any talk about 'the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of "Things in themselves"' (*Logic* III, ch. V). But if 'empirical laws' are 'uniformities which observation and experience has shown to exist', what makes them different from laws? Mill distinguishes 'ultimate' from 'derivative laws'. Derivative laws are the result of 'a collocation of causes'. Derivative laws are 'resolved' into ultimate laws and are, by subsumption, explained by them. The law of inertia is 'ultimate', an unexplained explainer. Kepler's laws are derivative.

This may not do, especially if the covering law model of explanation is rejected. One might ask, for example, whether there are *any* empirical uniformities which are not the product of a collocation of causes? And if so, perhaps the problem resides in the analysis of causality?

Mill affirmed that there were 'laws of society,' but they 'can be nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human beings' (VI, ch. VII). In addition, then, to the universal 'laws of the mind', there were 'derivative laws,' the object of 'ethology', Mill's science of character. History, then, can only be explained as 'collocations of causes', a point made by Weber who with greater consistency also emphatically rejected the covering law model of explanation. One final note: subsequent methodologists have altogether ignored Mill's sound advice (*ibid.*) regarding the use of his 'experimental methods' in social science!

7 **Karl Marx: One Human Science?**

Although every author discussed in this entry has been variously interpreted, the situation is especially difficult as regards Marx's philosophy of the human sciences. Not only were many of his important texts unknown until this century, but different interpretations give rise to different Marxist politics. In what follows we sketch two widely diverging interpretations, the first is the conventional understanding, shared by the mainstream on both sides of the historic confrontation between capitalism and Marxian socialism. The second became prominent in the 1970's.

On the 'orthodox' view, Marxism is a positivism and a materialism. As a positivism, it has a deterministic theory of history in which societies must pass through stages. As a materialism, it holds that 'the economic structure of society [is] the real foundation on which arises the legal and political superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of social consciousness'. A 'dialectic' then explains change. Thus, 'at a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into contact with existing relations of production... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into fetters. Then begins an era of social social revolution' (Marx, 1859). As in Comte, agency drops out.

On the alternative interpretation, Hegel is taken far more seriously, but on this reading, Marx rejects the idealism/ materialism problematic, offering instead a naturalism which acknowledged the active constitutive side of idealist epistemology while holding to the causal demands of the independently existing 'material' reality. On this view, Marx rejected the reified abstractions of idealism. Thus, superstructural properties, e.g., law and ideology, have no independent existence. Versus the 'ideologists,' there are can be no independent histories of law and ideas. There are only 'real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which

they live, both those which they find already existing those produced by their activity'. This text, from the *German Ideology*, published only in 1883, along with the much later published Paris *Manuscripts* and *Grundrisse* offer the best textual support for this strongly agency-centered reading of Marx's philosophy of social science. It is summarized in the oft-quoted text from Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*: 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past'. Similarly, 'stage theory' is rejected: As Marx wrote in response to a reviewer of *Capital*: 'my critic...feels that he must absolutely metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophical theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself...But I beg his pardon'.

Following on this interpretation is a strongly realist reading of *Capital*. Vol. 1 provides an abstract model of capitalist reproduction, shorn of all the particularities and contingencies which shape concrete capitalist societies. E.g., it is a system-law that by virtue of the structural relations which define capitalism, there will be tendency for the falling rate of profit. But this 'tendency' may not be actualized, just as the inertial tendency of a planet to move rectilinearly is not realized. There are other causes at work in the world. For example, capitalists, struggling to reduce costs (and thus reducing the rate of exploitation) will move capital where labor is cheaper.

Finally, since conscious beings make history, it becomes critical to consider how their understanding enters into social reproduction/transformation. In all societies, production is social and people are more or less interdependent. But the form which products take when production is organized for generalized exchange is the commodity. Under this condition, however, 'the relations connecting the labor of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between persons at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things.' Such 'fetishism' is essential to capitalist reproduction, and on this reading, its analysis is continuous with his earlier analysis of 'alienation'.

8 Dilthey and Historicism

Marx and Engels asserted that 'we know only one science, the science of history'. But as 'naturalists', this did not require a fundamentally different epistemology. The writings of Wilhelm Dilthey (1831-1911) are in the background of most subsequent 'anti-naturalisms' in the philosophy of the social sciences.

For him, the natural sciences had emancipated themselves from metaphysics--in positivist fashion. This would not do for *Geisteswissenschaften*, a term introduced into German as a translation of Mill's 'moral sciences'. In the *Geisteswissenschaften* we are not dealing with 'representations' of an unknowable external reality, but with the objects of consciousness themselves. 'Understanding (*Verstehen*) is possible because life "objectifies" itself in such institutions as the family, civil society, state and law, art, religion and philosophy. As products of life and spirit, these institutions can be understood' (quoted from Makkreel, 1983, p. 139).

This 'solution' to the problem of the foundations of knowledge in the human sciences is not without difficulties, acknowledged by Dilthey. Thus, 'this task led me to the most general problems; a seemingly insoluble contradiction arises if we pursue historical consciousness to its last consequences. The finitude of every historical phenomenon, whether it be a religion, an ideal,

or a philosophic system, hence the relativity of every sort of human conception about the connectness of things, is the last word of the historical world view'(*ibid.*, p. 144).

For Hegel, 'spirit' was 'objective' and constituted a specific stage in historical development. This could overcome both subjectivism and relativism, but while Dilthey seems to have moved in this direction, it is doubtful that he finally did overcome the 'seemingly insoluble contradiction.'

9 Max Weber: Human Science as Concrete

A consequence of the Cold War was the view that Marx and Weber polarize on the idealism/materialism dichotomy. There is good reason, however, to believe that Weber, influenced by neo-Kantian philosophy also rejected this dichotomy. For him, *Verstehen* (understanding) was unproblematic, 'a transcendental assumption' of both everyday life and of any attempt to understand it. Like Marx, Weber rejected Hegelian versions of history in which concrete reality 'emanated' from abstract ideas which had independent existences. Finally, while Weber rejected the reductionist monocausal Second International understanding of history, one of the most important aims of the journal he edited was 'the advancement of the economic *interpretation* of history'.

Nearly always missed is Weber's central distinction between two kinds of sciences: abstract or nomothetic and concrete or historical, a distinction which in variant forms begins with Otto Ranke and is found in Dilthey, Rickart, Menger, Simmel and Windelband, who gave us the pair, 'nomothetic/idiographic'.

For Weber, the two kinds of science satisfy different interests and require different methodologies, but--and this crucial--the distinction does not divide the natural and human sciences. The purpose of 'nomological science' is 'generalized abstraction' and the elimination of 'purely contingent facts'. Its concepts are 'generic'. Thus, the laws of pure mechanics are true of everything; but such knowledge is nonetheless 'worth knowing'. The human sciences could be nomological, but assertions true of all societies would not be interesting. Indeed, 'the theses that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality to "laws" is meaningless'. The concrete sciences have as their aim 'the descriptive reproduction of reality in its full actuality'. We want knowledge of things 'which we regard as essential because of their individual *peculiarities*' (Weber, 1975, p.57). In the human sciences, we need, not generic concepts, but ideal-type concepts, rich in intension and particular in extension. An ideal-type is 'like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality', including 'typical modes of action'(Weber, 1904, p. 90). The construction of such concepts is the main task of sociology. Ideal-types solve the problem of causal explanation because they enable us 'to become aware of the characteristic meaning of single, concrete cultural elements together with their concrete causes and effects' (*ibid.*, p. 65). It follows also that explanation is not by subsumption under law.

10 Spencer and Engels: Two Monisms

While Darwin's *Origin of Species* surely established 'evolution' as a prominent way of thinking, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was already insisting that evolution ensured that 'progress

...is not an accident, but a necessity'. Spencer 'induced' one evolution 'going on everywhere after the same manner': 'There is a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and the integration of matter' (1862, p. 325). As regards society, this issued in a ever-perfecting functional harmony: 'As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group....;so surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for a social state;...so surely must man become perfect' (1897, p. 32).

Spencer's views could be classified as both positivist and monistic naturalist. They compare in this regard to those of his contemporary, Frederick Engels (1820-1895). The 'old materialists' (Dühring, Buchner) could not explain novelty. This could be overcome with a 'dialectical' materialism: 'the science of the general laws of motion and development in nature, human society and thought' (1939, p. 155). These 'reduce' to three: the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, and *vice versa*; the law of the interpenetration of opposites; [and] the law of the negation of the negation' (1940, p. 26). These are all in Hegel, but his 'mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history and laws of thought, and not deduced [inferred] from them' (1940, p. 26).

Engels, like Spencer, is aware that his super-generalizations are abstract and do not 'say anything concerning the particular processes of development' (1939, p. 154), nor for the same reason, do they say anything about the particular mechanisms of these processes. But if so, then as with Spencer, the most obvious problem is their vacuousness.

11 Pareto and Durkheim: Two Positivismisms

Gustav Schmoller lost the *Methodenstreit* to Karl Menger and the new neo-classical economists. As Schumpeter has argued, for all the technical innovations, marginalism did not represent a paradigm shift from earlier classical political economy. Three differences, all consequences of a more self-conscious positivism, can be noted. First, hints of realism as regards causality largely disappear. Second, as Pareto put the matter, 'establishing a theory is something like passing a curve through a number of fixed points'; and third, 'normative propositions' must be sharply distinguished from 'existential propositions'.

Durkheim and Pareto both accepted positivist versions of law and theory. In consequence, both contributed to the idea that quantitative social research was the main task of the social scientist. Both thought of a society as a system although they differed fundamentally on its character.

Pareto (1848-1923) argued that 'the form of society is determined by all the elements acting upon it, and it, in turn, reacts upon them'. The economic system, the domain of 'rational' behavior, is a subsystem of the social system, embedded in a natural environment. But features of this are accounted for indirectly, since their effects are felt on individuals, the units of the social system. Individuals are possessed of 'sentiments,' Pareto's term for the various manifestations of non-rational behavior, so that action is a joint outcome of the 'rational' and 'nonrational'. Generalizing general equilibrium theory, Pareto warmly endorsed the dream of positivist social science:

In order thoroughly to grasp the form of society in its every detail it would be necessary to know what all the very numerous elements are, and they to know how they function--and

that in quantitative terms... The number of equations would be equal to the number of unknowns and would determine them exhaustively (1935, para. 2062).

In contrast to Weber (and more recent complexity theory), the social system, like the system of planets, is a closed system. Accordingly, the 'laws' of society can be mathematical functions of variables. This vision, usually unspoken, still pervades inquiry in social science.

Durkheim (1858-1917) saw no usefulness in economics, nor for that matter in any of the 'utilitarian' sorts of theory which Hobbes had initiated. He agreed with Comte, also, that 'since it does not call for one social form rather than another', psychology cannot explain any of them (1938, p. 108). Instead, there are irreducible 'social facts'--that is, 'ways of acting or thinking with the peculiar characteristic of exercising a coercive influence on individual consciousness' (p. liii). Social facts are 'external' and depend on the collective consciousness which has its own laws. This road, which connects also to platonism leads directly to 20th century structuralism.

Durkheim was a functionalist, but he was also a critic of the functionalism which he attributed to Comte and Spencer. Once having shown that some social form was 'useful' insofar as it satisfied some 'need,' they were content. Missing was an account of 'how it originates or why it was what it is' (p. 90). Moreover, a social fact can exist without being useful at all. But Durkheim did not escape the progressivism of Comte and Spencer. Societies, like organisms, have a lawful 'development'. 'Anomie' was 'abnormal', the product of the breakdown of religion and authority which had subordinated modern industry. Indeed, 'what is needed if social order is to reign is that the mass of men be content with their lot...And for this, it is absolutely necessary that there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge and which tells them what is right' (1958, p. 200).

12 The Twentieth Century

Employing available intellectual materials and exploiting the new opportunities in the new institutions of Higher Education in the US, Americans constructed the prevailing disciplinary division of the human sciences (Manicas, 1987). By the early 1920s these were reconstituted on a manifestly positivist reading of 'hard science'. This was then profoundly reinforced by 'logical positivism', imported from Vienna.

By the 1950s, the philosophical debate had polarized between positivists and a minority of anti-naturalists who rejected the idea of a human science, at least as understood by positivists. (Natanson, 1963). Thus Popper, Hempel, Brodbeck and others continued to defend the relevance of the covering law model for social science, even while it was being attacked by sympathetic critics. Except for marginalized Marxists and a few non-Marxist dissenters, for example, C. Wright Mills (1959), it was business as usual in the departments of the academy.

Kuhn (1967) devastated foundationist epistemology and generated a radical sociological challenge to foundationist epistemology (Barnes, 1982). But he did not raise questions about either causality or explanation. A third alternative, a non-positivist, realist understanding of science, did. Hinted at by Toulmin, Scriven, Sellers, Hanson and others, it was given perhaps its first clear expression by Harré (1970) and then by Bhaskar (1975). It was applied to social science by Harré and Secord (1973) and, influenced by the fresh readings of Marx, by Keat and Urry (1975), Benton (1977), Bhaskar (1979) and Outhwaite (1983).

This enabled a reconsideration of the ancient ontological debate regarding the nature of

society. It continued to be polarized across two dimensions, on the one hand between 'methodological individualists,' standing in the tradition of Hobbes (Gellner, 1856; Watkins, 1957; Homans, 1967) and functionalist 'holists', generally influenced by Durkheim (Mandelbaum, 1955), and on the other between 'subjectivist' approaches in, for example, Schutz (1966) and Garfinkel (1967) and variant 'objectivist' structural approaches which included the very different views of, for example, Levi-Strauss (1962), Althusser (1965), and Munch (1987).

The more or less explicitly realist efforts to reconcile these turned on re-examining the status of 'agents' as conscious beings engaged in practical activity, an extended gloss on Marx's remark that persons make history but not with materials of their choosing. On Bhaskar's 'transformational model of social action', social forms predate the actions of agents which reproduce and transform them. Giddens's 'structuration' view (1976, 1980), less explicitly realist, defines social structure in terms of the 'rules and resources' available to agents in acting. Social structure thus has but 'virtual existence'.

Some of the same polarities were confronted in re-examining the question of culture (Gellner, 1964; Foucault, 1969; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970; Bauman, 1977; Williams, 1977; Anderson, 1980; Hall, 1980; Archer, 1988). Feminist voices (Harding and Hintikka, 1983; Alcoff and Porter, 1992) were increasingly important. In turn, 'cultural studies' was being influenced by developments in 'post-modern' theory, including here a 'decentering of the subject' and a strongly anti-naturalistic turn towards 'discourse' (Lacan, 1977; Derrida, 1976).

By the 1990s the hegemony of positivism could no longer be taken for granted.

References and Further Reading

* Alexander, J. (1987) Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Berkeley: University of California Press, 4 vols. (Alexander begins his extended review with an account of positivism, proceeds in vol. 2 to discuss Marx and Durkheim and then in the following volumes, what he sees to be two efforts at synthesis: Weber and Parsons. Extensive bibliography.)

* Althusser, L. (1965) For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Vintage, 1970. (The critical book in provoking the idea that there is a decisive 'break' in the thought of Marx; introduces the idea of 'structure in dominance'.)

* Aristotle (c. 360s-320s) Politics, trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1977. (This is certainly the most important of Aristotle's work as regards the nature and organization of human associations.)

* ----- (320s--320s) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1968 (Contains much of interest as regards Aristotle's influential views on human nature and conduct. Still relevant.)

* Barnard, F.M. (1965) Herder's Social and Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A very useful selection of key texts.)

* Barnes, B. (1982) T.S Kuhn and Social Science, New York: Columbia University Press. (Barnes, an originator of the so-called 'strong programme' in the sociology of science, shows why Kuhn's work was important to a sociological understanding of social science.)

* Bhaskar, R. (1975) A Realist Theory of Science, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 2nd Edition, 1978. (A systematic effort at 'realist' theory of science, versus Humean causality and the covering law model of explanation.)

* ----- (1979) The Possibility of Naturalism, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. (Applies 'realism' to develop a 'critical naturalist' theory of social science in which 'society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency'(p. 43).)

Berlin, Isaiah (1976) Vico and Herder, New York: Viking. (An accessible and sensitive comparison.)

* Benton, T. (1977), Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies, London: Routledge. (Discusses 'positivism,' 'humanism' (or anti-naturalism in social science) and an alternative which derives from Marx.)

* Bodin, J. (1576) Six Books of a Commonweale, ed. with an introduction by K. D. McRae, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. A facsimile reprint of the English translation of 1606. (Offers the earliest radical reconceptualization of the political association as that had been derived from the Greeks. Spellings of the citations in 4 have been modernized from the old English.)

* Bourdieu, P. (1970) and Passeron, C. Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, trans. R. Nice, London: Sage Productions, 1977. (An alternative to the dominating assumption that 'culture' and 'society' are analytically distinguishable.)

Carver, T. (1983) Marx and Engels: The Intellectual Relationship, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. (The best treatment of the very critical differences in their respective philosophies.)

* Comte, A. (1830--42) The Positive Philosophy of August Comte, freely trans. and condensed by Harriet Martineau, London: Trubner and Co., 2 Vols., 2nd edn, 1875. (Comte's philosophy is the first and perhaps most influential effort to define social science as science, conceived as the search for invariant lawful regularities.)

* Darwin, C. (1859) Origin of Species, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (The classic of modern evolutionary theory.)

* Derrida, J. (1970) 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,' repr. in A Postmodern Reader, ed. Joseph Natoli and Linda Hutcheon, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. (Although so-called 'post-modernism' is a highly contestable notion, Derrida's work

is surely critical. This is an accessible essay which argues against most of the deep assumptions of mainstream social science.)

* Descartes, R. (1637) Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. 1, trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, New York: Dover Publications, 1931. (Descartes's Discourses powerfully influenced thinkers of the modern age who sought to break away from the inherited legacy of Aristotle and the Schools.)

Dilthey, Wilhelm (1910) Pattern and Meaning in History, trans. unacknowledged, ed., H.P. Rickman, New York: Harper and Row, 1962. (A useful, if brief collection.)

* Durkheim, E. (1895) The Rules of Sociological Method, New York: Free Press, 1938. (A book which, perhaps, most influenced the main strands of post World War II sociological thought.)

* ----- Socialism and Saint Simon, Yellow Springs, OH.: Antioch Press, 1958 and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, from lectures given from Nov. 1895-May 1896. (A critique of the 'founders' of socialist theory which in some ways, at least, attempts a reproachment of Comte and Marx.)

* Engels, F. (1885) Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science, New York: International Publishers, 1939. (This book, along with The Dialectics of Nature (below) established the dominating conception of Marxian social science as a 'dialectical materialism.' See Carver 1983).

* -----(1927) Dialectics of Nature, New York: International Publishers, 1940. (The best statement of Engels' philosophy of science.)

* Foucault, M. (1969), The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Pantheon, 1970. (In this influential, but very difficult book, Foucault, another of those who have propelled 'postmodernism,' aims to show how different 'discourses'--of life, labor and language--get 'structured' and why we view them as providing the universals of social life--a view which he emphatically rejects.)

Frisby, D. and Sayer, D. (1986) Society, London and New York: Tavistock. (The best introductory account of the 'career' of the concept of society. Though brief, all the major figures are intelligently and clearly explicated.)

* Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. (A fundamental critique of the 'normative model' which has dominated sociology since Parsons.)

* Gellner, E. (1956) 'Holism Versus Individualism,' reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed., May Brodbeck, New York: Macmillan, 1968. (This volume well represents the hegemony of positivist philosophy of social science during this period.)

* Giddens, A. (1976) New Rules of Sociological Method, London: Hutchinson. (In this rather

brief book, Giddens discusses critically the main themes and some of the main figures of philosophy of social science: Schutz, Garfinkel, hermeneutics, Durkheim, Parsons and Marx and concludes with a criticism of positivism.)

* ----- (1980) The Constitution of Society, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Giddens' most thoroughgoing statement of his 'structuration' theory-- his effort to resolve the continuing dichotomies of social theory. Important.)

* Harding, S. and Hintikka, M. (eds.) (1983) Discovering Reality, Boston: D. Reidel (One of the better collections of interventions in epistemology by feminists).

* Harre, Rom (1970) The Principles of Scientific Thinking, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Perhaps a 'Copernican revolution' in the philosophy of science; it provoked a range of new 'realist' thinking.

* Harre, Rom and Paul Secord (1973) The Explanation of Social Behavior, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (The 'ethnogenic' approach of this book offered a clear alternative to most mainstream conceptualizations.)

* Herder, J.G. (1794-91) J.G. Herder on Social and Political Culture, trans., ed., and with an introduction by F.M. Barnard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. (Very useful for the general student.)

* Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1950. (The source of much modern political theory. Indispensable.)

* Homans, G. (1967) The Nature of Social Science, New York: Harcourt Brace. (An important work by a recent 'behavioralist' critic of 'holistic' (structuralist) views of sociology.)

* Iggers, George G. (1983) The German Conception of History: the National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present, Middleton: Wesleyan University Press. (An excellent overview of this critical history.)

* Keat, R. and Urry, J. (1975) Social Theory as Science, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ('Realist' theory.)

Kerferd, G.B. (1981) The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Gives a sympathetic account of the central issues discussed in 1, above.)

* Kuhn, T. (1967), The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, enlarged edition, 1970. (A book which upset the long legacy of empiricist, positivist thinking about the nature of science, including social science. Essential reading.)

* Lacan, Ecrits, A Selection, trans., John Sheridan, New York: Norton, 1977. (A 'decentering of the

subject' which draws on Freud's theory of the unconscious. Often cryptic.)

* Lenzer, G. ed. (1975), August Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings, New York: Harper, 1975. (A very convenient student's edition. Judicious editing.)

* Levi-Strauss, C. (1962), The Savage Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. (A strongly 'structuralist' but anti-functionalist approach to social science.)

* Locke, J. (1690) Two Treatises of Civil Government, with an introduction and appartus criticus by P. Laslett, 2nd Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. (The foundation of modern constitutionalism and liberalism.)

* Machiavelli, N. (1515, 1527) The Prince and the Discourses, New York: Modern Library, 1950. (The Discourses are less well-known than The Prince since it was the latter which has shocked readers; but contrary to widespread opinion, for reasons set out The Discourses, most leaders of modern states have learned from Machiavelli.)

* Makkreel, R. F. (1975) Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Perhaps the most important recent commentary on Dilthey.)

* Mandelbaum, M. (1955), 'Societal Facts', The British Journal of Sociology', 6 (4): 305-317. (A 'classic' defense of 'holism' against 'methodological individualism'.)

----- (1971) Reason, Man and History, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Perhaps the best review of nineteenth century writers relevant to the human sciences. Important and accessible.)

* Manicas, P.T. (1987) A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (A fuller treatment of the history beginning with the eighteenth century.)

* Marx, K. (1852) The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, New York: International Publishers, 1963. (Probably the best concrete discussion of class and its role in social change in the corpus of Marx's voluminous writings.)

* ----- (1859) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904. (The 'Preface' has been extremely influential in defining the character of Marx's 'historical materialism'.)

* ----- (1867) Capital, Vol. 1, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970. (Certainly one of the most influential books of social science, very much incorporated into current theory--by Marxists and non-Marxists alike.)

* Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1883) The German Ideology, New York: International Publishers, 1947. (For many interpretators, this is the most critical text in gaining an understanding of

'historical materialism'.)

* Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1877) Marx and Engels Selected Correspondence, New York: International Publishers, 1942. (One of several collections.)

* Mill, J. S. (1844) Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 2nd Edition, Clifton, N.J.: Augustus Kelly, 1974. (Now little read, these lively essays show that Mill would not have approved of subsequent developments in the philosophy of 'economics'.)

* ----- (1843) System of Logic, 8th Edition, London: Longman, 1930. (A monumental, influential and still useful effort to set out the 'logic' of the human sciences. Introduces his famous 'methods'.)

Mills, C. W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination, Harmondsworth: Penquin. (The title, now very much in the literature, is often hardly taken seriously; a hardnosed attack on 'abstracted empiricism' and 'grand theory', both still very much in evidence.)

* Natanson, M. (ed.) (1963), Philosophy of the Social Sciences, New York: Random House. (The editor made his selections based on the assumption that there were two polar positions underlying the social sciences, an 'objective' versus a 'subjective' point of view. Contains most of the most important essays which define this debate. Very influential.)

* Outhwaite, W. (1983) New Philosophies of Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, New York: St.Martins Press, 1987. (Parallels in some ways Benton 1977.)

* Pareto, W. (1915-1919) Mind and Society, New York: Harcourt, 1935. (This massive and often tedious work is now largely forgotten even while there is a considerable residue of its driving vision.)

* ----- (1906) Manual of Political Economy, New York: Augustus Kelly, 1971). (A clear statement of Pareto's philosophy of social science.)

* Passmore, J. (1957) A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Harmondsworth: Penquin, 1968 (Certainly the best account of the often ignored late nineteenth century 'philosopher/physicists' whose views powerfully influenced the idea of science which was appropriated by the emerging modern social sciences. Passmore is a reliable expositor of all the figures he treats.)

* Randall, J. H. (1940, The Making of the Modern Mind, Cambridge, Ma.: Riverside Press. (Randall gives a superb account of how thinking about society shifted from the medieval period to modernity. Very readable.)

* Ross, D. (1991) The Origins of American Social Science Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A detailed study of the critical period, 1870-1929, of the constitution of American disciplinary social science.)

- * Rousseau, J.-J. (1755) The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G.P.H. Cole, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1950. (Rousseau's writings are essential, but are less often read in terms of philosophy of social science.)
- Sayer, A. (1984) Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, 2nd Edition, London: Routledge, 1992. (A very useful realist textbook on method.)
- * Schumpeter, J.A. (1954) History of Economic Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press. (A rich historical source, but not helpful as regards the Methodenstreit.)
- * Schutz, A. (1966) The Collected Papers, 3 Vols., The Hague: Nijhoff. (Schutz was central in the effort to restore 'subjectivity' to social scientific understanding--versus the reigning positivism. Difficult.)
- * Shanley, M. L. and Pateman, C. (eds.) (1991) Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. (An excellent collection of feminist re-examinations of many of the figures discussed in this entry.)
- Skinner, Q. (1978), The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 Vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. (A detailed study with attention to the development of concept of the modern state, a datum for all subsequent social scientific thinking.)
- * Smith, Adam (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed., R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2 vols, 1976. (A classic, but as much sociological and historical as economic.)
- * Spencer, H. (1850) Social Statics, New York: Appleton, 1897. (Spencers best effort to defend 'laissez-faire'.)
- * ----- (1862) First Principles, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976. (Aims to show that nature and history may be understood in terms of fundamental, evolutionary principles.)
- * Vico, G. B. (1725) The New Science, trans., T.G. Bergin and M. Fisch, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948. (Usually ignored, Vico's work is strikingly modern in many ways.)
- * Watkins, J.W.N. (1957), 'Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8: 104-117. (Perhaps the 'classic' statement of 'methodological individualism'. Reprinted in Broadbeck (1968) and many other places.)
- * Weber, M. (1903-06) Roscher and Kneis: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, trans. with an introduction by Guy Oakes, New York: Free Press, 1975. (This book contains Weber's most systematic effort to think through problems in the philosophy of social science, but it is not often read. Hard going.)

* ----- (1904) "'Objectivity" in Social Science,' in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans., E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch, New York: The Free Press, 1949. (This volume contains the more famous of Weber's discussions of social science.)

* Williams, R. (1977) Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A very influential effort to overcome the 'reductionism' of much Marxist theory.)

PETER T. MANICAS