

The Social Sciences: Who needs 'em?*

Introduction

Unlike pears and porcupines, the disciplines of the social sciences are not “natural kinds:” they exist only by virtue of beliefs and practices created by historical agents working with materials at hand. And their social construction began in earnest in America only some one hundred years ago.¹ “Economics”—or more often “political economy, had perhaps an earlier birth, but even it lacked a firm conception of itself as a “science,” an idea which itself did not have a settled meaning until the very recent past. As regards “political economy,” there remained considerable debate about both its methods and boundaries, and it was generally carried on as part of the curriculum in moral philosophy. Comte had invented the term “sociology” (along with “positivism”) but few people at the end of the century, including, e.g., Max Weber, thought of what they did as sociology, or that it was a “science” as defined by him. And there were no “departments” of disciplines in social science in universities: Albion Small created the very first sociology department in 1905 at the new Rockefeller-funded University of Chicago. Political studies were part of “history” and no one thought that there was a “science” of politics. Speaking from Johns Hopkins, the first of America’s new Universities, Herbert Baxter Adams observed: “History is past politics and Politics present History.” Similarly, psychology was not distinguished from philosophy until very late in the nineteenth century.

At least in broad terms, it is easy to identify the historical process which generated the beliefs and practices which constituted disciplinary social science. And it is also fairly clear why, once they were articulated and institutionalized in the US, they became the norm, if not always the dominant forms, of institutionalized social science across the globe. As I shall suggest, this was not because once each had articulated a distinctive domain of inquiry, a “scientific” grasp of society became possible. The “superiority” of this arrangement was elsewhere: Indeed, beginning with the political crises of the interwar period, but especially after World War II, American hegemony guaranteed the authority of the Americanized disciplines of the social sciences. But, of course, in the course of the past one hundred years, things have changed. And to anticipate, they may well wither away, as rapidly as they were created and then diffused, becoming for some later century, the equivalent of what alchemy is for us.

How we got to where we are

Two changes of enormous importance were critical to the American institutionalization of the social sciences. First were the new problems created by very rapid industrialization: immigration, urbanization and “the social problem.” Second, usually ignored, was the creation of the modern “research” University, an American innovation on German practice. Universities, of course, had existed in Europe for centuries, but as many observers have noted, “the true ancestor’s of today’s universities are certainly not their medieval precursors.”² Similarly, America had “colleges” but the curriculum was “medieval” and culminated in “moral philosophy,” frequently taught

*Forthcoming in *Futures*.

by the President, who was often a cleric. There was no graduate curriculum. Sensitive to their backwardness, but even more sensitive the potential new roles that a University could play, academic entrepreneurs, working closely with the Rockefellers, Carnegies and Vanderbilts, built what was needed. Shored up by carefully directed violence, racist politics could easily be joined to the politics of economic growth and, in turn, both could be joined to technocratic solutions—solutions to be provided by “experts” As Bledstein put it, “Americans lacked tradition as a source of authority, but they did “not lack ‘science.’”³

Indeed, was social inquiry to be left to the “metaphysical philosophers,” the likes of Henry George, or to dilettantish reformers like Jane Addams or W.E.B. DuBois, or to irresponsible journalists, like Jacob Riis? Surely social problems were as amenable to scientific solutions as any other. And surely, if social scientists were to be professionals, they had to mark out their own scientific territory and establish their own system of credentialing. Remarkably, by 1920, the now familiar ensemble of “disciplines” and PhD programs was substantially in place.⁴

To be sure, the promise of what “science” might contribute to the “controversies” was predictable enough. For example, Professor John Burgess, head of the recently created School of Political Science at Columbia, insisted that immigration should be restricted: “We must preserve our Aryan nationality in the state...” And what of undesirables already in the United States? For Burgess, a step in the right direction would be for “every Irishman to kill a Negro and be hanged for it.”⁵

Indeed, one cannot underestimate the role that “social scientists” played in legitimating beliefs comfortable to the ruling powers. Thorstein Veblen, writing in 1918, saw clearly what was happening. Given the ‘exigencies of competitive academic enterprise in America,’ with “businessmen” as executives of the new universities, there was little choice for even well intended “social scientists.” A consequence was distraction from the goals of science. Veblen held to the old-fashioned idea that social scientific inquiry was “inquiry into the nature and causes, the working and the outcome of [the] institutional apparatus.” But even if this inquiry “should bear no colour of iconoclasm,” its results “will disturb the habitual convictions and preconceptions on which they rest.” So instead, “the putative leaders of science,” “enlarge on the commo nplace,” and “conserve those usages and conventions that have by habit become embedded in the received scheme of use and wont, and so have been found to be good and right.”⁶ The problem was not so much that social scientists were reformers, but that constrained by their pre-possession, a self-imposed image of science and disciplinary fragmentation, they were, in fact, bad scientists.⁷

All of this, however, could be justified as “research.” Indeed, when, in 1929, Herbert Hoover assembled a distinguished group of academicians “to examine the feasibility of a national survey of social trends,” an effort which, after four years, produced 1600 pages of quantitative research, the symbiosis of state, capital and positivist social science was complete. Thenceforth, “researchers” could produce many

tons of “findings,” and there would be little danger that any of it would bear any “colour of iconoclasm.”

The happy state of affairs was propelled by the consensus produced by World War II and by US hegemony following it. Enrollments in higher education exploded, both in the US and elsewhere. “Modernization” projects required “science,” and rebuilding Europeans began to rebuild their universities.⁸ In the US, Cold War concerns produced both funding and rationale for all sorts of new institutes and inquiries, exemplified well enough by CIA funded “Area Studies” and the Center for International Studies (CENIS). Simpson summarizes:

The CENIS recipe—academic prestige, government and foundation funding, assertion of precise scientific authority on social questions and selective purges of dissenting academics—operated with the context of the relative stability of American power at home and abroad. Together, they gave birth to an academic regime in the social sciences that functioned for two decades in the West with little effective challenge.⁹

Then things began to come apart: Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a Birmingham bus, Michael Harrington “discovered” poverty in America, Mario Savio denounced UC Berkeley for serving the needs of capital rather than serving as the conscience of society; the War in Vietnam continued and butter gave way to guns; bras and flags were being burned; hoses, dogs and clubs became prominent instruments of “social control.”

The social sciences were not entirely immune to this. Abstractly speaking, there were three different responses. First, the complacency of the mainstream—defined, e.g., by Daniel Bell’s “End of Ideology”—was undermined. It was clear that the functioning “social system” had broken down, that “the happy robots” and “cultural dopes” (Mills’s and Garfinkel’s characterization, respectively, of Parson’s “actors”) were no longer happy or dopey, that “modernization” had some pitfalls, and that the dreams of W.W. Rostow on the American role in international politics were hallow.¹⁰ But if “theory” became a bit more sensitive, “research” could still continue. Left out of the equation were the attitudes of voters toward social scientific “expertise”—and the potential generosity of the CIA and private foundations. Where, indeed, were these “experts” when we needed them most?

Second, as Bruce Cumings has noted, because of this ferment, there emerged in the 1970s a social science which

met a high standard of quality and relevance. In political science, sociology, and even to some extent economics, political economy became a rubric under which scholars produced a large body of work on the multinational corporation, the global monetary system, the world pool of labor, peripheral dependency, and American hegemony itself.¹¹

Purged or self-censored in the 1950s by McCarthy and HUAC, younger voices rediscovered Marx. Some of the work was, if not Marxist, at least Marxist-inspired. Similarly as regards the explosion in revisionist historical writing. Other work owed to C. Wright Mills and to a re-thinking of the multi-disciplinary approach of Max Weber. And in part because European social science had not become fully Americanized, much of the good work was being done by Europeans, of whom some were then working in the US. But all of it, because it sought to understand the *causes* of institutional outcomes, had a critical edge.¹²

This efflorescence was short-lived. Tolerated, but marginal even during its heyday, the collapse of “actually existing socialism” promoted a retreat for many social scientists who worked in this mode. Worse, it has discouraged younger researchers who might have chosen this mode of inquiry. Today, typically, countless dissertations are ground out either in abstract “theory” (the formalism of “rational choice” or “network” theory) or on “research” which satisfies the strictures of “good science” (as defined by Vienna-inspired empiricism). In contrast to the much more ambitious approaches of political economy, it bears no “colour of iconoclasm.”

A third response was to forswear “meta-narratives” altogether and to settle for “local,” unabashedly parochial “thick descriptions,” “genealogies,” or “deconstructions.” One could, on this style of research, provide “allegories” which examined “texts” (which came to refer to anything which was “meaningful”) from the perspective of the author, who while disclaiming “privilege” nevertheless urged our belief. This “post-modernist” move began in France and was powerfully propelled by the events of 1968. Accordingly, it was part of the vibrant debates in France over Marxism. But for complicated reasons (including the women’s and anti-war movement), it caught fire in the American academy, initially in departments of literature and then in the social sciences where it merged with ideas promoted by philosophers who were rightly critical of mainstream “analytic” philosophy of science and by social theorists who were disenchanted with agentless, quantitative “social research.” As with Marxism, there is an explicit critical dimension to this work—especially pertinent in gender, ethnic and post-colonial studies, but because it so fervently anti-science and so enthusiastically relativist, “post modernism” managed to redefine “the academic left,” further relegating Marxist-inspired work to the dustbin of history.¹³

But there is further consequence: the persistent (and fervent) attacks on science—of which some, indeed, were well placed, contributed mightily to the current de-legitimation of social science, a de-legitimation which should not be underestimated. It hardly matters that within the university, the politically correct posturing of postmodernist thinking never unseated the mainstream, for it is the popular perception that counts. Indeed, the withdrawing of authority from social science was as much the result of the practices and consequences of these practices by mainstream social scientists themselves. We can summarize these under five related headings:

First, social scientists resisted charges that the materials and approaches they used were Eurocentric, race and gender biased. Instead, they accepted efforts on the part

of those who had been left out of the curriculum to create their own units: Black Studies, Women's Studies, Ethnic Studies, etc. The "founders" of these units were "radicals," of course, and as marginalized, they very often were on the extremities of "postmodernist," and sometimes Marxist, theoretical orientations. In this highly politicized environment, both sides suffered, not only in terms of their work, but by giving credence to the fictitious notion that "the tenured radicals" had "corrupted" higher education.¹⁴

Second, they use dull textbooks to "introduce" students to their "disciplines." This had the effect of convincing students that little was to be gained by further study in that discipline—unless perhaps they assumed that it was less challenging than a major in physics and might be vocationally more useful than, say, a degree in literature or philosophy! The required course surely did not help them to read critically their awful daily newspaper (which tells them, e.g., that violent crime is decreasing, that we have "a drug problem" (but not an alcohol problem!) *and* that it is important that the state builds a new prison.)

Third, social scientists produced graduate programs which, typically, required only that students become expertise in a narrowly defined problem. If graduates managed to get work in the academy--which lately they do not, they reproduced themselves, by using a dull textbook in their teaching, and by doing "research" in their narrow specialty, e.g., "corrections," "collective choice," or "voting behavior."

Fourth, they were rewarded with tenure and promotion for papers published in "refereed" journals, preferably the "official" journals of the discipline. Here are some illustrations from the Spring, 2000 issues:

American Political Science Review: "Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflicts"

American Journal of Political Science: Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Role-Call Voting"

American Journal of Sociology: "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organizations, Disruption, Political Mediation and Framing"

American Sociological Review: "The Web of Group Affiliation Revisited: Social Life, Postmodernism and Society"

Sociological Perspectives: "Is there a Supply-Side to Occupational Sex Discrimination? (The regressions suggest that the answer is yes and no, but mostly yes.)

American Economic Review: "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search" (The elaborated mathematical model, "Symmetric Steady-State Equilibrium," of course, makes assumptions which *could* not be realized.)

American Anthropologist: "Having and Holding: Storage Memory, Knowledge and Social Relations"

American Psychologist: "Social Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being"

Psychological Review: "A Model of Response Time Effects in Symbolic

Comparison'

All of these papers have equations, graphs, or tables; most have a “model” and all have ample citations to “the literature.” None of them entail any sort of clear policy choices—and thus tend to reinforce the status quo. Most of them are very hard to read—unless you are a specialist. Symptomatic here of the popular understanding is the attitude of the Chair of the Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, James F. Carlin, who asserted that “at least 50% of the non-hard sciences research on American campuses is a lot of foolishness.”¹⁵ Indeed, that academics are not public intellectuals is also explained at least in part because, even when they have something to say, they say it badly. (There was a time when mainstream sociologists won the prize for bad prose; today it surely is due to all of those in all the disciplines who are enamoured by the jargon and style of postmodernism. Graduate students, of course, have to learn to write the awful prose they write: I do not exclude myself.)

The situation is exacerbated by the proliferation of “professional” journals devoted exclusively to the narrowly focussed interests of “researchers,” including here the many journals created by postmodernists. While this proliferation assists in generating a plausible CV, it further distances academics from citizens as indeed, it distances them from one another, both within and between departments in the university. Of course, if academics rarely appear in the national newspapers, e.g., *The New York Times*, or in journals with large readerships, e.g., *New Yorker*, then other writers will play larger roles in forming public opinion than academics.¹⁶ Thus, e.g., Arthur Sullivan, who worries not at all about his “credentials” and little about his “facts,” periodically offers his (often bizarre) opinions in the *New York Times Magazine* on a variety of socially pertinent topics. And, of course, the relative absence of academics in these venues contributes to the de-legitimation of academic social science. (There are of course, exceptions, e.g., Alan Wolfe, whose musings in the popular media neatly exemplify Veblen’s charge.)

Much of the foregoing leads to the final and perhaps most critical source of de-legitimation: It became clear that the *promise* of the social sciences—that they would provide solutions to the social problems which face us—was not being realized. Given the style of what counted as “research,” this result was, to be sure, to be expected. Consider academic debates over poverty: Is it the result of lack of education? Is it because people are unequally gifted and motivated? Or is it because families fail? Or is it prejudice, in schools and in labor markets? Social scientists cannot agree, even on the fact, plain enough to the ordinary working person, that people are poor *because they can not find a job that pays a living wage*. The difficulty here is just that, in one obvious sense, we all know that the dynamics of capitalism causes poverty. And on the other, if we want to understand *how institutions reproduce it and who ends up being poor*, a holistic, or “multi-disciplinary” approach is required. Hence the power of Michael Harrington’s (now dated, but still illuminating), *The Other America*.

The Upshot

The critical historical processes which explain the genesis of the social sciences in their current form remain the processes which continue to shape them. One hundred years later, capitalism has changed and with it, the university. Neither topic can be treated here, but, again, the general outlines are clear enough.

Global capitalism has generated forms of trans-national capital and competition not known 100 years ago. This undercuts the idea that states can underwrite development by fostering research in the universities, and legitimated by neo-liberal ideology, it promotes the idea that there is a market solution to every problem. Thus, while the state continues to munificently fund “defense” related research, the rate of growth of federal spending for research has fallen steadily. Some of this, to be sure, comes into departments of the social sciences, but, predictably, awards are very specifically conceived and are always in areas where state action seems urgent: e.g., in health, drug and prison policy.

But of even greater importance in terms of the present problem, *corporate spending* in the university is increasing dramatically, from \$850 million in 1985 to \$4.5 billion less than ten years later. Fearful of competition from Japan, Congress encouraged this by passing in 1980 the Bayh-Dole act. It enables universities to patent and license campus-based inventions to US-based corporations. Thus, before Bayh-Dole, some 250 patents were annually produced by universities. After Bayh-Dole, the number had jumped to 4800. And, not only does this money come with strings attached, but almost none of this goes to the social sciences. Most of it, predictably, goes to bio-tech research and technological transfer, and most of the rest to business. Thus, the Haas School of Business at Berkeley is “plastered with corporate logos.”¹⁷ The university has always been an aspect of the “mode of production,” but “flexible accumulation” calls for very different sorts of “expertise” than what was called for during the earlier stages of capitalist industrialization. A good book on this topic is sorely needed.

A second factor, propelled by the first, is the fact that higher education is no longer affordable. Tuition in private schools is already astronomical, even with the large federal and private support flowing to private schools. And as the president emeritus of the University Michigan noted, “We used to be state-supported, then state-assisted, and now state-located.”¹⁸ In the decade of the 90s, higher education was the “biggest loser in state budget battles,” even as costs were increasing. Capitulating to neo-liberalist ideology, “autonomy” was the answer: Let the public universities control their monies—and let them find them—from corporations, grantors, students, anybody but legislatures. A consequence was accelerated tuition increases.¹⁹ Another was pressure on administrators to establish priorities. Inevitably, the losers are just those disciplines which find it difficult to legitimate their existence. It is not clear who is worse off between the humanities, including instruction in foreign languages, and especially the more esoteric languages, and the social sciences—especially those which lack both a vocal constituency and direct applied components.²⁰

Finally, and not unrelated to the foregoing, the new technologies have enabled new forms of competition for the established institutions of higher learning. The largest

private university in the United States with some 40,000 students is the University of Phoenix. It does need a campus and is not a place “to discover the eternal verities of the Western tradition.” It offers BAs, but these are almost entirely in directly vocationally oriented fields. Obviously, these new players are putting increasing pressure on administrators to respond—and this process has just begun. Indeed, there was a time when academics could pretty much dictate the content of higher education. That began to change, as noted, when the university became a critical aspect of the modern mode of production. During the heyday of the modern university, in the three decades following the Second World War, the university was a “multi-versity” which tried to be all things to all people. That is no longer possible. It is now demand-driven in ways that were inconceivable even ten years ago. Faculty have always complained about the lack of motivation, or of skills, of their students. But the problem is no longer the fraternity and “the gentlemen’s C.” Students who work to pay their way want a good job and they assume, rightly or wrongly, that a credential is the surest route. They are impatient and hard to convince that what we offer in the way of general knowledge is useful, including, or perhaps especially including, what is provided by their dull textbooks in disciplinary social science.

Zygmunt Bauman has offered an analysis of a more general crisis of intellectuals, typified by postmodernity, in which the kinds of “services” that intellectuals were best prepared to provide are no longer either easy to provide or in demand. “The services in question amount to the provision of an authoritative solution to the questions of cognitive truth, moral judgment and aesthetic taste.”²¹ Whether or not this broad claim can be sustained, it has particular poignancy as regards the social sciences. He suggests that the situation represents “an unprecedented challenge,” and offers that “while in no way doomed, [sociology and social philosophy] must adjust itself to new conditions in order to self-reproduce.” He argues, rightly, that neither of two previously attempted “meliorative” strategies will succeed, the idea that “reliable knowledge” can be provided which enables individuals to act “rationally,” or that such knowledge can be produced which enables the state “to impress a design of a better reality upon an imperfect reality.” Indeed, not even orthodox Marxist believe this any longer!

He suggests three options: the first, postmodern, offers that we become masters in “the skill of interpretation.” But what indeed of our status as “scientists”? The second, also postmodern, seems attractive: “If what sociology does does not matter, it can do whatever it likes,” the equivalent of *l’art pour l’art*.” But if so, does Bauman confuse “can” and “may”? There is a third route, then, a task which was discerned by C. Wright Mills: social science would aim at “making the opaque transparent, on exposing the ties linking visible biographies to invisible societal processes, on understanding what makes society tick, in order to make it tick, if possible, in a more ‘emancipating’ way.” With this last, I must heartily agree; but, sadly, we need then to ask: Who will pay us to do any of these?

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ENDNOTES

¹ What follows draws from my *A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987. I make no pretense here of any sort of comparative account, either of conditions preceding the institutionalization of the social sciences around the globe nor of present arrangements across the globe. For discussion of the different historical experiences of European social science, see Wagner, Peter, Wittrock, Bjorn, and Richard Whitely (eds.), *Discourses on Society: The Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines*, Sociology of the Science Yearbook, Vol. XV, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, especially, perhaps the fine summary essay by Wagner and Wittrock, "States, Institutions, Discourses: A Comparative Perspective on the Structuration of the Social Sciences," in Wagner et al, *ibid.*, pp. 331-358. The volume treats nineteenth century European differences well, but no effort was made to examine traditions elsewhere. Historically rooted differences remain in contemporary practices in European social science, e.g., in the absence of a separate faculty for the social sciences in France, or in the French admixture of neo-classical theory and engineering in economic science. A *license* degree in economics was not created until 1958.

² See Wittrock, Bjorn, "The Modern University: The Three Transformations," in Rothblatt, Sheldon and Bjorn Wittrock (eds.) *The European and American University Since 1800: Historical and Sociological Essays*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

³ Bledstein, Burton. *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1976; See also, Hofstadter, Richard. *The Age of Reform*, Knopf, New York, 1955.

⁴ See also Ross, Dorothy. *The Origins of American Social Science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. While her explanations suffer, she confirms my claims that disciplinary social science was an American invention, that special circumstances in America enabled this and that these "sciences" were constituted in positivist terms, serving both technocratic interests and ideology (p. 472).

⁵ Quoted from Herbst, Jurgen. *The German Historical School in American Scholarship*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1965, p. 121f. See Burgess, John. *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, 1890, "The Ideal of the American Commonwealth, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1895, and "Some Impressions of the United States," *Fortnightly Review*, 1882. By the 1920s, to be sure, race issues could be best handled by ignoring them. More generally, a stance of political neutrality guaranteed both "science" and legitimation of the status quo. See note 7.

⁶ Veblen, Thorstein. *The Higher Learning in America: A memorandum on the conduct of universities by businessmen*, Sagamore, New York, 1957., pp. 132, 136.

⁷ A third condition of some consequence as regards the shape of the new disciplines in social science was the ability to appropriate a distinctly "positivist" conception of science. It put a premium on "facts" (freed of "values") and on "prediction and control." I develop this in my *History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences*.

⁸ The effects on social science practices of Americanization in the "developing world" have not, to my knowledge, been systematically examined. For Korea, see Kim, Hyung-chan, "The Americanization of Higher Education in Korea." In Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seong Hyong Lee, eds. *Forty Years of Korea-U.S. Relations, 1948-1988*, Kyung Hee University Press, Seoul, 1990.

⁹ Simpson, Christopher. "Universities, Empire and the Production of Knowledge: An Introduction." In Simpson. *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, The Free Press, New York, 1998, p. xxii. See also, Chomsky, Noam et al. *The Cold War and the University: Towards an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, Free Press, New York, 1997.

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- ¹⁰ See Milligan, Max A. and Walt W. Rostow. "Notes on American Foreign Policy" (1954), in Simpson. *Universities and Empire*, pp. 39-56.
- ¹¹ Cumings, Bruce. "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War." In Simpson, ed., *Universities and Empire*, p. 180.
- ¹² To be sure, from its beginnings, there were dissenting voices, even in the academy, promoting different conceptions of the human sciences. See my *A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences* and Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*.
- ¹³ See Gross, Paul and Norman Levitt. *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1998; McLaren, Peter and Ramin Faramandpur. "Reconsidering Marx in Post-Marxist Times: A Requiem for Postmodernism?" *Educational Researcher*, April 2000, 19 (3). 25-33.
- ¹⁴ For example, Roger Kimball's *Tenured Radicals: How Politics has Corrupted Higher Education*, New York, Harper and Row, 1990;
- ¹⁵ *New York Times*, 5 January 1998.
- ¹⁶ See Jacoby, Russell, . *The Last Intellectuals*, Basic Books, New York, 2000.
- ¹⁷ I draw on Press, Eyal, and Jennifer Washburn, "The Kept University," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 2000, available online at: www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/2000/03/press.htm. As Press and Washburn note, federal funding for research totaled \$31 million in 1940 and was \$3 billion in 1979. This included money dispensed to the NIH and other agencies; but they are bit nostalgic in holding that this largess represented "a growing appreciation for the basic, undirected research that universities perform." But this is an excellent essay and neither writer, predictably, is an academic.
- ¹⁸ Quoted from Breneman, David W. "The 'Privatization' of Public Universities: Mistake or Model?" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 7 March 1997; Sue Hasbrouck, "To the Editor," *ibid.*, 25 April 1997. State support at Ann Arbor is but 10% of the total budget; 13% at Virginia,
- ¹⁹ See Carnavale, Dan. "Legislatures and Public Colleges Wrangle Over Tuition and Fees," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 10 September 1999. Breneman, *op. cit.*, notes that replacing the loss from state funds at Virginia would require a 130% increase in tuition.
- ²⁰ For example, at Michigan, the Dean of the Graduate School argued that "we need to think about [investment in the next generation of academics] in different ways." On condition that the department funds would not be cut, Romance languages, Psychology, Sociology and History agreed to restrict admissions. See Magner, Denise, K. "Doctoral Programs Decide that Smaller is Better," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 26 February 1999. \
- ²¹ Bauman, Zygmunt. "Is There a Postmodern Sociology"?. reprinted in Seidman, Steven (ed.). *The Postmodern Turn*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, 187-204. For a far better account of "the postmodern condition," see Harvey, David. *The Postmodern Condition*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.